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Abstract 
This thesis looked at traffic crashes in the emirate of Dubai in the United Arab 
Emirates (UAE) to establish the current situation in road safety and ways of 
improving it. A global overview of road safety literature revealed that standards 
of road safety vary widely by region. Key indicators like fatality rate and risk 
(Jacobs et al, 2000) were found to be higher in most neighbouring Gulf 
Cooperative Council (GCC) countries (10-25 fatalities/100,000 pop., 3-5 
fatalities/10,000 motor vehicles) than in the best-performing Western countries 
(6 fatalities/100,000 pop., 1 fatality/10,000 motor vehicles).  
Interventions and countermeasures to tackle specific road safety issues were 
reviewed from international studies. Countermeasures were chosen with 
consideration for the local situation in Dubai within the categories of Human, 
Environmental and Vehicle factors. Examples of selected measures include 
offending driver punishment (Human), Electronic Stability Control (Vehicle) and 
central barriers (Environment). These measures were mostly studied in 
different environments to those in Dubai so the aspect of knowledge transfer 
between areas of different cultural and environmental conditions was 
discussed.  
Data from real world injury crashes (as collected by Dubai Police and the 
Roads & Transport Authority) over twelve years (1995 – 2006) were subject to 
macroanalysis in SPSS to identify the main issues over the past decade. 
18,142 crashes involving 30,942 casualties and 48,960 vehicles were analysed 
at the outset. The following issues were among the main concerns:  
- High proportion of fatal crashes out of all injury crashes (13.5% compared to 
1.4% in the UK);  
- Most fatal crashes involved a single vehicle hitting a pedestrian;  
- Most injury crashes involved a single vehicle;  
- Inconsiderate driving was the most common crash cause cited by the police.  
Countermeasures found in the literature to counteract these problems were 
then suggested for application and the estimated savings from applying them 
were calculated. Savings were quantified as either reductions in casualties or 
injury crashes. Furthermore, cost savings for the calculated reductions were 
estimated using existing UK crash costs due to the scarcity of UAE crash cost 
estimates. Calculation of the estimated improvement in safety if these 
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countermeasures were applied retrospectively meant a reduction of 4,634 
injury crashes and 1,555 casualties over the 12-year period with an estimated 
cost saving of approximately £368 million or 2.7 billion Dirhams. 
To refine this method more detailed data on crashes were required and 
collected from the dedicated crash investigation team files in Dubai Police for 
2006 and part of 2007. This new dataset (300 crashes) was put into a purpose-
built database with over 140 fields and subject to microanalysis to more 
accurately match the problems and interventions. Six interventions were 
matched to individual cases in the database where they would have positively 
altered the outcome. This process was verified by independent crash experts 
and investigators. The benefits from these six countermeasures were then 
weighted to calculate the benefits for the whole crash population over a year. 
Examples of specific interventions included guardrails along the roadside; 
grade-separated crossing facilities for pedestrians; Electronic Stability Control 
and speed cameras. The estimated total reduction in crashes was 2,412 
annually with calculated savings of £40 million or 280 million Dirhams. 
This was the first time this geographical area was studied in such depth and 
detail to allow the calculation of benefits from interventions matched to known 
road safety issues. Various limitations were encountered such as the 
unavailability of GIS basemaps and the continuously changing infrastructure 
and population of Dubai. Numerous areas of further work were identified. Such 
work areas include hospital studies for collecting injury data to compare with 
police data; changing vehicle standards so that they are better suited to local 
crash types; the calculation of crash and injury costs based on local figures; 
vehicle fleet analysis for comparing different vehicle segments and exposure; 
and improved data collection and storage methods. 
 
Keywords: Crashes; Accidents; Traffic; Road Safety; UAE; Dubai; 
Strategy; Pedestrian Safety; Vehicle Safety; Speeding; Injury Prevention 
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"Do not kill yourselves nor kill one another. Surely, Allah is Most Merciful to 
you" Surah An-Nisa (4:29), The Holy Quran. 
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Chapter 1  Global Assessment of Road Traffic Injuries 
1.1 Introduction  
Human beings have been mobile creatures since times ancient. Mobility is 
utilised for recreation, food gathering and hunting, avoiding danger and 
generally staying alive. Their modes of travel however have changed 
somewhat over the years as have the merits (and hazards) of different modes 
of travel. Humans were not equipped to travel unaided at speeds greater than 
10 km/hr. The reaction times needed and the low tolerance to impact at higher 
speeds hinder the fast human being. This chapter presents the background to 
the challenge of counting and managing road traffic injuries around the world. 
It demonstrates different ways of measuring the damage caused by poor road 
safety both in economic and lost output measures. 
1.2 Human tolerance to injury 
Humans are mostly capable of reacting to dangers and changes in their 
surroundings in a timely manner and changing direction or speed of travel 
while walking to accommodate or avoid those dangers. This ability decreases 
as speed increases (generally above 5-10 km/h); even riding a bicycle can be 
challenging at speed. A car that goes at many times that speed is even more 
challenging to human tolerances. 
“Travel hazards changed completely after the invention of the automobile in the 
second part of the 19th century. On July 3rd 1886 Carl Benz in Mannheim was the first 
person driving in public…The maximum velocity of this 3-wheel vehicle was 15 km/hr. 
Twenty years later the maximum vehicle speed increased already to close to 100 
km/hr. Due to higher vehicle speeds, but more important due to the larger speed 
differences between various means of transport, the first traffic crashes occurred. The 
increasing motorisation generated mobility and consequently more people were 
exposed to risk.” (Wismans et al, 1994). 
In the first half of the 20th century literature on the subject of road crashes and 
related studies was scarce (Mackay, 1965). In 1917 in North America Hugh 
De Haven survived a military aircraft crash (De Haven, 2000). This led him to 
develop an interest in morbidity and mortality from crashes and the human 
body’s tolerance to impact. The other cadets involved in the crash did not 
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survive according to one narration of the story (Hess et al, 1982). The 
prevailing attitude at the time was: 
“Flying was dangerous and the best way to prevent injuries was to stay 
on the ground.”∗ 
De Haven persisted, conducting a study of survival in falls from height (started 
in 1938) to prove that the fragile human body had more tolerance to severe 
deceleration than previously thought possible (De Haven, 1942). This was 
further proven by rocket-fired sled tests conducted by John Stapp on monkeys 
and subsequently on his own body (Stapp, 1957) that showed the human 
body could tolerate deceleration of 50g’s for very brief periods of time (50 
times the acceleration due to gravity). The work of these pioneers paved the 
way for understanding and managing injurious forces on the human body in 
future decades. 
1.3 Describing the problem of road safety on a global scale 
From the first recorded fatality due to a motor vehicle in New York on 13 
September 1889 (Wagner et al, 1997) the number of people involved in motor 
crashes has increased enormously. One estimate puts the cumulative total of 
deaths due to road crashes up to 1997 at 25 million (Faith, 1997). In Europe 
and North America (UNECE countries – United Nations Economic 
Commission for Europe, see Appendix A) the number of people injured in 
road crashes in 2003 was around 5 million. The number killed in the same 
year was around 140,000 (UNECE, 2005).  
The definition of a road fatality is not universal but one commonly used is that 
of the Convention of Road Traffic (UNECE, 1968) where a person dies from 
an injury suffered in a road crash within 30 days of the crash. This includes 
vehicle occupants as well as other road users like pedestrians and cyclists. 
Global estimates of annual road fatalities for 1999 (Jacobs et al, 2000) by TRL 
for countries that record this data show at least half a million recorded 
fatalities occur annually on roads, even more if adjusted for under-reporting 
(table 1). 
 
                                            
∗ Words of De Haven’s commanding officer when told that “luck could be changed by better 
engineering and design” (Horsch et al, 1991). 
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The following table shows global estimates made using an adjustment factor 
to bring the figures from countries without a 30-day-definition into line. One 
final adjustment was made for under-reporting with the factor estimated to 
affect 2-5 per cent of HMC figures and 25-50 per cent of LMCs though how 
this figure was arrived at is not explained in the study. 
Table 2: 1999 upper and lower fatality estimates and 30-day adjustment 
    
1999 inc. 30-day 
adjustment
1999 lower under-
reporting estimate
1999 upper under-
reporting estimate
HMC  105,654 107,767 110,937
Africa  67,067 83,834 100,600
Central-Eastern Europe 73,071 91,339 109,607
Asia-Pacific 262,666 328,332 393,999
Latin/Central America & 
Caribbean 74,404 93,005 111,606
Middle East 33,194 41,492 49,790
Global   616,056 745,769 876,539
   Source: Jacobs et al, 2000
The World Health Organisation (WHO) has a higher global estimate at 1.18 
million in 1998 but this has come under scrutiny because in some cases it 
was based on less than ideal projections (Jacobs et al, 2000): 
“…estimates for the entire region of sub-Saharan Africa were based only on South 
Africa which in turn represented only about 1 per cent of the region’s population 
(Cooper et al, 1998)”. 
To put things in perspective the global estimate of deaths from all causes in 
2001 was 56 million (Lopez et al, 2006) so road fatalities made up about 2.1% 
of the total every year (Peden at al, 2004). This is not a large percentage but 
this must not undermine the subject matter of this topic which still directly 
concerns millions of people. In the same year the number of people injured in 
Table 1: 1999 Minimum fatality estimates for countries with data 
    1996 reported 1999 estimated
1999 inc. non-
reporting estimates
HMC  100,116 98,822 98,834
Africa  38,492 40,769 58,319
Central-Eastern Europe* 58,612 60,051 63,540
Asia-Pacific 204,379 226,663 228,405
Latin/Central America & Caribbean 58,484 61,318 64,700
Middle East 20,225 25,462 28,865
Global   480,308 513,085 542,663
*Higher regional growth rate 
applied  Source: Jacobs et al, 2000
 18
road trauma was estimated at 50 million (Peden et al, 2004). Those injured in 
road crashes suffer numerous after-effects from their experience both 
immediately after injury and later on in life. The impact on victims’ quality of 
life has been the subject of extensive study (Barnes, 2006). Indirectly it affects 
far larger numbers. This appears in the literature to be the upper range of the 
global impact of road-related deaths as the global percentage works out at 1.3 
– 1.5% using the more conservative TRL estimates.  
1.4 Global Burden of Disease (GBD) study 
The study in which the former estimate was made was part of a framework 
entitled the Global Burden of Disease (GBD) study which began with a 
publication in 1992 (World Bank, 1993) and with updated publications since 
then (Murray & Lopez, 1994 & 1996, 1997a,b,c; Lopez et al, 2006). Projected 
estimates continued to the year 2020 (Murray & Lopez, 1997d). Among the 
other important calculations which highlight how this problem may develop in 
the coming decades was a ranking of the leading causes of mortality 
worldwide in 1990, when road traffic crashes ranked 9th and in 2020 where 
the ranking is projected to rise to 6th. This may be attributed to a number of 
factors that relate to the LMCs in particular. A key factor is the expected rise 
in population in the increasingly prosperous economies of countries like China 
and India which leads to increased exposure to transport and the risks 
associated with it. Another important factor is the expected rise in the number 
of motor vehicles in use as economic development in these regions leads to 
motorised transport becoming more accessible to a larger section of the 
population. This increased use of motor vehicles will expose this larger 
section of the population to the risks associated with transport and road use. 
Another worrying estimate that takes into account the wider impact of traffic 
injuries on human life uses Disability-Adjusted Life Years or DALYs (Murray & 
Lopez, 1997d). DALYs are defined as the sum of the years of life lost due to 
premature mortality (YLL) in the population and the years lost due to disability 
(YLD) for incident cases of the health condition (WHO, 2006). 
Estimates made by Murray & Lopez using DALYs showed that road deaths 
would be the 3rd leading cause of loss of these “life years” worldwide by 2020 
and the 2nd if looking at developing regions only. The leading cause of life-
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years lost was estimated to be ischaemic heart disease (that caused by low 
blood supply). These calculations make this subject a primary area of 
research and investigation. 
1.4.1 GBD shortcomings 
DALYs have been used in the GBD study since the start and have developed 
with it but the valuation protocols have changed over the years (Nord, 2002). 
The methodology used to assign weightings to different diseases have been 
criticised as flawed in their conception (Anand & Hanson, 1997). Some of the 
many assumptions which make the measure an estimate at best are life 
expectancy (80 years for males, 82.5 for females) which assumes that if 
health improves alone it will lead to this “maximum” value not taking into 
consideration other factors such as nutrition, wealth and economic activity. 
The calculated loss in earnings of a road crash victim who has become 
disabled will vary according to the life expectancy so the earnings for a 65-
year life expectancy might be less than those for an 82-year life expectancy 
(Anand & Hanson, 1997). These factors combine to weaken the estimate and 
cast doubt on its accuracy. 
1.5 The multiple dimensions to the problem 
Every road traffic crash has many outcomes, not limited to the harm and injury 
caused, which will be discussed in the next section. There are associated 
costs and losses involved both direct and indirect. Direct costs include the 
costs of healthcare; rehabilitation; repairing infrastructure damage and 
repairing damage to the vehicles involved; while indirect costs include the 
value of lost earnings for survivors and those supported by them (Peden, 
2004). 
1.5.1 High economic costs 
TRL estimates (Jacobs et al, 2000) of global economic costs for road traffic 
crashes range from 1% for developing countries to 1.5% in transitional 
countries to 2% in highly motorised countries as a percentage of Gross 
National Product (GNP). These estimates divided countries according to their 
level of “motorisation”. Motorisation was devised as a measure to differentiate 
the extent of motor vehicle use in a population. It was often measured by the 
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number of vehicles per population (normally vehicles/1,000 population). The 
Transport Research Laboratory (Jacobs & Aeron-Thomas, 2000) classified 
HMCs (Highly Motorised Countries) as those in North America, Australia, New 
Zealand, Japan and Western Europe. LMCs (Less Motorised Countries) were 
classed as those in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA); Latin/Central 
America and the Caribbean (LAC); Central and Eastern Europe (CEE); 
Asia/Pacific and Africa. 
Older literature mentions no less than six different methods for economic 
valuation of crashes (Hills & Jones-Lee, 1981). More recently three main 
costing methods were mentioned by Jacobs and others as suitable and 
relevant to road crashes. These may be broadly defined as (Jacobs et al, 
2000): 
“(1) the ‘gross output’ or ‘human capital’ (HC) method (well suited to the objective of 
maximising the wealth of a country); and 
(2) The ‘willingness to pay’ (WTP) method (especially used for social welfare 
maximisation and for cost-benefit analyses).” 
(3) The “cost of restitution”, was mentioned by Krupp (Elvik, 1995) and is understood to 
mean the direct costs of a crash only. 
TRL workers and the UK Department for Transport (DfT) favour the second 
approach where possible (DfT, 2007b) if the costs are intended to be used in 
cost benefit analysis. This was only available for HMCs. The first method is 
still used due to lack of empirical data for the second method in Asian and 
African countries for the estimates mentioned previously. Other studies deal 
with the subject of costing in more detail (Elvik, 1995 & TRL, 1995) and 
methods were expected to continue to change with the progress of time and 
Table 3: Road crash costs by region (US$ billion)   
  Estimated annual crash costs 
Region   Regional GNP 1997 GNP Cost
Africa  370 1% 3.7
Asia  2,454 1% 24.5
Latin 
America/Caribbean 1,890 1% 18.9
Middle East 495 1.5% 7.4
Central & Eastern 
Europe 659 1.5% 9.9
Sub total  5,615  64.5
Highly motorised 
countries 22,665 2% 453.3
Total       517.8
   Source: Jacobs et al, 2000
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availability of data especially in developing countries. This presents a problem 
with the validity of comparisons between different regions if the costing 
method used is different. With current data availability it is not possible to 
unify the costing procedure and results. The cost figures used to estimate 
savings later on in the thesis are taken from UK costings which are in turn 
based on the Willingness To Pay method as mentioned earlier. 
1.6 Regional divisions and estimates of road crashes & 
injuries  
The World Bank divides the world into 8 regions (World Bank, 1993): sub-
Saharan Africa; India; China; other Asia and islands; Latin America and the 
Caribbean; Middle Eastern crescent; formerly socialist economies of Europe; 
and established market economies (mainly OECD countries, Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development). These were abbreviated in 
appendix A. For simplicity the data from two groups only will be reviewed 
according to the division of HMC/LMC. 
Vital registration information (births and deaths) is recorded to varying 
degrees in these regions, and this forms the basis to forming the picture of the 
global impact of road-related deaths. According to the WHO (Mathers et al, 
2005) only 115 countries collect this vital data. Out of these only 64 are 
considered to have complete data. Some developing countries with large 
populations employ sample registration techniques - like India and China - as 
representative of the whole population. This is due to the difficulty of 
implementing a complete registration system due to cost and lack of adequate 
staff training or supporting legislation. Overall there is a long way to go for 
many countries to implement vital registration systems to enable good data 
collection on mortality (Sibai, 2004). 
1.6.1 Problems with global figures 
There are three main problems of difference and under-recording between 
country’s figures mainly due to differences of definition. While 30 days after a 
crash is a typical cut-off for reporting a fatality some countries use other time 
periods like 24 hours, 3 days, 4 months and so on. The definition of a crash is 
another grey area as some countries do not report deaths at road works or 
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side streets so the numbers reported by the health authorities are more 
accurate (Jacobs et al, 2000). The final problem found by the TRL workers is 
that of updating and transferring records of fatality data especially in 
developing countries. This means the data might be altered or some 
significant portions might go missing in between the points where they are 
manually recorded and when finally inputted into the national system. 
Campbell (Johnston et al, 1998) described the many complexities faced in 
international comparisons along with some crash rates that can be used as 
measures of severity: 
1. Crashes per vehicle kilometre of exposure 
2. Crashes per passenger kilometre of exposure 
3. Crashes per hour of exposure 
4. Crashes per number of trips 
5. Crashes per number of participants 
6. Crashes per population regardless of individual exposure, and 
7. Fatal or injury crashes per total number of crashes. 
 
1.6.2 Economic cost estimates in HMCs 
Elvik (1995) carried out an evaluation based on official country data for 20 
HMCs and the costs of traffic crash fatalities varied greatly between countries 
(Table 4). The total costs were made up of three elements: direct costs, lost 
productive capacity and lost quality of life. Direct costs made up the smallest 
element of total costs (except for New Zealand where no figure was provided). 
The indirect costs of crashes made up the largest element of the economic 
valuations. Values of the quality of life lost were not available in a number of 
countries. The greatest total costs were found in Switzerland and the United 
States. 
Estimates of road crash costs were collected from various sources reflecting 
the huge costs incurred. In the United States the estimated cost is US$ 230.6 
billion annually (Blincoe et al, 2002) while in the EU the cost is put at €180 
billion (ETSC, 1997 & 2003).  
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Table 4: Official economic valuation of a traffic crash fatality in 20 
motorised countries in 1991. Norwegian currency* 
  Amount in million Norwegian kroner 1991 
Country   Lost productive capacity Direct costs Lost quality of life Total costs 
Australia  2.79 0.05 - 2.84
Austria  4.84 0.03 - 4.87
Belgium  3.13 0.03 0.12 3.28
Denmark  1.68 0.04 3.44 5.16
Finland  4.51 0.01 7.11 11.63
France  1.78 0.02 0.13 1.93
Germany  5.50 0.01 - 5.51
Great Britain 0.55 0.01 7.28 7.84
Japan  3.97 0.27 - 4.24
Netherlands 0.87 0.00 - 0.87
New Zealand 0.00 0.05 6.28 6.33
Norway  2.68 0.07 - 2.75
Portugal  1.85 0.00 - 1.85
Spain  0.93 0.00 0.48 1.41
Sweden  1.00 0.05 10.55 11.60
Switzerland 6.71 0.04 11.05 17.80
United States 3.82 0.94 12.80 17.56
- = This cost item is not included in national cost estimates.  
*Currency conversion factor, May 1994: 1US$ = 0.139Kr Source: Elvik, 1995
As a percentage of GNP in the UK they cost 0.5% and in Sweden 0.9% (often 
seen as the best-performing countries in that region in the field of road 
safety). In countries with a poorer road safety record they are notably higher 
like Italy at 2.8% and the USA at 2.0% (see table 5, Elvik, 2000).  
1.6.3 Economic cost estimates in LMCs 
In China, the “estimated annual economic cost of injury (including traffic-
related) is equivalent to US$12.5 billion, almost four times the total public 
health services budget of China”  in 1998 (Zhou et al, 2003). In Saudi Arabia 
in the early 1980s the daily cost of traffic fatalities and their management was 
put at around on US$1 million (Bener & Jadaan, 1992). 
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Table 5: Recent crash cost estimates from LMCs 
 
Key to table: HC: Human Capital. LAC: Latin American Countries. MENA: Middle East & 
North Africa. 
1.7 Comparing fatality rate and fatality risk 
Risk is a term that can take on different meanings depending on the context 
and purpose at hand (Fischhoff et al, 1984). One definition of risk in the traffic 
safety field is the possibility of an unwanted event (Elvik & Vaa, 2004). Two 
calculated measures that are often used to make comparisons between 
different regions easier are those of fatality risk and rate (Jacobs et al, 2000, 
Kopits & Cropper, 2003). There are different definitions of risk in the literature. 
In this research, when “fatality risk” is used it means the risk to the general 
population of dying in a road crash and is often measured in numbers per 
100,000 units of population. Fatality rate on the other hand is the number of 
fatalities per 10,000 motor vehicles.  
The term “motor vehicle” or MV is used to include motorised modes of 
transport such as saloon cars, buses, heavy goods vehicles and motorcycles 
(except where a certain type is excluded as shown at the foot of some tables). 
Exposure of the population to travel (Chapman, 1973; Elvik & Vaa, 2004) is 
another important element in consideration of such figures as risk changes 
with exposure. If there are two identical countries with an identical number of 
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MVs and every vehicle in country A undertakes 7 journeys a week of the 
same length, while every vehicle in country B undertakes 14 journeys a week 
then the exposure of the population to vehicles in country B is clearly greater 
all other things being equal.  
Table 6 shows the road safety situation using some key indicators in HMCs in 
1974. The majority of countries have fatality risks between 13 and 30 
(fatalities per 100,000 population) and fatality rates (fatalities per 10,000 MVs) 
show a greater variation ranging from 3 to 24. The highest reported 
motorisation at the time was found in Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the 
USA. The lowest motorisation was in Eastern European countries (Hungary 
and Poland). The fatality risk appears independent of motorisation levels with 
the lowest risk evident in Western and Northern Europe (Great Britain, 
Table 6: 1974 Motorisation, fatality rates & risks in some highly 
motorised countries 
Country 
Vehicles per 
100,000 population 
Road deaths per 
100,000 population 
(Risk) 
Road deaths per 
10,000 vehicles 
(Rate) 
Great Britain 32 13 4 
Australia 47* 27 6* 
Austria 31 33 11 
Belgium 34 27 8 
Canada 45 28 6 
Denmark 33* 15 5* 
Fed. Rep. Germany 33 24 7 
Finland 28 18 7 
France 42 28 7 
German Dem. Rep. 31 13 4 
Hungary 13 17 13 
Irish Rep. 19 19 10 
Italy 36 18 5 
Japan 33 14 4 
Luxembourg (1973) 41 31 8 
Netherlands 41 19 6 
New Zealand 49 22 5 
Norway 30 13 4 
Poland 10 15 15 
Portugal 12* 28 24* 
Spain (1973) 17 18 10 
Sweden 35* 15 4* 
Switzerland 41 21 5 
United States of 
America 61 21 3 
*figures exclude 
mopeds   Source: DfT 1977
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Germany and Norway) and Japan. Fatality rates were also lowest in those 
countries in addition to Sweden and the United States of America.  
Table 7: 2004 Motorisation, fatality rate & risk in some highly 
motorised countries 
Country 
Motor vehicles 
per 1,000 
population*  
Road deaths per 
100,000 
population (Risk) 
Road deaths per 
10,000 vehicles* 
(Rate) 
Australia 673 7.9 1.0 
Austria 637 10.7 1.7 
Belgium 583 11.2 1.9 
Denmark 467 6.8 1.5 
Finland 528 7.2 1.4 
France 615 9.2 1.5 
Germany 655 7.1 1.1 
Hungary 327 12.8 3.9 
Italy 745 9.7 1.3 
Japan 636 6.7 1.0 
Luxembourg 794 11.1 1.4 
Netherlands 522 4.9 0.9 
New Zealand 719 10.7 1.5 
Norway 625 5.7 0.9 
Poland 437 15.0 3.4 
Portugal 510 12.3 2.4 
Spain 614 11.0 1.8 
Sweden 563 5.3 0.9 
Switzerland 675 6.9 6.9 
United Kingdom 552 5.6 1.0 
*Excluding mopeds   Source: DfT 2006b 
Table 7 shows how the situation changed for a similar group of countries in 
2004. Virtually all countries have reduced both fatality risk and rate (with the 
exception of Poland) in some cases to less than a quarter of the original 
figures while motorisation increased manifold. Before any comparison can be 
made it cannot be assumed that the 1974 and 2004 figures are directly 
comparable or contain the same types and range of errors or inaccuracies but 
they provide a general view of improvement over time. Early figures for 
fatalities in LMCs are even more difficult to come by and less likely to be 
accurate if the level of development of the nations they were gathered from is 
taken into account but more recent statistics are available as shown in table 8.   
The variation between different countries is large and gives a worrying outlook 
for the future. If populous countries such as China and India were to reach the 
level of motorisation of HMCs without the single-digit fatality rate then the 
fatality rate may rise along with motorisation (as has been shown from the 
sample of countries in the previous two tables). 
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Projected estimates of fatalities using fixed effect models made by a World 
Bank funded study (Kopits & Cropper, 2003) based on economic growth 
predicted a 66% increase in the global road death toll between 2000 and 
2020. Most of the rise is expected to come from LMCs while HMCs are 
expected to witness a decrease in road deaths if the current trends continue 
and no drastic changes occur. This will likely mean a reversal of the current 
situation where the regions with the most MVs account for the least proportion 
of fatalities and those with the least MVs account for most of the fatalities 
worldwide. As car ownership levels rise in the previous LMCs and they join 
the HMC’s group they will account for both the largest proportion of MVs and 
Table 8: Motorisation, fatality rate & risk for selected years in some 
Less Motorised Countries (LMC’s) 
Country 
Motor vehicles 
per 1,000 
population 
Road deaths per 
100,000 population 
(Risk) 
Road deaths per 10,000 
vehicles (Rate) 
Bangladesh 
(1996) 3.8 1.7 44.5 
China (1995) 22.5 5.9 26.1 
India (1995) 31.2 6.3 20.3 
Pakistan (1996) 18.4 3.2 17.4 
Turkey (1996) 82.7 8.7 10.5 
       
Albania (1996) 32.4 7.8 24.1 
Bulgaria (1996) 296.5 12.1 4.1 
Kazakhstan 
(1996) 81.5 16.6 20.4 
Poland (1996) 291.3 16.5 5.7 
Romania (1996) 139.2 12.6 9 
        
Argentina (1996) 154.7 18.4 11.9 
Brazil (1996) 161.6 16.7 10.3 
Cuba (1996) 64.1 12.9 20.2 
Mexico (1995) 142.8 3.6 2.6 
Paraguay (1995) 51 2 3.9 
        
Kenya (1993) 14.3 9.2 64.3 
Malawi (1996) 5.6 10.9 193.2 
Nigeria (1993) 12 7.8 65 
Tanzania (1994) 4.6 5.1 111.4 
        
Egypt (1994) 37.2 7.4 20 
Iran (1995) 80.8 4.7 5.9 
Saudi Arabia 
(1994) 151.9 21 13.9 
Yemen (1996) 33.9 8 23.7 
      Source: Jacobs et al 2000
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fatalities worldwide which is a worrying prospect for all the parties involved in 
road safety.  
The Middle-Eastern countries in the above table appear to show a large 
variation in fatality risk with Saudi Arabia leading in that respect. However 
Saudi Arabia also has the highest rate of motorisation of those countries so 
the fatality risk may be held down in the other countries by virtue of lower 
motorisation. This is shown in the fatality rate which is less dependent on 
motorisation because it is calculated using a fixed vehicle ratio (for every 
10,000 vehicles). In that measure two of the three countries in that group 
apart from Saudi Arabia (Egypt and Yemen) have higher fatality rates than 
Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia is a key indicator because it is the largest country 
in the GCC (Gulf Cooperative Council which is made up of six neighbouring 
countries bordering the Arabian Gulf) both in population and area. The United 
Arab Emirates borders Saudi Arabia and shares many characteristics with 
that country – it is the focus of the next chapter.  
1.8 Summary 
A basic introduction to the field of road and vehicle safety and the impact of 
the invention and increased use of motor vehicles on human injury worldwide 
was presented. From various studies conducted in different areas of the world 
the cost to humans (mainly in terms of casualties and fatalities) was shown to 
have increased significantly in the past 100 years. The cumulative total of 
road fatalities in the last century was estimated at 25 million (Faith, 1997). 
Estimated deaths related to road crashes in 1998 were estimated at 1.2 
million worldwide (Jacobs et al, 2000). The concept of motorisation (ratio of 
vehicles per population unit) was introduced and a distinction was made 
between different geographical locations based on the level of motorisation 
(HMC v. LMC). The performance of these different regions in terms of road 
traffic injuries was evaluated based on commonly-used measures such as 
fatality rate and risk. Fatality risk was the probability of dying from a road 
crash as a member of the general population, calculated as a fatality per 
100,000 people. Fatality rate described the rate of fatalities among motor 
vehicles as a fatality per 1,000 motor vehicles. HMCs generally have between 
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500 and 700 motor vehicles per 1,000 heads of population while LMCs have 
less than 300 motor vehicles per 1,000 people. Fatality risk for HMCs were 
found to be in the region of 6 to 12 deaths per 100,000 people. In LMCs the 
fatality risk at times reached 20 deaths per 100,000 people or more (assuming 
the data gathered was reliable which was difficult to establish in some cases). 
The economic costs of crashes were reviewed where available. In HMCs 
every fatality’s calculated cost to the economy in 1991 (Elvik, 1995) ranged 
from $6 million to $126 million. As a percentage of GNP (without the 
estimated loss of quality of life) road crashes cost HMCs between 0.5 – 2.5% 
(Elvik, 2000). In LMCs the estimates were higher at between 2 – 4.5% 
(Jacobs et al, 2000).  
Future predictions of the size of the problem are worrying to all observers and 
road users. In 2020 road crashes were predicted to become the 6th leading 
cause of mortality worldwide; in 1990 it was ranked 9th (Murray & Lopez, 
1997d). This highlighted the need to deal with the problem immediately and 
continuously. 
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Chapter 2 The Road Safety Situation in Dubai, United 
Arab Emirates (UAE) 
2.1 Introduction 
The emirate of Dubai in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) was the primary 
focus of this work. After defining the road safety problem on a global scale this 
section focuses the research to the area of interest and defines the questions 
that were the impetus for this work. 
Research questions: 
1. Is there a road safety problem in Dubai? 
2. What is the nature of the problem and the main causes? 
3. What can be done to overcome the road safety challenge with 
measures that have been effective elsewhere?  
4. What is the magnitude of benefits that might be gained from applying 
these measures?   
The development of road safety performance in many countries was reviewed 
in the previous chapter. Major countries in the Middle East region were shown 
to have adverse performance in road safety as shown by fatality rate and risk 
(Jacobs et al, 2000). The next step is to review the performance and situation 
of Dubai and the UAE in this context. 
Since the formation of the UAE in 1971 the growth witnessed in Dubai has 
impacted every aspect of life there. Until the start of this study (2005) there 
had been significant growth in the population and with this an increase in the 
number of newly registered vehicles; the number of newly issued licenses and 
the number of traffic violations (DMSC, 2007a). This chapter describes the 
road safety scenario and how road safety is managed in the area. The few 
previous studies conducted will be used to present the problem at a basic 
level and demonstrate the novelty of the work undertaken in Dubai. The main 
stakeholders in this area will be introduced to indicate how complex the 
management of this issue is on the local (Dubai) and national (UAE) level. 
Regional data is presented to show the overall standard of road safety in 
neighbouring countries that share some of the climate and culture of the UAE. 
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The many rules and regulations that govern the use of motor vehicles will be 
translated from Arabic and reviewed to establish the extent and breadth of 
existing safety legislation. Safety regulations will be compared to international 
standards where possible to highlight differences where they exist. Finally 
recent and future proposed changes in regulations in Dubai and the UAE with 
a potential effect on crashes will be discussed. 
2.2 Aims and intended outcomes of the study 
The overall aims and objectives of this research can be arrived at by posing 
the following questions first: 
♦ How does Dubai compare to other nations in terms of casualty rates? 
♦ What is the nature and circumstances of crashes in Dubai? 
♦ What is the influence of enforcement? 
♦ What is the influence of road infrastructure? 
♦ What is the influence of demographics? 
♦ What is the influence of driver education? 
♦ What is the influence of time and work patterns? 
♦ What is the influence of environmental conditions?  
Once the above questions are addressed it will be easier to determine which 
further steps could be taken to improve the road safety situation. The 
worldwide scientific literature on countermeasures can then be selectively 
scanned and reviewed for suitable interventions according to the broad 
problem areas that were established.  
In summary the main objectives and intended outcomes of the thesis are as 
follows:  
♦ To assess – through the analysis of crash data – the main factors which 
influence the traffic casualty situation in Dubai thus establishing a baseline 
for future studies; 
♦ To assess the suitability of countermeasure application - through 
international knowledge transfer - armed with the knowledge of what is 
already in use locally; and 
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♦ To establish how reductions in casualties could be derived if the 
countermeasures suggested were applied. 
2.3 Background to the road safety situation 
To provide an adequate background to the subject of road safety in Dubai it is 
important to understand the geographical context in which it all takes place. 
The city of Dubai is part of an emirate by the same name, that itself is part of 
seven constituent emirates that make up the UAE. It lies on the coast of the 
Arabian Gulf and is covered by a significant road network. On the following 
page is an official map kindly provided by Dubai Silicon Oasis Authority, 
Government of Dubai (© 2010). It illustrates the layout of major roads and 
developments in the emirate. The numbers superimposed on the map (1-5) 
correspond to the locations of roads pictured in figures 1 to 5. Photographs of 
some of the main roads and road types in Dubai are included on the following 
pages. These are mentioned in more detail in the following chapters. 
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Figure 1: Dubai – Al-Ain road highlighting the desert surroundings and central barrier 
with lighting in the middle of the road (Copyright AreJay, Wikimedia Commons, GDFL, 
Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 Unported licence: full text available at 
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/deed.en.) 
 
 
Figure 2: A photograph showing a typical side street in the area known as Bur Dubai, 
where different traffic modes compete for space (Copyright by Perla, Picasa Web 
Albums). 
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Figure 3: A section of Sheikh Rashid Road, before the installation of a pedestrian fence 
between the two carriageways (Photographs provided courtesy of the Government of 
Dubai, Department of Tourism and Commerce Marketing - Copyright 2010). 
 
 
Figure 4: The beginning of Sheikh Zayed Road (that ends at the border with Abu Dhabi 
emirate) showing one of the first air-conditioned pedestrian bridges spanning the full 
width of the highway (Photographs provided courtesy of the Government of Dubai, 
Department of Tourism and Commerce Marketing - Copyright 2010). 
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Figure 5: An aerial view of Dubai Creek that divides Deira (on the right) from Bur Dubai 
(on the left). Photographs provided courtesy of the Government of Dubai, Department 
of Tourism and Commerce Marketing - Copyright 2010. 
 
Records of traffic fatalities and injuries (from all crashes where at least one 
motor vehicle was involved) have been kept by Dubai Police since at least 
1983 as shown in figure 6. 
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Figure 6: Fatalities and total crash cases (injury & non-injury), historic trend. Source: 
Dubai Roads & Traffic Authority, Dubai Police. 
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The casualty figures include car occupants, pedestrians, cyclists and 
motorcyclists. The motor vehicles involved in crashes are not limited to 
passenger cars, but include buses; trucks; motorcycles and other road-going 
motorised traffic. Though the total figures shown are not large compared to 
industrialised nations (the overall deaths per year were under 300) the rising 
trend is a source of worry for all the stakeholders in the area. To see the 
overall picture it is important to take into account population growth and the 
linked fatality risk (figure 7). While the population is increasing steadily the 
fatality risk has remained stable over the years at a value of ~20 per 100,000 
people. This implies that there has been no increase in the risk of fatality. On 
the other hand the level at which it remains is still three times that of the best-
performing HMCs like Sweden and the UK. This indicates that there is 
considerable scope for improvement. Studies by workers in the field (Al-
Madani, 2000; Almubarak, 1998; Ashur, 2003; Bener & Alwash, 2002; 
Weddell & McDougall, 1981) have looked at the UAE road traffic situation 
(tables 9 & 10) especially in the last decade and have come to the conclusion 
that the UAE has a major problem. Road crashes were the cause of 
significant mortality and morbidity. Many recommendations have been made 
for improving the situation. These recommendations were broadly based 
around the four areas of education (including awareness and learning); 
engineering; enforcement and emergency and medical care. 
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Figure 7: Population and Fatality Risk (deaths per 100,000 population), historic trend. 
Note 2006 population figures are preliminary. Source: Statistics Centre of Dubai; RTA. 
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A comparison of Dubai and the UAE (table 10) with some of the best-
performing and worst-performing countries in road safety terms in the 
European Union (EU) shows the large differences between them while the 
levels of motorisation did not vary significantly.  
The sole source of traffic crash data in Dubai is the authorities responsible for 
building, maintaining and policing roads. It is imperative to know the source of 
this data and how it is collected before it is used with any confidence. Traffic 
crash management in the emirate of Dubai and in the UAE in general involves 
Table 9: Registered Vehicles, Population, and Fatalities in the UAE 
(1990-2000) 
Year 
Number of 
Registered 
Vehicles 
Population in 
Thousands Fatalities 
Fatalities per 
100,000 Population 
Fatalities per 
10,000 
Vehicles 
1990 303,284 1,844 394 21 13 
1991 309,539 1,875 490 26 16 
1992 344,855 2,062 510 25 15 
1993 398,788 2,145 567 26 14 
1994 442,700 2,230 600 27 14 
1995 428,149 2,377 563 24 13 
1996** 453,291 2,479 358 14 8 
1997 463,891 2,624 619 23 13 
1998 539,407 2,776 646 23 12 
1999 575,929 2,938 661 22 11 
2000 673,040 3,108 673 22 10 
2001 745,000 3,167 803 25 11 
2002 767,000 3,349 755 23 10 
2003 792,000 3,551 873 25 11 
2004 1,025,000 3,761 824 22 8 
2005 1,073,000 4,106 830 20 8 
2006 1,078,000 4,229 878 21 8 
**: Data does not include injuries and fatalities in Sharjah, Ajman, and Abu Dhabi city. 
 Sources: Ashur, 2003; Ministry of Economy, 2006; 2009.
Table 10: Comparison of the UAE with some HMCs 
Country 
Motor vehicles per 
1,000 population 
Fatalities per 100,000 
population 
Fatalities per 
10,000 vehicles 
UAE (2000) 217 21.7 10 
UAE (Dubai only, 
2005) 525 20.5 3.75 
Greece (2003) - 14.6 - 
Portugal (2004) 510 12.3 2.4 
United Kingdom 
(2004) 552 5.6 1.0 
Sweden (2004) 563 5.3 0.9 
Source: DfT, 2006b; Ashur, 2003; RTA 2006b; Ministry of Economy, 2005.
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a number of different stakeholders sometimes with overlapping 
responsibilities. In the case of Dubai, road design, construction and 
maintenance used to fall within the remit of the municipality until 2005 when a 
Roads and Transport Authority (RTA) was established. All traffic matters 
(aside from policing) were transferred to the authority. This included vehicle 
registration and licensing. 
Crashes are first reported to the police who have a range of responses 
depending on the situation. A patrol car is often dispatched immediately 
followed soon thereafter by a road ambulance or air ambulance (especially for 
areas that are distant from the main trauma centre). A rescue vehicle may 
also be sent depending on the nature of the crash if there is a risk of trapped 
victims. Dubai police operates most of the above services and is often called 
to assist in incidents outside the emirate of Dubai in areas where the same 
resources might not be available. Road crash victims are exclusively 
transferred by Dubai Ambulance Services Centre. In extreme cases an air 
ambulance can be dispatched. One of four is always on duty all year round 
with the possibility of calling in more units as the need arises◊. 
In 2006 a dedicated trauma centre (Interhealth Canada, 2009) was 
established at one of the main hospitals (Rashid Hospital Trauma Centre) to 
deal almost exclusively with trauma cases from vehicle crashes and similar 
cases and they deal with a large number of road crash victims. Dubai Civil 
Defence also operate a fleet of rescue vehicles and heavy equipment that can 
be used to free trapped passengers. They are always called in the case of a 
vehicle fire or spillage on the roadway. A police forensic team is also called if 
suspicious circumstances surround the incident. Vehicles involved in fires are 
often towed to the police forensic laboratory for further examination. 
The growth witnessed in Dubai over the past few years has been remarkable. 
This can be measured by many variables; whether in the number of driving 
licences issued; or the number of motor vehicles licensed; or the number of 
residents or the number of dwellings that exist (DMSC, 2007a). A rapidly 
expanding country and economy is expected to see different trends in crash 
rates than a country with a shrinking economy or total net emigration. 
                                            
◊ Personal communication, Paramedics at Rashid Hospital, December 2007. 
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Figure 8 shows an example of this growth expressed here in the length of 
paved roads being constructed over a period of six years. The total road 
network length has increased by almost 50% in six years in an effort to keep 
up with the increase in the number of vehicles registered and the growth of 
the city as a whole.  
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Figure 8: Length of paved roads in Dubai, 2000 – 2006 (Source: DMSC, 2007b; 2008). 
Adding almost 900 kilometres of new roads in such a short time period is 
typical of the speed of development taking place in Dubai. Other growth 
indicators show first time vehicle registrations to have increased by 37.1% in 
2005 and a 32.7% increase in new driving licences issued for the same year 
(DMSC, 2007a). 
2.4 Road safety studies on the UAE 
2.4.1 Introduction 
To establish the novelty of this research topic in this part of the world it was 
necessary to outline what previous work has been done in the subject area 
and where it was carried out along with a brief overview of the results 
obtained. This will also serve to avoid duplication in effort. An extensive 
literature review showed very few completed and published works of scientific 
research existed on this topic in Dubai. Published studies will be reviewed 
after the unpublished works are reviewed. 
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2.4.2 Unpublished studies 
Two independent studies were conducted in recent times by researchers on 
the topic of road safety in the UAE one from 1998 and the other from 2002. 
Almubarak (1998) from the Department of Civil and Transportation 
Engineering at Napier University in Scotland reviewed and compiled the data 
for crashes in 1990 – 1992 for all of the UAE and from 1989 – 1990 for the 
city of Abu Dhabi. Some of the main findings are listed below:  
• The main study area of urban Abu Dhabi possesses an adverse road 
safety record 
• Particular problems highlighted were child and pedestrian casualties 
• Some cost estimates were made, which showed the economic cost of 
crashes to be around 1.5% of the UAE GDP (1991 figures) 
• Some significance was found in relationships between vehicle 
registrations and fatalities using statistical tests (T-test) for the study 
area 
• Using a development of the “innocent victim” concept to measure crash 
involvement. Those under 21 years of age and UAE nationals were 
found to be over-involved while Asian nationality groups and taxi 
drivers were found to be under-involved. 
• Ramadan (Muslim holy month of fasting from food and water) and 
summer months showed different crash rates (higher in Ramadan, 
lower in summer – although this may even out when Ramadan falls in 
the late summer). Accident Involvement Ratio (AIR = percentage of 
accidents to percentage of traffic flow) peaked at the time of sunset 
(just before breaking the fast) and during working hours (0800 – 1300) 
and from 0300 to 0500. 
The fasting month of Ramadan (when able and healthy Muslims abstain from 
food and water during daylight hours) has been the focus of some studies in 
the past due to the perceived increase in fatigue and tiredness due to fasting 
(Rashed, 1992). Research in a multi-cultural area of London showed 
increased attendance to the Accident & Emergency department of a major 
hospital for Muslims during Ramadan when compared to non-Muslims 
(Langford et al, 1994). It would be safe to assume a number of these 
attendances relate to motor vehicle injury. This directly relates to the UAE 
because it is a majority-Muslim country where the adult population practises 
fasting regularly.  
The accuracy and comprehensiveness of the supplied crash data might not 
be as complete as the records suggest because it is unlikely that all crashes 
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in the years of study were actually reported to the police or the insurance 
companies whose data was used for cost estimates. The problem of 
underreporting with crash data is widely known and acknowledged in most 
countries of the world (WHO, 1975; Mufti, 1983; Ofusu et al, 1988; Bener et 
al, 1992; Jacobs & Aeron-Thomas, 2000). It has also been studied in depth by 
the Department for Transport in the UK  (DfT, 2006a). 
The author cites the lack of a no-claims-bonus system by insurers in the UAE 
as an incentive to claim for all crashes while in reality there are other reasons 
that might prevent a claim from reaching insurance companies. Such reasons 
are the avoidance of hassle if only minor damage is involved or the belief 
(ethical or otherwise) in the non-validity of the insurance system as a whole. 
Also the data collected from federal authorities might not be the same as that 
submitted to them by the local police forces especially before the dawn of 
electronic mass communications and the internet. These factors combined 
mean there might be other explanations for observations but it is impossible to 
stand on all the possible reasons without expending an enormous amount of 
effort in addition to what was done already. 
Haj Ahmed (2002) from the UAE University’s Faculty of Medicine and Health 
Sciences conducted studies on the medical and economic impact of road 
crashes in the UAE at the University of Abertay Dundee. The data used was 
collected from the federal security and health authorities. Some of the main 
findings were: 
• The total economic costs calculated using Human Capital and 
Willingness To Pay methods were found to be 2-3% of the UAE GDP 
(1995).  
• The total economic cost of crashes in 1995 was approximately $1bn 
(AED3.8bn) while every minor injury cost AED50,000 (~£7,000), and 
fatalities cost AED7.5m (~£1m) each. 
• Drivers between 18 – 40 years old were most involved in fatalities.  
• From 1985 – 1995 crashes per population and per vehicle declined in 
the UAE while the severity of injury and rate of death in a crash 
increased. 
• Seat belt effectiveness was studied from hospital admissions. An 
estimated 62% reduction in costs of crashes could have been achieved 
in 1995 if every occupant involved in a crash that year had used a seat 
belt. 
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The sources of data for most of the above work were similar to the first 
studies in that they are secondary, collated by central authorities from various 
sources and thus suffer from the same shortcomings and limited coverage. 
Both works illustrate the limited extent and accessibility of data in this field 
and are a good primer for anyone planning research work in the area. 
However the need for in-depth injury and crash data is undoubtedly clear 
(Almubarak, 1998; Haj Ahmed, 2002) because it allows an accurate depiction 
of the road and vehicle safety situation and continuous monitoring and 
analysis of the situation with time along with the assessment of remedial 
measures. 
2.4.3 Published papers and journal articles 
A small number of published studies examining the UAE and the regional 
situation with regards to traffic safety were found and reviewed. These studies 
most often targeted specific issues that are seen as significant like the 
influence of a high percentage of 4x4s in the vehicle fleet or mobile phone and 
seat belt use or driver comprehension of road signs.  
Studies of seat belt use from police crash data will only reveal usage rates for 
those involved in crashes which might not reflect the actual driving population 
due to differences in risk-taking behaviour or habits. Nevertheless they can 
provide an indicator of usage levels and the effectiveness of seat belts in 
reducing injury severity. Seat belt use for front occupants was made 
compulsory, and enforced, across the UAE in January 1999. This provided an 
excellent opportunity to study the effect of this measure on crashes and 
injuries. A study on Dubai police data at the period before and after 
implementation (Abdalla, 2005) found that fatalities and serious injuries were 
significantly reduced and that fatalities among unbelted casualties are more 
than twice those among belted casualties. Another study (El-Sadig et al, 
2004) in the oasis city of Al-Ain, 150km south-east of Dubai, using hospital 
admissions of road casualties found that minor injuries increased in the post-
implementation stage. “Moderate to fatal” injuries declined significantly during 
this stage (54% to 17%) as did the number of days spent in hospital for 
survivors. 
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Bener (Bener et al, 2006) also looked at hospital admissions from road 
crashes in the city of Al-Ain using a questionnaire filled in by doctors and 
hospital staff assessing the injuries according to the Abbreviated Injury Scale-
1990 revision classification (Association for the Advancement of Automotive 
Medicine, 1990). Their findings indicated the involvement of a 4x4 (four-
wheel-drive or sport-utility vehicle) in almost half the crashes and found that 
most of the injured were pedestrians and young drivers. Such vehicles are 
common as a second or even first car in the UAE due to the extensive desert 
terrain and they are used on family outings and the “school run” due to their 
increased load and passenger-carrying capacity compared to smaller cars as 
UAE families tend to be large (in 1995 the average household size in the UAE 
was 5.3 members; Ministry of Economy, 2007). 
A case study of highway capacity, level of service and traffic crashes (Ashur 
et al, 2005) found young drivers in the downtown section of Abu Dhabi city 
(capital of the UAE) most responsible for crashes. The most prominent crash 
type was the “chain crash” (front-to-back crashes from following too close to 
the vehicle in front) and the most common crash cause was reckless driving. 
However this study had some coverage omissions (due to road works on an 
important road in the area) as well as a lack of accurate geographical 
matching of crash locations (due to the non-coding of precise locations using 
Geographical Information Systems). 
Studies of drivers’ comprehension of road signs and the relationship between 
comprehension and safety (as measured by factors like crash involvement or 
frequency of speed citations) brought up interesting results. Bi-lingual road 
signs might be the norm in some countries but are not universally used, hence 
some drivers might be bewildered by some of the combinations of road signs 
found in Dubai. One study based on a questionnaire survey (Al-Madani, 2000) 
of drivers in the GCC (Gulf Cooperation Council) states of Bahrain, Qatar and 
the UAE completed by 2,820 drivers showed that drivers with more 
experience tend to comprehend signs better though this had little influence on 
their crash involvement. However seat belt usage increased with the 
understanding of posted signs. A later study (Al-Madani & Al-Janahi, 2002) on 
a wider scale (4,774 respondents) covering five GCC countries found that 
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only around 55-56% of drivers correctly identified warning and regulatory 
signs. Factors that affected this comprehension rate were age, gender, 
education and income while marital status was not seen to have an effect. 
Drivers that were young, female and with a low level of education and income 
were less likely to comprehend the signs than drivers that are older, male and 
with higher levels of education and income. Another interesting find was that 
European and American drivers are significantly better than Arab and Asian 
drivers in sign comprehension. This difference is difficult to put down to either 
culture or educational driver training and licensing background (from different 
countries) without further study. 
 
Figure 9: Example of a road sign from the UAE by a shopping mall, indicating a speed 
bump that also serves as a pedestrian crossing. 
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Figure 10: Example of a road sign gantry on Sheikh Zayed Road in Dubai illustrating 
the amount of information and symbols that may confront a new driver (Copyright by 
Sawfun, Picasa Web Albums). 
The self-reported use of mobile phones while driving (for drivers involved in a 
crash) was studied in Qatar (Bener et al, 2005). Most GCC countries have 
laws banning the hand-held use of mobiles while driving though enforcement 
does not appear to be very strict. The Qatari study found significant use of 
mobile phones amongst drivers and a large number of calls were received 
while driving (on average, 4.28 per day). Similar cultural attitudes are likely to 
prevail amongst neighbouring countries, where it is seen as acceptable to use 
a mobile phone while driving. Yet a third of the respondents favoured laws 
banning the use of any mobile phone equipment while driving. In Dubai in 
2006 mobile phone penetration was fairly high at 2.2m lines for 1.4m 
residents (DMSC, 2007c) but the extent of the problem has not yet been 
studied in depth. 
2.5 Road safety in the regional context 
Neighbouring countries that share similar geographic and cultural identities 
are useful for the comparison of key data where it is available. In this case 
data from each of the neighbouring countries was not readily available or 
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published however some sporadic figures from the GCC Information Centre 
Statistical Department allowed the plots in figure 11 and 12 to be made.  
GCC Fatality Rate (deaths/10,000mv) 1999-2004
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Year
D
ea
th
s/
10
,0
00
m
v
Bahrain
Kuwait
Qatar
Oman
KSA
(Approx.yr)
Dubai
 
Figure 11: Fatality rate for available GCC country data. Note: Saudi Arabia (KSA) use 
the Hijri calendar so years were matched as closely as possible to the Gregorian 
calendar (Source: The Cooperation Council for the Arab states of the Gulf (GCC), 
2005). 
From the data available it appears that Qatar, Kuwait and Bahrain fare better 
than Dubai in both indicators, while Oman is worse off and Saudi Arabia is not 
far off the Dubai levels. It must be stated that the reporting and recording of 
crash data varies significantly between regions as does the population 
density. The small island state of Bahrain is home to about 750,000 
inhabitants while Saudi Arabia with its vast desert areas is home to over 23 
million people (Cooperative Council for the Arab States of the Gulf (GCC), 
2005). 
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Figure 12: Fatality risk for available GCC countries (Source: The Cooperation Council 
for the Arab states of the Gulf (GCC), 2005). 
2.6 Overview of some local and national stakeholders in 
road safety 
Responsibility for and monitoring of road safety involves a large number of 
government organisations and executive bodies. The division of responsibility 
is not always clearly defined or addressed in any existing publication but all 
bodies were in agreement upon the joint nature of responsibility for this key 
aspect of the transport system. The key stakeholders for road safety are 
outlined over the next few pages to show how they relate to the problem and 
to outline later where they might be involved in any recommended solutions. 
2.6.1 UAE Ministry of Interior 
The Ministry of Interior is the Federal body responsible for legislation and 
policing at the highest level in the country. The Ministry oversees the police 
forces in the seven Emirates and is linked directly to those in Abu Dhabi and 
some of the Northern Emirates while the Dubai Police force retains some level 
of independence. However the Ministry retains a close working relationship 
between all the parties involved in policing. The major police forces (Abu 
Dhabi, Dubai and some from the Northern Emirates) predate the 
establishment of the federation of the UAE in 1971 hence a large degree of 
independence is maintained in day to day affairs. Federal laws apply to all the 
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Emirates but they may be supplemented by local orders and regulations that 
are Emirate-specific. 
The governing traffic laws (No. 21 of 1995 and No. 12 of 2007) were issued 
by the council of Ministers based upon the recommendations of the various 
police forces and Ministry submissions. 
2.6.2 Emirates Authority for Standardization & Metrology (ESMA) 
ESMA was established in 2001, and is the Federal body in charge of 
standards, metrology and certification in the UAE. It works in close 
collaboration with the GCC-SO (Gulf Cooperative Council Standards 
Organisation) in adopting standards for the Gulf region. Vehicle standards for 
crashworthiness and safety specifications are set by ESMA, and all vehicles 
legally imported and sold in the country must be certified according to these 
specifications. 
2.6.3 The Executive Council – Dubai 
TEC (The Executive Council) is the chief government office in Dubai that 
oversees the various local departments and sets performance standards and 
continuously monitors these departments to make sure they keep pace with 
the developments of the Emirate as a whole. The council is made up of 
representatives of all the local departments (Police; Roads & Transport 
Authority; Municipality; Courts; etc) and meets once a week and is headed by 
the Crown-Prince of Dubai.  
2.6.4 Dubai Police 
Dubai Police was established by a local decree in 1956 and is one of the first 
local police forces in the region. It is administratively divided into 12 
geographic regions each with a police station or outpost. Responsibility for 
policing the roads and monitoring drivers and issuing fines mostly falls within 
the remit of the police. Responsibility for vehicle registration and driver 
licensing falls with the RTA. 
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2.6.5 Dubai Health Authority (DHA) 
The DHA was established in 2007 by a local decree by the Ruler of Dubai, to 
oversee the healthcare sector in the Emirate. It will gradually replace the 
former Department of Health & Medical Services with a number of 
independent centres according to specialisation. It is the main body 
responsible for the provision and regulation of healthcare in the city through a 
number of hospitals and health centres and the only provider of emergency 
medical services in the Emirate. The primary trauma centre is run by the 
authority at Rashid Hospital and is currently managed by a Canadian health 
services consultancy (InterHealth Canada, 2009). Most casualties of road 
crashes are referred to this trauma centre. 
2.6.6 Roads and Transport Authority (RTA) 
The RTA was set up by a local decree in 2005 to take responsibility for the 
development and maintenance of roads in Dubai along with public transport 
and vehicle and driver licensing (departments that were previously with the 
police or municipality). It is divided into a number of agencies according to 
specialty, mainly the Traffic & Roads; Marine; Public Transport; Rail and Taxi 
agencies. Traffic safety is one of the main responsibilities of the RTA, along 
with the other stakeholders mentioned in this section. 
2.6.7 Dubai Public Prosecution 
The Public Prosecution (PP) department is responsible for the prosecution of 
offenders in road crashes where there is loss of life, injury, or property 
damage. The traffic prosecution section is positioned within Dubai Police 
Traffic Department. They maintain a close working relationship and try to 
improve road safety through securing suitable punishment for offenders in 
serious crashes according to the law, so that they may set an example to 
others and act as a deterrent. They also liaise with the police and RTA on 
issues that become apparent through prosecution like blackspots or recurring 
patterns of crashes. 
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2.6.8 Dubai Centre for Ambulance Services 
The ambulance service in Dubai was initially provided by the police and health 
authorities but an independent centre has been recently setup to unify the 
emergency response where casualties are involved. It is based in close 
proximity to the Dubai Police control room and operations are run through 
their own control room in close cooperation with other emergency service 
providers. A total of about 100 ambulances are positioned at strategic 
locations around the Emirate including a number of quick-response 
motorcycle paramedics and four Dubai Police Airwing helicopters to provide 
evacuation cover for any type of emergency that may arise. The average 
response time is about 8 minutes◊. 
2.6.9 Media 
Media in the UAE and Dubai is predominantly state-owned and operated. A 
small number of private or internationally-owned operations run alongside the 
local press. Newspapers, television and radio stations contribute in reporting 
on major traffic incidents and almost all casualty crashes which serves to 
inform the population of the road safety situation on a regular basis. Also 
some of the stakeholders grant frequent interviews to the press to update 
them on projects, plans, statistics and rule-making. Sometimes campaigns are 
run by local television channels to highlight serious crashes with graphic 
images to serve as a deterrent to potential offenders. 
2.6.10 Dubai Municipality 
The municipality has responsibility for licensing the construction of buildings 
and dwellings and maintaining public parks and irrigation. They used to have 
responsibility for roads before the RTA was established. They also have a 
Geographic Information Systems (GIS) Centre responsible for mapping in 
Dubai. The regularly-updated map is provided by the GIS Centre to most 
government departments (RTA and the police being two key users) for 
multiple purposes; from planning of new projects to plotting out existing trends 
(of pedestrian fatalities for instance). 
                                            
◊ Personal communication, Paramedics at Rashid Hospital, December 2007. 
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2.6.11 National Transport Authority 
This was set up in 2006 and headquartered in Abu Dhabi to oversee marine 
and land transport (National Transport Authority, 2009). It is the central body 
concerned with the registration of marine vessels bearing the UAE flag. It is 
also concerned with proposing laws and regulations governing transport in the 
UAE while liaising with local and neighbouring bodies. The NTA also advises 
on joining various international treaties related to the different transport 
modes. 
2.7 Vehicle safety standards in the UAE & GCC 
ESMA hold a number of vehicle-safety-related standards for products used in 
the UAE. These standards were mostly shared with the Gulf Standards 
Organisation (GSO) using the same number. Table 11 lists the relevant 
standards. 
Table 11: Motor Vehicle Safety-Related Standards in the UAE  
  
Name of Standard  
 
UAE 
Standard 
No. 
Motor Vehicles: Methods of Testing Passenger Cars Impact Strength Part 1: 
Frontal Impact 36 
Motor Vehicles: Methods of Testing Passenger Cars Impact Strength Part 2: 
Moving Barrier Rear Impact 37 
Motor Vehicles: Methods of Testing Passenger Cars Impact Strength Part 3: 
Side Impact 38 
Motor Vehicles: Methods of Testing Passenger Cars Impact Strength Part 4: 
Roof Strength 39 
Motor Vehicles: Passenger Car Impact Strength 40 
Motor Vehicles: Front and Rear Exterior Protection Devices for Passenger Cars 
(Bumpers etc) and its Methods of Test 41 
Motor Vehicles: General Requirements 42/2003 
Motor Vehicles: Conformity Certificates 48 
Motor Vehicles - Methods of Testing of Safety Belt 96 
Motor Vehicles - Safety Belts 97 
Motor Vehicles - Conformity Certificates for Vehicles Manufactured in Multi-
Stages 153 
Road Vehicles - Safety Glasses - Test Methods for Optical Properties 684 
Motor Vehicles - Safety Glass – Mechanical Test 1007 
Motor Vehicle - Head Lamps Safety Requirements. 1503 
Motor Vehicles - Head Restraints and Its Method of Testing 1598 
Motor Vehicles - Speed Limiters - Part 2: Technical Requirements U. A. E. 
STANDARD 1625 
Motor Vehicles - Speed Limiters - Part 3: Methods of Test 1626 
Motor Vehicles –Laminated Safety Glass 1677 
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A review of the standards alongside United States Federal Motor Vehicle 
Safety Standards (FMVSS) revealed some similarity in limits and 
specifications. For example, frontal crash test speed and permissible rearward 
displacement of the steering column in UAE Standard 40 were identical to the 
parameters set out in FMVSS 208 (NHTSA, 2003). It was expected for a new 
regulatory agency to adopt existing standards that are met by a large number 
of product suppliers (in this case, automotive manufacturers) rather than go to 
the prohibitive cost of developing its own new standards. However this 
necessitates the constant monitoring of leading global standards to update 
local standards accordingly – but only when the global standards are 
compatible with the local culture and environment. 
2.8 Vehicle technical regulations in the UAE 
The UAE traffic law of 1995 (Dubai Courts, 2006) describes in chapter 3, 
section 2, items 34 and 35, the technical specifications that vehicles must 
meet as follows (translation from the original Arabic provided by the author): 
“No mechanical vehicle may be used on the road unless it is mechanically sound and 
equipped, as a minimum, with the following: 
1. A solid, functional steering wheel that is easy to turn. 
2. Two independent, effective braking systems, or one effective system that is 
operated by two independent means, one of which is capable of stopping the 
vehicle surely and quickly if the other should fail. 
3. Suitable alerting device capable of giving an auditory warning when needed. 
4. Front-mounted mirror such that it gives the driver a view of the road behind. 
5. Windscreen made of a transparent material that does not distort vision and 
does not shatter into sharp pieces upon breakage. 
6. A motorised device to wipe the glass when needed. 
7. A seat belt, used, fitted and described according to regulations. 
8. A device to prevent pollution and reduce exhaust noise. 
9. Speedometer. 
10. An inflated spare tyre fit for purpose. 
11. Fire extinguisher (fit for use) for buses and vehicles and tankers used to 
transport flammable liquids. 
This may be extended to other vehicles as directed by the law. 
Motorised cycles are excluded from rules 5, 6, 7 and 10. Every mechanical vehicle 
must be equipped with lighting devices clearly fixed to the vehicle, that show the 
width of the vehicle, and they may not be obscured or rendered inoperative by any 
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part of the vehicle or the load it carries, and an indicator of the direction of travel of 
the vehicle. Trailers must be equipped with rear and side lights that show the length 
of the trailer. Motorised cycles must be equipped with a main light to illuminate the 
road ahead at night, and another at the back, and any side cars must be additionally 
equipped with two side lights at the front and at the back. Normal cycles must be 
equipped with a main light at the front and a red light and red reflector at the back. 
The carriage must be equipped with enough light to alert other road users of its 
presence at night.”  
2.9 Driver regulations in the UAE 
Chapter 1, section 1, item 10 of the UAE traffic law (Dubai Courts, 2006) 
describes the obligations of the vehicle driver as follows (translation provided 
by the author): 
1. “To remain on the near side of the right edge of the road in relation to the 
direction of vehicle travel (the UAE population drives on the right side of the road, 
opposite to the UK). 
2. To ensure sufficient vision in front when attempting to overtake a vehicle or 
person or animal or obstruction, and to indicate the intention to overtake and alert 
others that will be overtaken using alerting signals, and ensuring they respond to 
the alert. 
3. To remain at the right edge of the road to allow other priority traffic to pass. 
4. To take necessary precautions before turning in a side road, or curve or junction 
or crossroads, and to give the necessary signal for changing the path of travel, 
and ensuring it is possible to turn without putting other road users in danger. 
5. Not to overtake another vehicle in the same carriageway except from the left side, 
unless the vehicle moved to the left to turn into a road on the left, after the driver 
of the other vehicle has given the correct signal, and provided there is enough 
space allowing the overtake without danger. 
6. Not to drive while under the influence of wine or any another alcoholic substance 
or drug, or other similar substance. 
7. Not to drive while exhausted to a degree that affects vehicle control. 
8. To reduce speed, or stop when necessary, to allow another vehicle in front that 
has indicated to turn left or right, to do so. 
9. Not to endanger pedestrians, and to stop when necessary, to avoid annoying or 
injuring any road user. 
10. Not to exceed the maximum speed permitted on the road, while taking into 
account the surrounding conditions and weather and vehicle and other safety 
considerations. 
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11. Not to cause any clear damage to the surface of the paved road, while not 
contradicting the federal law no. 8 of 1986 (relating to permitted axle weights on 
paved roads). 
12. Not to reverse without checking if the road is clear, and only by the distance 
necessary for protection or turning in the road. 
13. To follow the signs given by a police officer that is directing traffic. 
14. To use the vehicle’s indicator when turning, depending on the direction of turn, 
whether left or right. 
15. To illuminate the vehicle between sunset and sunrise and when necessary, by 
that which alerts others to its presence.” 
Additional obligations apply to drivers of vehicles that carry passengers (taxis, 
buses, etc) and heavy vehicles. A brief comparison of some of the key 
differences in traffic-related legislation is made in the following table.  
Table 12: Examples of some key differences in traffic-related legislation 
and practice between the UAE and UK. 
Dubai (UAE) UK 
Seat belt legislation for front seat 
occupants 
Seat belt legislation for front and rear 
seat occupants and children 
Penalty points for licences not 
introduced until 2008 
Penalty points in use for some time 
Penalty points expire after one 
calendar year 
Penalty points expire after 4 to 11 
years depending on offence 
Annual mechanical roadworthiness 
test required for all vehicles older 
than two years 
Annual mechanical roadworthiness 
test required for all vehicles older 
than three years 
Highest permitted speeds (on 
highways) of 120 kph (75 mph) 
Highest permitted speeds (on 
highways) of 112 kph (70 mph) 
Alcohol breath testing on the 
roadside generally not in use 
Alcohol breath testing on the 
roadside in widespread use 
 
2.10 Recent changes in traffic legislation and policing 
2.10.1 Changes in Dubai 
Some changes were related to the emirate of Dubai only as policing and law 
enforcement may differ slightly from one emirate to another according to local 
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laws and orders that may supplement federal laws. Subjects covered by these 
changes in legislation and policing include toll roads, speed limiters and 
speed camera use.  
2.10.1.1 Toll roads and speed limiters 
The situation in Dubai is changing on an almost daily basis as authorities in 
charge of roads, policing and regulation explore different methods to tackle 
the problems they face in managing traffic on the roads. The most recent 
changes at the time of writing (that might affect the incidence and severity of 
crashes) were the announcement of the start date for the first road toll ever in 
the region; the introduction of a minimum speed limit on major highways; and 
the installation of speed limiters on certain vehicle categories. 
The road toll system (called “Salik”, an Arabic word for “uncongested”) was 
introduced on 1 July 2007 at Al-Garhood bridge at the rate of 4 Dirhams (the 
local UAE currency, abbreviated AED) per crossing, up to a maximum of 
AED24 per day per car (~£3.30 at April 2007 exchange rates). All vehicles 
crossing the toll gates will have to be equipped with a Radio Frequency 
Identification (RFID) sticker to collect payment and avoid being fined (Ahmed, 
2007b). Toll roads may have an effect on safety as they affect exposure. In 
Norway (Elvik & Vaa, 2004) it was found that toll ring roads had a lower 
number of injury crashes than roads in other towns, but only marginally so 
with an average reduction of -5%. Also because tolls are often implemented 
on congested roads, the likely change in congestion might subsequently affect 
the safety of these roads. Shefer and Rietveld (1997) argue that a positive 
effect of congestion is a reduction in fatalities as the opportunities for 
speeding decrease. Hence if the new road toll results in lower congestion and 
possibly faster traffic in some areas of Dubai, it might also affect safety 
(negatively). 
A minimum speed limit of 60km/h was introduced in April 2007 on the main 
highways in Dubai to try and minimize the speed difference between different 
vehicles and thus improve traffic flow and lessen the severity and occurrence 
of crashes. Speed limiters (set at 120km/h) have become mandatory on taxis 
earlier in the year and there are plans to make them compulsory on “safari” 
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vehicles or those used for taking tourist parties off-road after the involvement 
of one of those vehicles in a fatal crash early in 2007. Fifteen-passenger 
minibuses have also come under scrutiny due to their involvement in some 
high profile crashes. 
2.10.1.2 Speed camera use 
In 2007, 193 enforcement cameras of different types (termed “radars” locally) 
were operational on the streets of Dubai, including 97 fixed speed cameras, 
74 red-light cameras, 16 mobile speed cameras, and 6 shoulder enforcement 
cameras (to detect abuse of the emergency lane). In 2008, 287 new devices 
were brought into operation consisting of 174 fixed speed cameras, 184 red 
light cameras, 15 mobile speed cameras and 14 radar guns (Almutairi, 2008). 
2.10.2 Changes in the UAE  
Federal legislation changes in the UAE after the commencement of this 
research in 2005 that were related to road safety include an amended traffic 
law and restrictions on vehicle registration according to age. Federal laws 
apply to all emirates in addition to any local laws and regulations. 
2.10.2.1 Traffic law amendment 2007 
The law no. 12 of 2007 (in force on 1/3/2008; Abu Dhabi Police, 2008) 
amends some of the statutes of the 1995 law. The main change was an 
introduction of a penalty points system whereby if 24 points are accumulated 
in a year the licence is suspended for 6 months and not returned until the 
driver passes a driver rehabilitation test at an approved institution. If the 24 
points are accumulated again within the prescribed period then the licence is 
withdrawn and the driver may not reapply until a year has passed since the 
withdrawal. 
The other major amendment was to the table of fines (many have been raised 
with the speeding fines made proportional to the extent of speeding) and the 
association of penalty points with certain violations. Vehicle detention has also 
been extended to cover more offences with the most severe being the 
detention of heavy goods vehicles for up to 60 days (for dangerous overtaking 
manoeuvres) and for a month if the driver is found guilty of causing a rollover 
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of his or another vehicle or jumping a red light. These punitive measures are 
in addition to a heavy fine (AED 3,000, ~£430) and licence suspension for a 
year (Abu Dhabi Police, 2008). 
2.10.2.2 Vehicle registration restrictions – 2008-2010 
In an effort to reduce the volume of traffic by limiting the number of vehicles 
registered the Interior Ministry’s Traffic department announced a number of 
initiatives (Emirates News Agency, 2008). The first deals with vehicle 
emissions putting more stringent limits on the emission of Carbon Monoxide, 
Hydrocarbons and Nitrogen Oxides. The second deals with the import and 
registration of older vehicles. From January 2009 no light vehicles older than 
5 years or heavy vehicles older than 7 years may be imported with the 
exception of classic cars that pass all the required tests. Also from December 
2008 all vehicles over 20 years old will not be renewed or registered. This 
maximum age will be reduced to 15 years in January 2010. The transfer of 
registration (hence sale) of vehicles above 10 years of age will also be 
prohibited for vehicles intended for use inside the UAE. All this will contribute 
to reducing the number of old vehicles on the road if applied according to the 
schedule suggested. 
2.11 Summary 
This chapter provided the background to the road safety scene in Dubai. The 
main research questions in the work were defined. The broad aims and 
objectives of the study were outlined along with the expected outcomes.  
Road safety in the emirate of Dubai and the UAE was reviewed from 
aggregate data in the context of the high rate of growth being experienced in 
most sectors (the past decade saw the population and number of fatalities 
double). Comparisons of the road safety situation using common indicators 
such as fatality rates and fatality risks were made with different countries in 
the region and the world. These comparisons showed a large potential for 
improvement in the road safety scene in Dubai. The way that road crashes 
are managed in Dubai was shown to involve multiple parties from the police, 
health authority, roads authority and civil defence. The different public and 
private bodies that affect road safety and policing were numerous. Examples 
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were the Ministry of Interior; Dubai Police; Public Prosecution; Rashid 
Hospital; Ambulance Services and the Media.  
Rule-making involved both local (emirate-level) and federal (UAE-wide) 
legislation and both applied in Dubai. Existing legislation that related to 
vehicle regulations and crash testing as well as rules of the road and driver 
licensing and punishment was translated and presented. Vehicle crash-testing 
standards were found to have some commonality with US standards. Existing 
legislation was dynamic and stricter rules for vehicle age and offending driver 
punishment were proposed for application. These rule changes were 
expected to lower the average vehicle age and increase fines for driving 
offences. Policing and enforcement were being strengthened through 
automatic enforcement technologies such as fixed and mobile speed 
cameras.  
Previous research in this field from surrounding regions was presented to 
show pre-existing concern about this area and the common challenges faced 
by other researchers. The little data found indicated slightly better 
performance in road safety in the past by Qatar, Kuwait and Bahrain while 
Saudi Arabia had similar levels to the UAE. Oman appeared to fare worse 
compared to neighbouring countries. 
This overview of the situation in Dubai gave enough background information 
to form a clear picture of the situation as it stood at the time of writing. This is 
important as it allows a better understanding of the context of the work and 
the extent of the differences that exist between Dubai and cities around the 
world in Africa, Europe and America. There is no substitute for ground-work 
and site visits for familiarisation with the situation and environment. It is 
however possible to gain some understanding through a snapshot as 
provided in this chapter. 
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Chapter 3 Literature Review – Safety Interventions to 
Reduce Crashes  
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter will provide the necessary background of technical knowledge on 
which a major part of the research is constructed. The description of safety 
interventions to reduce crashes and consequential casualties abound in 
literature; Elvik & Vaa (2004) in their handbook of measures list no less than 
124 safety interventions that have been the subject of scientific study in the 
past fifty years. To ensure the effectiveness of countermeasures that are 
selected for consideration in Dubai, their prior deployment in other areas of 
the world must have been documented along with their measured 
effectiveness. Only documents from scholarly sources (mostly peer-reviewed) 
that follow sound test principles were selected. Other sources (such as 
newspapers) were used to convey the reality of the local situation in Dubai 
and the UAE where little scientific literature exists to date. 
Studies in the field of road and vehicle safety were rare in the first half of the 
twentieth century and for some time afterwards (Mackay, 1965). The paved 
roads used by motor vehicles have only been around so long. As such the 
history of safety studies is mostly recent. Other countries have made progress 
in tackling the road safety challenge in various ways. Most of these countries 
created data collection projects to collate continuous data on road safety to 
monitor the situation and discover the main problem areas. The background 
to the major worldwide data sets and reasons for their creation will be 
reviewed here along with the status of data collection in Dubai.  
The international transfer of knowledge in this field will be reviewed from 
earlier studies and publications. The culture and environment of the UAE in 
general and Dubai in particular may make it difficult to carry interventions 
across borders without considering the effect of these factors. Finally, 
published studies that describe countermeasures considered relevant to 
Dubai crashes will be reviewed according to their area of influence (human, 
vehicle or environment).   
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3.2 How other countries manage road safety: real-world data 
Remedies for road safety problems should be arrived at like remedies for 
medical problems; first the problem must be diagnosed and defined. A trial-
and-error approach might occasionally achieve some positive results. In the 
real world such approaches abound due to the scarcity of resources. Ideally 
the most fruitful approach is that built on a solid foundation of information. In 
the road safety field this is provided by crash data and the related collection 
and interpretation of that data.  
The need for data exists for a number of reasons, first as an integral part of 
problem definition and then as a means to monitor the situation and develop 
solutions that work in the real world (Thomas et al, 2003). Safety policy needs 
to be based on real world data if it is to be effective in improving safety. 
3.2.1 Existing examples of data collection and crash data sets 
In most regions containing HMCs a system for collecting data across a large 
area (whether nationwide or continent-wide) is already in place or in the 
process of being developed. The United States National Highway Traffic 
Safety Administration (NHTSA) began a study in 1988 called the National 
Automotive Sampling System (NASS) General Estimates System (GES) 
(NHTSA, 2001). This study collects data from police reports of crashes 
throughout the USA in a sample that is nationally representative. The Fatality 
Analysis Reporting System (FARS) is also run by NHTSA and has been in 
operation since 1975. It collects data from the fatal crashes that occur in 50 
states, the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico including police reports, driver 
licence records, vehicle registration files, state highway department records 
and vital statistics from medical examiner’s and coroner’s reports (Finkelstein, 
1982).  
In Europe the CARE project (Community database on Accidents on the 
Roads in Europe) started gathering disaggregated data from the individual 
countries’ data sets, keeping their respective definitions, for fatal and injury 
crashes only since 1993 (European Commission, 2007). A more recent 
development in Europe is the European Road Safety Observatory (ERSO) a 
tool designed to inform concerned parties (particularly policy makers) on road 
safety through data collection and dissemination (SafetyNet, 2007a). ERSO 
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was a deliverable of the SafetyNet project which was tasked with establishing 
the framework for the creation of such an observatory (SafetyNet, 2007b). 
In the UK one of the first large-scale crash studies known as CCIS 
(Cooperative Crash Injury Study) was established in 1983 “bringing together 
Birmingham and Loughborough Universities, the TRL, the DfT and various car 
manufacturers” (Mackay et al, 1985, in Welsh et al, 2006). It was a 
retrospective study covering vehicles less than seven years old at the time of 
the crash, that were sufficiently damaged to require towing away from the 
scene of the crash. CCIS uses a stratified sampling criterion along the lines of 
the UK government’s classifications (100% of fatal crashes, 80% of serious 
and 10-15% of slight injury crashes) which results in a sample bias towards 
more serious crashes (Welsh et al, 2006). More recently an On-The-Spot 
(OTS) crash study was started in 2000 to put experienced accident 
researchers at the scene of the crash immediately after it occurs (often along 
with the emergency services) to enable the collection of vital data that is likely 
to disappear from the scene after the emergency services are done clearing 
up (Hill & Cuerden, 2005). 
On a broader level an aggregated database (with unified fields and 
definitions) was created by the OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development) called IRTAD (International Road Traffic and 
Accident Database) collecting around 500 fields of data on crashes occurring 
in OECD member countries since 1988 (IRTAD, 2007). Member countries 
include most of Europe, the USA, New Zealand, Australia and Japan (see 
Appendix A for full list). 
3.2.2 The different levels of data collected 
As outlined in the previous examples data is collected in various systems to 
different levels of complexity, detail and accuracy. The main levels of crash 
data are broadly divided into three segments; base, intermediate and in-depth 
as outlined in table 13.  
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Table 13: Levels of data, sources and functions (based on Sabey, 1990) 
Level Main source of data Functions 
Base level Traffic police accident reports 
National road transport statistics 
To assess accident situations (who, 
where, when, what) 
To examine trends in traffic volume, 
risks and accidents, make forecasts 
To evaluate the effects of legislation 
and other countermeasures 
Intermediate 
level 
As above, plus: 
Observation at sites 
Additional evidence from witnesses 
Judicial reports 
To identify and diagnose hazardous 
road locations (where, how, what) 
To reconstruct accidents and determine 
their useful countermeasures 
In-Depth 
level 
As above, plus: 
Interviews with road users involved 
Clinical assessment of injuries 
Technical inspection of damage 
To assess accident causes & 
mechanisms 
To study accident & injury prevention 
measures 
To further knowledge on vehicle safety, 
human tolerance & mechanism of injury
To monitor the effectiveness of specific 
legislation & legislative measures 
Specialist 
level 
As above, plus: 
On-the-scene attendance and data 
gathering of time-sensitive data 
Some or all of the above 
To aid monitoring the effect of 
developments and innovations in safety 
under real-world conditions. 
 
Base level data is thought to exist in most countries but it can only serve 
limited functionality in assessing the general state of affairs for traffic safety 
and the extent of the problem. Intermediate level data is available less widely 
and normally for more serious crashes that are associated with litigation or 
where there might be large sums of money being paid out in compensation. 
In-depth data is typically only collected for more advanced uses such as 
assessing crash causation and injury causation mechanisms and how the 
vehicle-human-environment systems interact with each other. Ideally this level 
of data is the most desirable from a research point of view but even this level 
of data collection is often constrained by practical considerations such as cost 
and privacy issues. In-depth data collection will normally involve the 
interaction with personal data such as names and addresses especially if 
questionnaires are used to supplement the data sources available. Medical 
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and injury information is another very useful data source but access to 
medical files is reluctantly granted in most cases as they are considered the 
personal property of the patient and must be treated sensitively and ethically. 
Most crash studies are first approved by an ethical board before collecting 
personal data to ensure the integrity of the data collection and storage 
process. 
3.3 Data functions and usage 
As outlined previously in table 12 base-level data is of limited functionality 
compared to more in-depth data. However it is still an important starting point 
for assessing the general traffic safety situation and to examine the trends in 
crashes and casualties and to evaluate the effects of any external factors on 
the situation such as a change in legislation that affects motoring. The data 
collected from Dubai will be used to perform basic trend-spotting for general 
crash numbers and their variation with time. The few external factors that 
might affect the numbers have been taken into account and before-after 
comparisons were used to show whether these factors (e.g. weekend change, 
seat belt law) have had any effect on crashes. The analysis of the available 
data is used to answer the questions set out in the second chapter (aims and 
objectives) about the nature and circumstances of crashes and their severity 
and the influence of various factors on road safety. 
3.4 Status of data collection in Dubai and the UAE 
The UAE has since its establishment in 1971 come a long way in a fairly short 
time. Prosperity such as that experienced today was unheard of in the 1970s 
but with the discovery of oil in the neighbouring emirate of Abu Dhabi (the 
largest by area, covering about 80% of the UAE) in the early 1960s and 
consequently in Dubai (and natural gas in Sharjah) the level of income (and 
expenditure) began to rise and motor vehicle ownership began to spread 
amongst the population. 
Dubai police started collecting base-level crash data using a self-developed 
form in 1983. This form underwent many updates with the current version 
being adopted in 2002. It has been submitted to the Ministry of Interior (the 
body responsible for policing at the federal level) for implementation nation-
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wide (Dubai Police, 2005). The department formerly responsible for road 
safety and traffic engineering in Dubai Police developed an electronic data 
input system running on Microsoft (MS) Access software which allowed the 
input of the crash form data from any computer terminal connected to the 
Dubai Police network. 
3.5 Assessing the benefits of countermeasures 
The effectiveness of countermeasures may be measured in two terms, either 
a reduction in crashes or injuries resulting from crashes or a reduction in the 
monetary costs associated with crashes (or preferably both). These 
measurements of effectiveness will be derived from previous studies 
conducted on the countermeasures in other parts of the world while making 
the broad assumption that a similar level of effectiveness will be seen if they 
were applied in a different context. Reasons why these assumptions might not 
hold true will be expanded upon in the chapters on countermeasures and 
discussion. 
The suggestion of countermeasures that will be made for application in Dubai 
will be based on the known level of effectiveness of each countermeasure. 
The priority and ordering of these measures will be made according to their 
projected effect on the ground in Dubai. The greater the effect of the 
countermeasure on road safety (in other words the greater the expected 
improvement in safety) the higher the ranking or priority that will be assigned 
to that countermeasure in the overall list of measures. Countermeasures that 
are already in use in Dubai or the UAE in a simplified form may be 
recommended again as there might be some alterations to be made in their 
application that can make them effective in Dubai as they have been effective 
elsewhere. 
3.6 International knowledge transfer 
The presence of knowledge in one place and the application of this 
knowledge are two different matters. In corporate culture it has been shown 
that different departments within the same organisation might possess 
valuable knowledge assets but these will often not be used by other 
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departments for numerous reasons (Szulanski, 2000). One of the main 
reasons behind this lack of knowledge use is the “stickiness” of the knowledge 
transfer process. Stickiness is defined as the difficulty experienced in the 
process of knowledge transfer (Szulanski, 1996; von Hippel, 1994; as cited in 
Szulanski, 2000). If stickiness is to be found within departments of the same 
organisation then it is more likely to be found on a larger scale in countries 
separated by borders or great distances with differences in language, tradition 
and culture.  
The same problem applies to the measures of road safety. The presence of 
other measures that can solve a particular problem might not be known. If the 
presence of a measure is known then the method of application or 
implementation of that measure might not be available. Many barriers can be 
found to the transfer of such knowledge but fortunately the propriety of 
knowledge (intellectual property) does not normally stand in the way of such 
transfer. It is understandable when a technology company might want to 
protect an innovative process from discovery by competitors for fear of losing 
market advantage or a competitive edge. However if a local council was 
successful in improving road safety through some innovative process then it is 
more likely that the council will want to advertise and spread the knowledge of 
their achievement through every possible channel. 
3.6.1 Early efforts at international knowledge transfer in road 
safety 
It is natural that the countries with more experience of the motor car and the 
problems faced by its use will tend to think of solutions earlier than countries 
without significant motorisation. Early work in this field was conducted 
(Jacobs, 1986) by the Transport Research Laboratory in the UK in the year 
1972 when a team of researchers was formed under the Overseas Unit to 
help what was known as third-world countries in this area. The objective of 
this team was to undertake research to establish the nature and extent of the 
road safety problem and to assess the long term effectiveness of remedial 
measures. The team was better placed to do this than many LMCs because 
at that time the UK had some experience of dealing with traffic safety issues 
with some success (Jacobs & Sayer, 1983). This success was measured as a 
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decrease in the crash rate (in terms of vehicle kilometres travelled) and the 
number of people killed and injured in crashes at the time but this change took 
place gradually over a number of decades. 
3.7 The steps to improving road safety 
The description of the objectives of the TRL team and others provide a 
template for deriving the steps necessary for knowledge transfer in this field to 
a different country or region (Elvik & Vaa, 2004; Jacobs & Baguley, 1995). 
First the current situation must be measured and analysed to establish a point 
from which progress can be measured (the baseline). This must of course be 
done while considering the nuances of the local situation such as the 
availability and extent of data recording and reliability. This will also allow a 
rudimentary understanding of the traffic safety situation in any particular 
place. This must also include (if possible) the analysis of crash rates and 
trends and their variation with time and identifying the presence of any 
unusual peaks or anomalies. 
The second step is the adoption of safety measures or at least the 
assessment of the suitability of measures that may improve the situation if 
they were adopted. In this step, knowledge transfer comes into play, for it 
would be a daunting task if every measure had to be proven to work beyond 
doubt in every new location on earth before adoption. This part of the task is 
made easier with the increased motorisation of the world as more and more 
regions face traffic safety issues and may develop new effective measures to 
deal with them. 
The third and final stage of the process would be to measure the effect of the 
road safety measures to see whether their application has been successful 
and if not, to try and find out why. When this is not possible due to practical 
constraints an attempt can still be made to measure the effects of 
countermeasures based on earlier experience with the same measures or 
based on knowledge of how the countermeasures work (Jacobs & Baguley, 
1995). For example if seat belts are not currently used by the majority of the 
motoring population and a lot of drivers are ejected out of the vehicle in 
crashes and it is known that seat belts can prevent ejection then it is 
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reasonable to assume that ejections will decrease in at least some crashes 
once seat belt wearing increases. If the number of crashes involving ejection 
is known and a time-series of data is available from previous years then the 
improvement in that respect can be quantified by projecting the expected 
numbers with and without the intervention in place. 
It is somewhat misleading to call the third stage final as this process is 
iterative and as some problems are solved others typically come up and some 
solutions might become outdated with time or the problem might develop 
immunity to certain countermeasures. Some measures might work well in one 
area but might need some fine-tuning and adjustment to work in other areas, 
other measures might be exhausted soon after introduction or the problem 
that they treat might go away due to other factors. 
3.8 Knowledge transfer and road safety 
The rapid globalisation that has taken place around the world in the last few 
years has allowed the sharing of experience and best-practice in many fields 
of science and technology. What would have taken one country twenty years 
to develop might be adopted by another country in five years once the 
complexity of the process is understood and the errors and mistakes that 
were made are not repeated. This can be seen as a distinct advantage to 
those that produce the best results or most workable methods of solving a 
problem as the adoption of their solution will save the repetition of effort thus 
saving valuable time and resources. 
As the wealth of nations increased so did their growth (Barro, 1996). As 
shown in previous chapters high motorisation was generally observed in 
richer countries (based on GDP). The problems that come along with high 
motorisation were also experienced by these countries first and thus dealt 
with earlier. In developing countries, road safety has been a focus of 
international development agencies (Dinh-Zarr, 2008) as this problem erodes 
significant resources that could otherwise be better employed for the 
development of nations. It makes sense to share such life-saving knowledge 
and experience in the quest for human development and the improved quality 
of life. The transfer of knowledge between nations should allow the 
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contraction of time and effort in achieving a good standard of road safety. 
Studying the problem in detail allows the focussing of efforts on key issues 
rather than following a haphazard approach to solutions which will waste 
precious resources that can be employed elsewhere in the nation-building 
exercise. 
3.9 Socio-cultural differences and their effect on road safety 
Research has hinted at a relation between the culture of a country (as 
represented by values and religion) and the level of road safety observed 
there. Comparisons between the fatality risks (deaths/100,000 inhabitants) in 
15 countries in Western Europe (Melinder, 2007) showed that wealthy 
Catholic Christian countries had less crashes than poorer non-Catholic 
countries when comparing two periods (1989-1991 and 1997-1999). However 
wealthy Catholic countries (e.g. Austria & Belgium) seemed to have more 
crashes than similar wealthy non-Catholic countries (e.g. Sweden & United 
Kingdom). This may be further expanded to other regions or countries to see 
if it still applies and shows that there are many ways of understanding or 
explaining differences in safety between countries.  
This is of interest because the social and cultural conditions prevalent in the 
GCC are unlike those in any other region of the world. The natural inhabitants 
of the land for centuries were Arab Bedouins (Bener & Crundall, 2005) whose 
occupations were based on two main activities, either land-based herding and 
farming (where possible near oases and wells) or sea-based fishing and 
pearling. The discovery of oil in the area starting with Bahrain in the early 
parts of the twentieth century (Gause, 1994) led to the increase in material 
wealth which was accompanied by rapid development (Davidson, 2006). The 
larger area of Arabia and neighbouring ancient Syria, Yemen and Africa is 
historically known as the origin of major faiths and cultures. The people who 
descended from such origins tend to be resistant to change, especially when 
fast-paced, as are all established tribes and communities (depending on the 
approach followed to implementing change). The combination of ancient 
tradition and considerable wealth combined with a relatively small population 
resulted in a combination of factors peculiar to this part of the world. 
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3.10 Countermeasures to improve safety 
Various solutions to traffic safety have been devised according to the local 
context of every region. Some of the solutions are markedly similar because 
they deal with similar problems. The purpose of the literature review is to 
canvass solutions that may be relevant to the Dubai situation from around the 
world. These particular measures will be appraised later on for their calculated 
effectiveness on the subset of crashes that they relate to. This assumes they 
will have the same effectiveness when applied to the local context in Dubai. 
This permits building on existing knowledge and avoiding reinvention of the 
wheel.  
As the problem’s global dimensions have been presented and the extent of 
the problem affects a large number of people there have been some efforts to 
address this problem and treat the perceived causes of crashes and injuries 
since the dawn of the “motor age”. The improvement of road safety normally 
results from a two-stage process firstly involving the identification and 
measurement of the problem and its extent and secondly attempting a remedy 
to the problem by a suitable countermeasure designed for that purpose. A 
simple example of this process is the seat belt which was suggested by a 
Frenchman, M. Gustave-Désiré Leveau, to help keep occupants in motor 
vehicles and to whom a French patent (331,926) was granted as early as 
1903 (Wismans et al, 1994). His effort stemmed out of the desire to keep his 
family from being thrown out of the vehicle in the event of a crash 
(Eckermann, 2001). The effect of the use of seat belts on a large scale was 
illustrated by the experience of the UK with seat belt legislation. After 
introduction of the seat belt law for front-seat occupants of vehicles in the UK 
in 1983 it was shown that usage went up to 90%, and morbidity and mortality 
figures for vehicle occupants went down by ~25% (Mackay, 1985). 
The Handbook of Road Safety Measures (Elvik & Vaa, 2004) lists 124 
countermeasures and previous studies conducted on them with some 
analysis of use and effectiveness.  
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The large volume included studies as long as they: 
“…provide at least one numerical estimate of the effect of a road safety measure, or 
provide information that can be used to derive such an estimate and state the number of 
crashes on which the estimate of effect is based.” 
A road safety measure is defined as a device, program or tool whose sole or 
main purpose is to improve road safety (Elvik & Vaa, 2004). There is no 
consensus on the definition of improvement but it can be interpreted from any 
one of a number of indicators like: a reduction in the total number of fatalities; 
reduced injuries; reduced number of crashes; less serious crashes (in both 
senses – less of the serious crash variety and crashes of a lower severity); or 
an improvement in the rate of any of the above provided it is statistically 
significant.  
Some countermeasures are highly effective in certain environments (e.g. 
studded tyres in severe winters) but not applicable in others (e.g. desert 
environment with no snow at any time of the year). Measures were divided 
into three broad sections as defined in Haddon’s matrix (Haddon, 1983) which 
attempted to simplify the traffic safety problem by classifying the factors 
involved according to phase (figure 13). 
 
 
 Humans Vehicles Physical env. Socio-econ. env. 
Pre-crash     
Crash     
Post-crash     
Losses Damage to 
people 
Damage to 
vehicles 
Damage to 
physical env. 
Damage to 
society 
Figure 13: Illustration of Haddon’s Matrix (Haddon, 1983). 
The exhaustive listing of every single countermeasure employed or developed 
to improve road safety is not a task that is feasible in the time-frame of this 
work so a selection of measures was made based on their relevance to the 
area of study and their effectiveness (as proven in previous research). 
3.11 Human factors in crashes 
The human element has been present in road safety since the beginning from 
the “design and build” stages of the automobile to operating and servicing it. 
Factors
Ph
as
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There is some overlap between these factors and vehicle factors, for instance 
in the build quality of a vehicle where manual labour is still used; the comfort 
of workers and ergonomic design of tools contributes to improved vehicle 
quality. Most human factors issues concern the person in control of the 
vehicle namely the driver and the behaviours they adopt, exhibit and 
undertake (Lewin, 1982; cited in Bener et al, 2005). For example road user 
distraction is one major consideration in road safety affecting a driver talking 
on a mobile phone. Mobile phone use by drivers has been linked to increased 
crash risk (Redelmeier & Tibshirani, 1997; cited in Bener et al, 2005). 
Whereas the traditional attitude was that programs of behavioural change are 
of little effectiveness this is no longer the case (Evans, 1991; Oxley et al, 
2004). In one of the most ambitious safety strategies adopted in the world – 
Sweden’s Vision Zero (Tingvall, 1998) – it was explicitly stated that 
responsibility for safety in the transport system is jointly held between the 
different stakeholders of the road transport system. Road user error is by far 
the most common crash cause or contributory factor. In the UK in 2007 (DfT, 
2008) the top 10 contributory factors reported for crashes were exclusively 
human-related with no mention of mechanical or road failures. 
3.11.1 School driver education as a pre-driving safety measure 
Young driver education has attracted some attention at government level in 
many motorised countries. While this measure might appear fool-proof, 
studies of crash involvement with teenagers who enrol in such schemes have 
sometimes been controversial. One of the largest studies in this area 
conducted by Stock and others (Stock et al, 1983) recruited over 16,000 high 
school students in DeKalb county, Georgia, USA, recording their “licensure, 
violation, and crash experience” (Lund et al, 1986). The initial study was 
designed to evaluate the relationship between driver education and the crash 
involvement of teenage drivers due to previous research showing negative 
rather than positive effects of young driver education (Mayhew & Simpson, 
2002). The results showed that teenage drivers who underwent driver 
education at school got their licence earlier than those students who did not. 
However the control students were more exposed to driving than their 
counterparts. The re-analysis conducted on the same data later (Lund et al, 
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1986), came to the conclusion that driver education courses at this level do 
not decrease crashes and violations among young drivers as a group. Instead 
it showed that the availability of driver education stimulates younger drivers to 
get licensed earlier which in turn leads to their involvement in more crashes 
and violations. The cautious recommendation from this study is not to count 
on young driver education as a safety tool for improving crash rates in this 
segment of drivers but rather that it be viewed as a method for teaching basic 
driving skills (Lund et al, 1986).  
A review of studies on this topic was conducted by Vernick and co-workers 
(Vernick et al, 1999) that concluded: 
“…In the absence of evidence that driver education reduces crash involvement rates 
for young persons, schools and communities should consider other ways to reduce 
motor vehicle-related deaths in this population, such as graduated licensing.” 
In the UK a program of education in schools that was run by the Driving 
Standards Agency (DSA), the agency responsible for administering driving 
tests, based on the road safety strategy of the British Government (DfT, 2000) 
came under criticism for not being evidence-based or rather being based on 
insufficient evidence (Achara et al, 2001). The program consisted of an 
education package, the main component of which was a 50-minute 
presentation made to classes of 16-18 year-olds by driving examiners. The 
evidence took the form of surveys that showed an improved attitude of 
students after undergoing the DSA presentations but no monitoring of the 
crash involvement of the same students once they qualified. 
In the USA (Hotz et al, 2004a; b) an education program called WalkSafe for 
primary schools proved effective in improving pedestrian crossing behaviour 
after a one-year trial in Miami-Dade County, Florida. In Melbourne, Australia 
(Congiu et al, 2008), a training package for educating school children was 
developed to improve road crossing behaviour. The performance of students 
improved when tested immediately after undergoing the training and one 
month later.  
3.11.2 Road user training and its effect on safety 
Training and qualification of drivers for licensing to operate a motor vehicle is 
a standard procedure followed in most countries around the world. The level 
of training however is not uniform. The effect of training and testing of drivers 
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may be measured by before/after studies when licensing laws were 
introduced or by studies conducted when there is a change in legislation. The 
effectiveness of driver education as a measure for improving road safety is 
disputed in India and other Less Motorised Countries (Mohan & Tiwari, 1998; 
Mohan, 2003). The argument is that perceived low standards of driver 
education should not be criticised before studying the causes of crashes as 
the driving environment is significantly different to more motorised countries. 
Other studies emphasise the difference in driving habits and vehicle usage 
between low-income countries and much of the West. For example, in Kenya 
(Nantulya & Reich, 2002) the majority of road user fatalities belong to the 
pedestrian category while in the USA drivers make up the largest group of 
road fatalities. Also in Vietnam motorcyclists were involved in 62% of motor 
crashes (ibid.) which is far higher than the involvement rate of motorcyclists in 
the UK for example (8.7% - DfT, 2006b). Driver education and training were 
found not to reduce motor crashes by most evidential evaluation of them 
(Vernick et al, 1999; Mayhew & Simpson, 1996; Roberts et al, 2001; in O’Neill 
& Mohan, 2002) however they continue to be suggested as remedies to 
problems in road safety. 
The education and behaviour of other road users (such as motorcyclists) 
seem to be influenced only by legislation – at least in the already motorised 
countries – as suggested by one study (O’Neill & Mohan, 2002). They argue 
that laws requiring compliance with helmet use for instance are complied with 
due to the high risk of detection, while in areas where the risk of detection is 
perceived to be low, legislation might not have any positive effect. Pedestrian 
behaviour has been reviewed in the literature in high income countries 
(Duperrex et al, 2002). Most of the studies related to younger road users. 
Though some behavioural changes were found in road-crossing, the effect of 
these changes on pedestrian injury in crashes was not known. 
3.11.3 Professional driver training and the effect on crash involvement 
and driver behaviour 
Professional driver education and training, or that given to qualified drivers is 
another measure that is used by some organisations and countries in the 
hope that it improves the safety of drivers. The majority of studies on this 
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subject show post-qualification training to be an ineffective measure in 
reducing crash involvement as the effects of practical training to handle 
emergency situations are short-lived (Christie, 2001) unless practised 
frequently. Examples of these situations are skids (loss of traction or 
movement of the car in a lateral direction) and under- and over-steer (where 
the vehicle veers off the intended path of a curve, either overshooting it or 
heading towards the centre of the curve radius). Christie conducted an 
extensive literature review of the subject covering Australia and other 
motorised countries, discussing many reasons why driver training might not 
be effective as follows: 
- False assumptions about driver deficiencies and the merits of 
training 
- Asking too much of driver training in crash reduction terms 
- Driving emergencies and crashes are rare events. 
The question of cost is also factored in the conclusion to Christie’s work as 
training of this type is time-consuming and hence expensive and it might be 
the case that this diverts funds from other areas more in need of attention 
(that may have a better track record of improving safety). No studies were 
found that speak of near-misses (a crash that was narrowly avoided) which 
might also be used as a measure of the success (or not) of driver training 
probably due to the difficulty in accurately measuring and recording such 
events before and after training. 
Studies using driving simulators (Dorn & Barker, 2005) that compared trained 
drivers (police drivers from two urban UK police forces) with non-police drivers 
of a similar age group and driving experience found that the police drivers 
tend to exhibit safer behaviour in some scenarios (like slowing down more in 
the presence of pedestrians and positioning the car more centrally and 
consistently on the road for better views ahead). This might reinforce the idea 
that this type of skill training needs continuous practice as all the police 
drivers drove daily and covered significant annual mileages in both their work 
and commute. 
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3.11.4 Driving age limit and crash risk effect 
In a review of US data it was found that the age of the driver has an effect on 
the level of threat to other road users (Evans, 1991) with an increase in age 
corresponding to a decreased threat. This cannot be attributed to age alone 
as driving exposure is also reduced with increased age according to the same 
study. This naturally leads to the assumption that a limit on licensing younger 
drivers will reduce this threat. However this does not take into account that 
older drivers if newly licensed will be similarly disadvantaged by inexperience 
as younger drivers are. Research from Norway (Elvik & Vaa, 2004) shows a 
peak in the risk of driver involvement in injury crashes at ages 18-19 which 
bottoms out at ages 45-54 then again peaks at age 75+. A similar trend is 
seen in the US (Massie et al, 1995). In Canada surveys of drivers of different 
ages by telephone (n~10,000) found younger drivers (16-24) more likely to 
engage in risky driving and to have a higher crash and violation rate (Jonah, 
1990). 
Very few studies were found of the effect of raising or lowering the driving age 
(at the lower end of the scale) aside from two; one which found an increase in 
the number of crashes and fatalities when lowering the minimum driving age 
from 18 to 16 in Quebec, Canada in 1962 (Gaudry, 1987) and the other in 
Denmark showed a decrease in moped injury crashes of 15-year-olds when 
the age limit was raised from 15 to 16 years in 1980 (Engel & Krogsgård-
Thomsen, 1989). No upper age limits have been found in existence for driving 
licences (Elvik & Vaa, 2004). 
3.11.5 Driving tests and crash risks 
To determine the suitability and safety of a driver to get behind the wheel a 
test is the established norm for ensuring that a certain standard of driving 
ability is attained before joining the driving population. Assessing the effect of 
this test is difficult because a before-after study would need to be done at the 
introduction of the test and most countries with a significant driving population 
have had a test for a long time. The methodological problems with testing the 
effectiveness of this measure on improving safety are acknowledged in a 
review of related studies (Elvik & Vaa, 2004).  
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Tests often consist of two parts: a written theory test and a practical test. The 
effect of theory tests on crash involvement is not evident in studies according 
to Elvik nor is there a difference between driving school instruction and 
family/friends instruction (Elvik & Vaa, 2004). Practical test outcomes are 
affected by the length of the test as found when comparing the mistakes 
made by drivers after 30 and 90 minutes of an examination (Fazakerley & 
Downing, 1980; cited in Elvik & Vaa, 2004) with mistakes increasing with an 
extended test time as would be expected. A study of the differences in crash 
involvement, over three years, of drivers that pass or fail an advanced driving 
test show a significant reduction in crashes for subjects that pass the test 
(Hoinville et al, 1972; cited in Elvik & Vaa, 2004). This is what international 
studies have found. There appears to be no published data on the 
effectiveness of the driving test standard in Dubai. 
3.11.6 Offending driver punishment’s effect on crashes and 
re-offending 
Driver punishment, most often through fines and suspension of licences, and 
less often through detainment and prison sentences has been used as a tool 
with some effect on crashes. The experience of Brazil (Poli de Figueiredo et 
al, 2001) showed that a new traffic code introduced in 1998 (which included 
an increase in fines and a penalty scoring system) led to a 21.3% reduction in 
crashes and a reduction in hospital emergency room admissions from road 
crashes by 33.2% over the 12 months after implementation of the law. 
Possible confounding factors can be the increase in speed limits on many 
roads and a reduction (over the same period) of tickets issued by 49.5%. This 
shows a case where deterrence theory by punishment appears to hold true 
but the same was not found for unlicensed drivers from a study in Brisbane, 
Australia (Watson, 2004). Unlicensed drivers caught by the police in a 
metropolitan area and interviewed on the frequency of their unlicensed driving 
and their intention to drive unlicensed in the future seem to be undeterred by 
the fines and punishment unless there is a high chance of apprehension and 
a severe enough fine imposed (ibid.).  
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One study (Lawpoolsri et al, 2007) found the risk of re-offending to be high for 
drivers in Maryland, USA suggesting that deterrence was no longer effective 
for repeat offenders. Some reasons suggested for this are the size of the 
penalty or the type of driver committing the offence and it should be noted that 
drivers that do get cited for offences are expected to be only a small 
percentage of the total “offending” driver population that are detected by the 
police (Elvik & Vaa, 2004). In some countries in Europe fines increase with 
the level of speeding and the number of previous convictions (Delhaye, 2006). 
Delhaye goes on to develop a model that can infer the driver type from their 
offending history in order to base the “optimal” fine structure on the probability 
of detection as well as the strength of relationship between driver type and the 
record of convictions held by the authorities. The average estimate of 
reduction in all crashes (injury and non-injury) based on a number of studies 
on driver punishment is 10% (Elvik & Vaa, 2004). 
3.12 Vehicle factors in crashes 
The invention of the motor vehicle has had a great effect on the speed and 
efficiency of transport in the last century. It also has a great effect on the 
involvement and survivability of a crash for all the parties involved whether 
they are motor vehicle occupants or other road users.  
Figure 14: Stages of safety in treating crashes (Thomas, 2006a).  
Traffic accident solutions 
Prevention Strategy Aims Example of involvement factors 
? Improve driver 
behaviour 
Alcohol, speed 
? Improve road design Crash barriers, 
guardrails 
Prevent the accident 
occurring 
Primary Safety 
? Improve vehicles Handling, braking 
Prevent the injuries 
occurring 
Secondary Safety 
? Reduce forces on road 
users 
Restraints, structure 
Reduce injury 
consequences 
Tertiary Safety 
? Medical treatment Rescue, paramedics, 
emergency medicine 
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Crash safety is generally divided into three sections, before (also known as 
the primary or active stage), during (also known as passive or secondary) and 
after the event (tertiary stage) as illustrated in figure 14. 
3.12.1  Active vehicle safety measures  
For vehicle safety the measures activated in the pre-crash stage to try and 
avoid the crash occurring are often described as “Active” safety measures and 
these include vehicle stability control, anti-lock braking systems (ABS), 
electronic brake assist (EBA) and many others like anti-whiplash devices. 
Future developments in active safety technologies promise further advances 
in crash avoidance including pedestrian detection, lane change assistance 
and advanced vehicle communications (Schulze et al, 2008). 
3.12.1.1 Electronic Stability Control (ESC) and crashes 
The control of vehicle dynamics by monitoring the rate of turn around the 
vertical axis (yaw) and rate of roll and lateral acceleration and subsequent 
intervention through selective braking of individual wheels and/or power 
reduction to the driven wheels was introduced into the mass market in the late 
1990s (Weekes et al, 2009). It came under various names depending on the 
supplier/manufacturer, from ESC, to ESP (electronic stability program), DSC 
(dynamic-) and VSC (vehicle-stability control) to name a few. These advanced 
systems were designed to intervene when the vehicle begins to lose control 
and thus could be used to prevent crashes that result from loss of control as 
many single-vehicle crashes do. The effectiveness of these systems has been 
evaluated in the USA and in Europe, with varying results mostly positive 
(Farmer, 2004; Kreiss et al, 2005; Lie et al, 2005) especially in low-friction 
situations. Thomas (2006b) in a study of crash involvement risks for cars in 
Great Britain with electronic stability control systems found a greater 
effectiveness of ESC in wet or icy conditions (reductions of 34% and 53%, 
respectively) and for fatal and serious injury crashes (19% reduction). 4x4’s 
and large luxury vehicles of a popular Japanese brand were the focus of a 
study in the USA that found a 52.6% reduction in single-vehicle crash rates 
(Bahouth, 2005). In Japan (Aga & Okada, 2003) a study of three models of 
one brand of vehicle showed a reduction of approximately 50% in the casualty 
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rate for severe single-car-crashes. The casualty rate was described as 
“casualties per vehicles in use per year”. There were indications in 2007 of the 
possibility of passing legislation to make such electronic controls standard on 
all cars for sale in the EU (Anonymous, 2007). 
3.12.2 Passive vehicle safety measures 
Measures that help deal with the crash during the event are known as passive 
(or secondary) safety measures. Such measures include deformation zones in 
vehicle structures, airbags, restraints (seat belts) and head rests. 
3.12.2.1 Seat belt wearing and legislation 
Seat belts have been fitted to vehicles for at least half a century since the first 
application by Nash in the USA in 1949 (Wagner et al, 1997). Seatbelt 
legislation followed soon after first requiring manufacturers to fit the devices in 
cars (first recorded in Wisconsin, 1962) then requiring vehicle occupants to 
wear them (in the Australian state of Victoria, 1970; Wagner et al, 1997). 
Nash discontinued offering the contraption when it found little use hence the 
need for legislation both for vehicle manufacturers and users. User legislation 
worldwide generally takes two forms either primary or secondary enforcement 
laws. Primary enforcement makes it possible to stop a vehicle and issue a 
ticket solely for failing to wear a seat belt whereas secondary laws allow a 
ticket to be issued for not wearing a seat belt only if the vehicle was first 
stopped for another offence (Rivara et al, 1999). Studies comparing the 
effectiveness of both types of enforcement suggest that primary enforcement 
is more effective, though secondary enforcement is almost exclusively present 
within the USA (Rivara et al, 1999). 
The number of countries with mandatory seat belt wearing laws stood at 40 in 
1990 (Evans, 1991). Studies from countries such as Sweden, Denmark, 
France, New Zealand, Germany, Canada and the Irish Republic report a 
decrease in fatalities after introduction of the law but to varying degrees 
(ibid.). Doubt has been cast on the effectiveness of seat belt legislation 
suggesting that risk compensation has not been taken into account and any 
improvement in injury outcomes for car occupants are offset by worse 
outcomes for other road users (Adams, 1982 & 1994). This was challenged by 
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research from other geographical areas (Lund & Zador, 1984). Another major 
factor in the argument is that the data from the first region to apply the 
measure (the Australian state of Victoria) is not significant enough and data 
from other regions is not conclusive. Additionally where large estimates of 
improvement were made they were later revised as in the UK (from 1000 life 
“savings” in 1983 to 200 in 1986; Adams, 1994). The smaller-than-expected 
improvement might also have been affected by an increase in the exposure of 
unbelted occupants with time because some seat belt wearers will gradually 
stop wearing them. Therefore before and after studies cannot hope to control 
for all other factors besides the seat belt legislation. More recent estimates of 
mandatory seat belt use benefits show the probability of being killed is 
reduced by 40-50% by wearing a seat belt for front seat occupants, and by 
~25% for rear seat occupants (Elvik & Vaa, 2004). Seat belt use in itself was 
not found to be universally effective as the benefit gained by users depends 
on many factors like posture, size and biomechanic characteristics (Mackay et 
al, 1998). 
3.12.2.2 Vehicle crashworthiness and consumer testing 
The outcome of a crash (for occupant injury) can be significantly altered by 
the crashworthiness of the vehicle involved. Crashworthiness is a measure of 
how well a vehicle performs in a crash mainly in terms of occupant protection 
and passenger cell integrity. “Consumer” crash testing (by a “neutral” third 
party rather than the vehicle manufacturer) was first conducted in 1987 by 
NHTSA (National Highway Traffic and Safety Administration) in America 
(Wagner et al, 1997) and soon other countries followed. This has been the 
predominant form of testing for crashworthiness until the introduction of high-
powered computers and simulation programs that have taken over from 
physical crash testing to some extent. Some vehicle manufacturers have 
voluntarily been testing vehicles before then as witnessed by Ford building 
their first crash test facility in 1954 (ibid.) and Mercedes-Benz testing all their 
vehicles with an off-set barrier since 1978 (Kallina & Justen, 1994). 
The trends of injury severity in traffic crashes (increasing injuries of slight 
severity and decreasing serious injuries) were suggested as proof of the 
effectiveness of improved crashworthiness (Elvik & Vaa, 2004). A number of 
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measures within crashworthiness were reviewed (ibid.) like collapsible 
steering columns (to prevent the steering being thrust into the driver upon 
frontal deformation), laminated window glazing (to prevent occupant ejection, 
or injury from flying glass), energy-absorbing instrument panels and head 
rests (to prevent whiplash and extreme head/neck travel). The overall effect 
was found to be positive (a reduction in the number of people injured) except 
for some instances of head rests increasing fatal injuries in rear-end crashes. 
Nowadays the design of most vehicles has been optimised to perform well in 
consumer crash tests (known often as NCAP for New Car Assessment 
Program, in the USA, and EuroNCAP in Europe) as witnessed by the large 
number of cars obtaining the maximum star-rating (five stars out of five). 
However the question of compatibility is a major worry for car-to-car impacts 
(Zeidler & Knöichelmann, 1998) as vehicle structures designed to perform 
well in a standardised barrier impact will behave differently with a crash 
partner that is significantly different in mass and stiffness. Also increased 
rigidity of the structure puts more pressure on the occupant restraint systems 
and might lead to increased loads on the occupants that can lead to more 
injuries especially for more vulnerable vehicle occupants with lower 
biomechanical limits (such as older drivers with lower bone density and 
strength).  
This is not to say that NCAP programs – and other passive safety 
developments – have not been effective in improving injury outcomes in 
crashes. In a comparison of injury outcomes of car to car impacts published in 
2000 cars with a 3 or 4 star Euro NCAP rating were found to be approximately 
30% safer than cars with a 2 star rating or cars that have not been rated yet 
(Lie & Tingvall, 2000). An earlier study on US NCAP tested cars compared 
the US NCAP scores for head injury, chest acceleration and femur (thigh-
bone) loading with real world crashes of the same model cars. Real world 
crashes were selected where a car with a good US NCAP score collided with 
a car of similar weight but with a poor score and it found that drivers of the car 
with a better NCAP score had a 15 – 25% lower risk of fatal injury (Kahane et 
al, 1994). In the UK (Welsh et al, 2007) vehicles of different ages were 
compared (before and after regulations for side impact came into play) and it 
was found that the post-regulation vehicles did see improved injury outcomes 
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for passengers compared to pre-regulation vehicles. The outcomes improved 
in particular for front occupants on the struck-side of the vehicle, however 
serious head and chest injuries continued to present a threat to life in post-
regulatory vehicles. The main contacts for head injuries were external objects 
(e.g. other vehicles) while the side door was the main contact for chest 
injuries (Welsh et al, 2007). 
Pedestrian test methods were developed for frontal vehicle structures to 
minimise the risk to pedestrians hit in crashes (British Standards Institution, 
2002). More recent European regulations (Directive 2003/102/EC) will come 
in force in two stages, beginning in 2005 (European Communities, 2009a;b). 
These regulations include a test of the bonnet using a head form to measure 
compliance with test limits (Kerkeling et al, 2005). More detailed tests using 
both a head form (for the bonnet) and leg form impactor (for the bumper 
leading edge) were introduced by Euro NCAP and incorporated into the 
overall score of a vehicle (Euro NCAP, 2009). This will make it more difficult 
for vehicles to achieve a high star rating without offering good pedestrian 
protection. Vehicle and system manufacturers realised a problem existed with 
vulnerable road users and have tried to develop systems that aid the driver in 
detecting and avoiding pedestrians (Moxey et al, 2006). The system goes one 
step further in deploying a device to reduce the severity of the impact on the 
pedestrian. Such systems hold promise for introduction in future automobiles. 
3.13 Environmental factors in crashes 
All factors related to the environment around the vehicle and user are 
classified here (socio-economic, physical, regulatory) except as expressly 
related to the vehicle and driver as those were covered in the previous 
section. 
3.13.1 Exposure control, as applied to reduce crash risk 
The concept of exposure has been discussed in relation to road safety for at 
least half a century (de Silva, 1938) and attempts to define it have been 
made. One early definition was “the number or relative danger of the hazards 
he (the driver) encounters” (de Silva, 1942). Haight (1973) describes it as 
being analogous to exposure to disease and says that measures for exposure 
can be “distance travelled, or the time travelled, or a product of these by the 
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density of traffic encountered, or by the speed of that traffic”. He continues to 
mention the common measure used for large areas and often, national policy 
which is a gross estimate of the amount of road travel done. It is an estimate 
at best due to the difficulty in measuring, to any degree of accuracy, the travel 
patterns of a whole nation. Fuel consumption has often been used as an 
indicative measure as it is assumed to be proportional to the amount of motor 
vehicle use. However fuel consumption will indicate both moving and 
stationary MV use with the engine on (like when stopped in traffic jams or at 
traffic lights or to run ancillaries like heating or cooling). Induced exposure is 
that exposure based solely on crash involvement and not the whole (non-
crash-involved) population (Haight, 1973). 
The control of exposure is seen as an obvious way to control crashes as the 
absence or reduction of traffic and traffic activity should directly influence the 
probability of involvement in a crash. Studies in Nordic countries show that a 
large part of the systematic variation in crash counts can be explained by 
changes in exposure measured through fuel consumption (Elvik & Vaa, 2004). 
In Canada estimates based on driver surveys suggested that “apparent 
differences in crash risk per kilometre” can be explained by differences in 
“driving speed and environment” and that exposure time rather than distance 
is better at explaining the differences between populations and areas 
(Chipman et al, 1993). These results, however, are only suggested and not 
endorsed as there is a large margin for error with surveys that ask for 
estimates of driving distance and time and are not measured precisely (for 
example using electronic tracking devices). Studies in Scandinavia using 
Poisson regression methods (Fridstrøm et al, 1995) explain variation in small 
crash counts (such as those for fatalities) by “randomness” whereas exposure 
is found to be a more probable explanation for injury crashes (to a degree that 
the relationship between the two is claimed to be almost proportional). The 
study goes one step further in consigning 80-90% of observable variation in 
the figures studied to changes in randomness and exposure. This leads to the 
conclusion that the greatest reductions in crashes can be achieved through 
drastic reductions in traffic volume though it is unclear to what extent this 
holds true and if there is a reversal point. This is supported by observations in 
very crowded urban areas that suggest that the increase in traffic there (and 
 85
the corresponding slow-down in speeds) results in an improvement in safety 
(Shefer & Rietveld, 1997). This phenomenon needs further study to confirm if 
it applies in different geographical areas and with traffic of different 
composition (for example different ratio of pedestrians or cyclists to motorised 
vehicles). 
3.13.2 Police patrol effectiveness in reducing traffic offences and 
crashes 
Police patrols in marked cars are one way of enforcing adherence to traffic 
regulations, especially speed limits. Although the effect of the patrol is limited 
to only the immediate vicinity, as the car travels the effect is spread over a 
greater area. The change in driver behaviour is often called the halo effect 
and is measured as the distance before and after an enforcement site (Fildes 
& Lee, 1993; Zaal, 1994). The principle of deterrence to poor behaviour 
(Homel, 1988 cited in Zaal, 1994) is that poor behaviour can be modified by 
making people fearful of the consequences of committing illegal acts. In 
relation to crime, a study in Minneapolis, USA (Koper, 1995) found that patrol 
stops of 11-15 minutes produce an optimum effect in securing the area (and 
preventing further incidents) but no studies of a similar effect by highly-visible 
stationary patrols on driver’s adherence to road laws have been found. The 
largest study of patrol effectiveness (one city of 120,000 inhabitants covering 
a period of 3.5 years) specifically looked at drink-driving enforcement (Voas & 
Hause, 1987) through patrols in the evenings of weekends. It found that the 
patrols had a measurable effect on crashes during night-time, first reducing 
weekend night-time crashes (during the first six months) then the weeknight 
crashes fell as well. However the two cannot be tied conclusively as patrols 
were not changed during weeknights. The major drawback to this method is 
the limited long-term possibilities for traffic safety as the effect subsided six 
months after funding was terminated. 
The effect of enforcement on seat belt wearing and speeding was studied in 
many countries and reported in extensive literature reviews (Fildes & Lee, 
1993; Zaal, 1994). Enforcement (when combined with legislation) can raise 
compliance with seat belt wearing but the level of improvement is dependent 
upon numerous factors like the levels of enforcement and publicity involved 
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(Makinen & Hagenzieker, 1991, as cited in Zaal, 1994). A difference was 
found between behavioural changes from enforcement strategies using visible 
(marked) and non-visible (unmarked) police cars by Galizio, Jackson and 
Steele (1979, cited in Fildes & Lee, 1993) with unmarked cars having no 
effect on speeds. Marked police cars on the other hand had a significant 
speed reducing effect. The type of police strategy used may be customised to 
the type of offence targeted (Sanderson & Cameron, 1982, cited in Fildes & 
Lee, 1993). Fixed offences such as driving with no insurance were most 
suited to visible enforcement as the driver was unable to change his 
behaviour in time to avoid detection. Transient offences such as speeding 
were better detected by non-visible enforcement (Sanderson & Cameron, 
1982) as the driver would not alter his behaviour on seeing an unmarked 
police car.  
Though enforcement and legislation are important factors in improving driver 
behaviour and compliance with the law, other non-enforcement factors have 
also been suggested to complement enforcement (Zaal, 1994). Such factors 
include educational and promotional programs as well as the effect of 
habitation (when seat belt wearing becomes a habit) after continuous use. 
The reasons behind the non-use of seat belts were investigated and drivers 
were found to fall within one of four categories (Landry, 1991, as cited in Zaal, 
1994): 
- Drivers who wear seat belts on the basis of improved safety. 
- Drivers who wear seat belts in response to compulsory legislative 
requirements. 
- Drivers who respond to enforcement and the threat of punishment. 
- Drivers who do not wear seat belts regardless of any other factors. 
These factors are important in tailoring the enforcement or legislative activities 
to the different driver types depending on their prevalence in the driver 
population. However in many countries enforcement is not actively pursued 
(Zaal, 1994) and actual apprehension rates for seat belt violations are very 
low (1%, Campbell & Campbell, 1986). This places the emphasis for 
compliance with the individual road user (Zaal, 1994). In the absence of 
enforcement, road user behaviour may deteriorate significantly as was seen in 
Finland during a police strike when serious speeding offences increased 
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considerably (Makinen, 1988 cited in Fildes & Lee, 1993). The overall seat 
belt use of vehicle occupants in Finland over thirty years (ETSC, 1996, cited 
in Peden et al, 2004) showed that legislation had a temporary effect on usage 
levels when not accompanied by fines, publicity and enforcement. 
3.13.3 Blood alcohol concentration legislation and the effect on 
injury crashes 
Legislation to regulate drink-driving involves either an outright ban on the 
practice or a certain blood alcohol concentration above which driving is 
banned. The former exists in the UAE and similar countries where drinking 
alcohol in itself is seen as a societal and cultural taboo while the latter is used 
in Europe, Canada and Australia (Voas et al, 2000) where drinking alcohol is 
more a societal norm. Elvik & Vaa (2004) in a meta-analysis (see Appendix A 
for explanation) of 18 studies on the subject found that general legislation 
banning drink-driving gives a 26% reduction in the number of fatal crashes 
while reducing permitted blood alcohol concentrations is also effective but to a 
lesser degree. Legislation appears to be most effective immediately after 
enactment with the effect diminishing over time (Ross, 1988). 
3.13.4 Drink-driving enforcement’s effect on offenders 
The enforcement of drink-driving laws and limits is the logical step after 
legislation, and can have a substantial effect on the rate of offence, as seen in 
the work of some researchers. In a meta-analysis of 26 studies of drink-
driving enforcement the effectiveness of this measure was found to be a 9% 
reduction in the number of fatal crashes and 7% for injury crashes (Elvik & 
Vaa, 2004). The effects of enforcement in the UK are detailed in a study 
commissioned by the Home Office (Riley, 1991). The findings of that study 
show that drivers in areas of high enforcement are less likely to drink and 
drive though this survey study relies on self-reporting and as such the results 
might not be entirely representative.  
In Australia random breath testing (RBT) of drivers to verify blood alcohol 
concentration has been in use in some areas since 1982. One study (Homel, 
1988) showed a 36% decline in alcohol-related fatalities over five years in the 
Australian state of New South Wales related to RBT. The legislation was 
launched with considerable momentum (Homel, 1990) with the recruitment of 
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200 new highway patrolmen especially for the task of breath testing and 
nearly one million breath tests carried out in the first year. This equated to 
approximately one test for every three license holders. This shows the 
dramatic effect legislation can have when supported by high profile and strict 
enforcement. 
3.13.5 Speed limits and their effect on actual speeds and crashes 
The setting of appropriate speeds and enforcing them can be an important 
factor in the frequency of crashes, particularly fatal ones. Early work on the 
subject of speed and crash involvement in the UK (in the counties of 
Berkshire and Buckinghamshire) found that drivers deviating from the average 
speed (whether higher or lower) have higher crash rates than other drivers 
(Munden, 1967). This was corroborated by a study in Tyne and Wear 
(Aljanahi et al, 1999). Other studies in the Kingdom of Bahrain found evidence 
of an association between mean speed and the crash rate (ibid.) and work in 
Ghana found that the ‘speed factor’ accounted for over half the crashes in two 
years (Afukaar, 2003) as reported by the police. Most studies that looked at 
the effect of speed reductions compared the imposition of speed limits where 
none existed before and the reduction of speeds in the higher speed ranges 
(e.g. 120km/h to 100km/h). Few studies looked at reductions in the lower 
ranges (Elvik & Vaa, 2004). The effect of reducing speed limits is almost 
always positive at least when the reduction is reflected in the actual driving 
speed (when drivers abide by the law). Experiments on Finnish roads in the 
1960’s and 1970’s (Salusjärvi, 1981) found that actual speeds correlated with 
speed limit restrictions and there was a direct correlation between speeds and 
crash numbers (higher speeds result in more crashes and vice versa). 
Estimates by the European Transport Safety Council (ETSC, 1995) claim that 
a 5km/hr reduction in average speeds could save over 11,000 deaths and 
180,000 injury crashes every year in the EU. A review of studies on speed 
and safety mostly in the USA (Wilmot & Khanal, 1999) found no statistical link 
between speed and crash incidence but a significant link between speed and 
crash severity was found. In the UK early work on real-world pedestrian 
crashes (Ashton & Mackay, 1979; Ashton, 1982) found that most crashes 
(>95%) occurred at lower speeds (less than 50 km/hr). Most crashes with 
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pedestrians where the vehicle was travelling at below 25 km/hr resulted in 
minor injuries to pedestrians. Impacts speeds over 30 km/hr resulted in non-
minor injuries. Pedestrians were most likely to be killed by impacts at speeds 
above 55 km/hr. This was based on the vehicle fleet of the time which was 
very different to cars on the road today. These results may no longer be valid 
for modern car fleets. Later reviews of literature found that fatalities occurred 
at slightly higher impact speeds (Neal-Sturgess et al, 2002) suggesting 
vehicle design improvements positively affected outcomes.  
3.13.6 Automatic speed enforcement devices and their effect on 
speed  
The enforcement of speed limits by authorities is a labour-intensive affair with 
a typical cycle (of speed checking by radar, then stopping a vehicle, then 
issuing the driver with a citation and completing the necessary paperwork) 
taking approximately 0.91 person-hours per citation in the Netherlands 
(Wilmot & Khanal, 1999). With a speed camera the figure is 0.02 person-
hours. Also the chances of being apprehended for speeding are fairly low 
even with high levels of traditional enforcement (Elvik & Vaa, 2004). Thus the 
automation of this task will save valuable traffic officer time and enable the 
processing of more citations but at the expense of high maintenance and 
capital equipment costs as speed cameras are fairly expensive. Speed 
cameras are designed to detect traffic violations (speeding) and identify the 
vehicle or driver automatically (Elvik & Vaa, 2004). Systems started off using 
analogue photography where films had to be manually replaced but nowadays 
digital cameras have been deployed that simplify the task of storing large 
amounts of information digitally and retrieving it quickly. Cameras provide a 
solution to bring speeding vehicles to account because the photographic 
evidence is used in association with existing laws to issue a fine or legal 
proceedings against the vehicle owner or registered keeper. In some areas 
(Sweden & Germany) this is made difficult because legislation does not allow 
the issue of a fine to a vehicle or vehicle owner but only to a driver. The 
experience of studies performed in a number of countries (Pilkington & Kinra, 
2005) shows some positive effect of the measure. In Queensland, Australia 
the application of an overt (not disguised) marked speed camera van in areas 
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within an approved speed camera zone was studied over a number of years 
(Newstead & Cameron, 2003). These zones were determined by a local road 
safety manual put together by the roads and policing authorities (Queensland 
Transport, 2000). Reductions of around 45% in fatal crashes were found in 
areas within 2km of the speed camera sites with associated reductions in 
hospitalisation and lesser-severity crashes. 
The average reduction in injury crashes calculated from a multitude of studies 
due to speed cameras is 17% (Elvik & Vaa, 2004). The effect of automatic 
enforcement on average speeds also appears to be time-limited as shown 
from a short-term study in the UK (Holland & Conner, 1996) while research in 
Kuwait shows that drivers show disregard for the speed limit after a number of 
years from camera installation as the fixed location becomes well-known and 
the phenomenon of speeding outside (immediately before and after) the 
camera zone is also observed (Koushki & Hasan, 2000). The distance-halo 
effect was also observed by a later study in Queensland, Australia 
(Champness et al, 2005) which found that a 6kph reduction in mean speed 
occurred due to speed camera deployment. However all effects of deployment 
disappeared about 1,500m beyond the speed camera location. 
3.13.7 Central barriers, guardrails and crash cushions as roadside 
safety devices 
The installation of a barrier at the edge of the road where there is a danger to 
the vehicle from running off the road (due to a drop in elevation or an obstacle 
or a combination of both) and the installation of a barrier between lanes of 
traffic travelling in opposite directions can prevent the worst outcome (injury) 
and limit the damage that happens when a driver loses control for any reason. 
Damaging obstacles that might be present off the side of the road include 
lamp posts, utility posts, rocks, trees and bodies of water (rivers, streams, 
etc.). Crash barriers might be located at sites where such obstacles cannot be 
positioned a safe distance back from the kerb. A study of road barriers in 
Willow Creek, California, spanning 17 years (7 before and 10 after barrier 
installation) looked at the fatalities from vehicles going over embankments on 
a 161km stretch of road. Regression analysis showed that 21 fatalities were 
predicted over the ten year period following installation. However no fatalities 
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at all occurred at the new installation sites, averaging a reduction of 2 per year 
(Short & Robertson, 1998). In a review of related research from a number of 
countries but predominantly the USA (Elvik & Vaa, 2004) most studies on the 
subject found a positive effect in reducing injury except that the installation of 
barriers in the median of highways resulted in an increase in non-injury 
crashes (with a reduction in injuries). The average reduction from installing a 
guardrail along the embankment of a road was 47% for any injury crashes 
(ibid.). 
On highways the separation of opposing traffic is particularly important due to 
the high speeds involved and the great potential for damage from just one 
vehicle crossing over into opposing traffic (Elvik & Vaa, 2004). One type of 
guardrail (concrete) appears to increase the probability of injury as opposed to 
metal rails most likely due to the more brittle deformation of concrete as 
opposed to steel. The average reduction in injury crashes from installing a 
median guardrail on multi-lane divided highways was found to be 30% for all 
injury crashes (Elvik & Vaa, 2004).  
The Australian experience (Corben et al, 1997) of treating a large number of 
blackspots with various measures found the following showed statistically 
reliable (p<0.05) improvements in before-after counts: 
? Changes to horizontal road geometry (reduced casualty crashes by 44%) 
? Large-scale shoulder sealing (reduced casualty crashes by 32%). 
This is a developing field with new barriers undergoing development and 
regulation (in the form of industry standards and crash testing certification) is 
catching up. New types of barriers are expected to come to market in the 
future allowing more research to be carried out to better understand their 
usefulness. 
3.13.8 Speed-reducing devices (speed humps and rumble strips) 
Devices such as speed humps (alternatively termed bumps) and rumble strips 
are used on roads to alert drivers to a possible hazard ahead or road feature 
that might require slowing down and paying more attention (like a roundabout, 
pedestrian crossing or junction). Such vertical deflections are used as 
engineering measures to slow drivers down (Schlabbach, 1997). These 
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devices are now widespread as a method for traffic calming. Higher speeds 
have been associated with more severe pedestrian injuries from a study in the 
USA in the late 1970s (Pitt et al, 1990) and 1990s (Gårder, 2004; Kim et al, 
2008) so reducing speeds is desirable especially in a pedestrian environment. 
Speed humps were first tested for public use in the UK in the early 1970s 
(Watts, 1973). Their use in urban settings has obvious advantages due to the 
proximity of pedestrians and other vulnerable road users but their use on main 
roads and arterial highways can be detrimental to traffic flow (Al-Omari & Al-
Masaeid, 2002) especially where no code of use exists as is expected to be 
the case in most LMCs. Their use as part of a wider measure of pedestrian-
friendly zones (that includes road design elements and signage to slow down 
drivers) has been reported as effective in reducing injury crashes, speed and 
traffic in the Netherlands. Similar results were found in Germany in a study of 
six cities albeit with a rise in non-injury crashes coupled with a decrease in 
injuries (Schlabbach, 1997). However most of those studies were before-after 
studies that might show different results if they were conducted over longer 
timescales or larger areas to detect any shift in crash location. Such devices 
were also part of a wider program of pedestrian safety measures considered 
for application in Victoria, Australia (Corben & Duarte, 2006). 
Studies in Vancouver, Canada (Zein et al, 1997) in four urban locations show 
a benefit of traffic calming measures (speed bumps combined with other 
measures like traffic restrictions, one-way streets and mini-roundabouts) in 
reducing crash insurance claim costs. However the study is not exclusive to 
speed humps and focused more on financial costs rather than human injury 
costs, being sponsored by an insurance company.  
Rumble strips (thin strips of plastic or asphalt laid at decreasing intervals to 
induce a “rumbling” sensation in vehicles travelling over them) have been 
shown to reduce crashes and vehicle speeds when used across the whole 
roadway especially in front of intersections (Fontaine & Carlson, 2001; Elvik & 
Vaa, 2004). Rumble strips applied as thin strips at the road shoulder to mark 
the edge of the carriageway (and hence alert drivers when they start to leave 
the carriageway) also appear to have been used successfully to reduce 
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crashes especially single-vehicle road-departure crashes (Griffith, 1999; Elvik 
& Vaa, 2004; Persaud et al, 2004). 
3.13.9 Measures for protecting pedestrians 
Measures designed to protect pedestrians from involvement with other traffic 
(namely motorised) are numerous and have come a long way since the days 
of red-flag-waving when a man with a red flag was supposed to run ahead of 
a car to alert other road users (DfT, 2004). Pedestrian crossings are one of 
the prime measures to protect pedestrians and provide them with safe 
passage across roads and they are of many types. Comparisons of different 
types have shown little difference between them in crash rates (Zaidel & 
Hocherman, 1987). Crossings have been shown to reduce crashes by 
numerous studies (Reading et al, 1995; Elvik & Vaa, 2004) but the safest 
types of crossings remain those that separate the two different types of traffic 
completely by elevation either above motor vehicles (overhead by-pass or 
bridge) or below (underpass). In Dubai the first solution has been applied to 
the most dangerous road (Sheikh Zayed Road) but due to the cost and 
complexity and the length of the road only a few have been built. In Abu Dhabi 
the second solution is favoured as the wide inner-city roads (3 lanes each 
direction) are notoriously difficult for pedestrians to cross, especially with little 
attention paid to pedestrian priority by drivers at zebra crossings. The 
effectiveness of grade-separated crossing facilities for pedestrians in reducing 
injury crashes is quite high at 82% (Elvik & Vaa, 2004) for all crashes where 
pedestrians attempt crossing the road. 
Pedestrianised zones (where MVs are not allowed, except for deliveries) are 
another measure which can be considered in busy market areas and streets. 
From studies conducted in Scandinavian countries and the UK (Elvik & Vaa, 
2004) the effect of pedestrian streets is always a reduction in crashes 
however there is a slight indication of increased crashes in adjoining streets 
that are not pedestrian-only. 
Australian work on the area of pedestrian safety in areas of high pedestrian 
activity in Victoria (Corben & Diamantopoulou, 1996; Corben & Duarte, 2006) 
showed a need for paying attention to a number of priority issues when 
considering countermeasures. These include vulnerable pedestrian groups; 
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locational preferences for crossing; crossing width and complexity; vehicle 
speeds and pedestrian level of service. Pedestrian level of service may be 
simplistically described as the degree of accommodation of pedestrian traffic 
within the transport system (Dixon, 1996). The countermeasures considered 
by researchers in Victoria (Corben & Duarte, 2006) included traffic control 
measures like speed zoning and signs as well as physical measures (gateway 
treatment; different carriageway pavement; rumble strips; roundabouts; 
carriageway/lane narrowing and medians). Most of the measures are self 
explanatory with the possible exception of gateway treatment. This refers to 
erecting a kind of outpost or symbolic structure at the entrance to an area of 
high pedestrian use (like a large sign or canopy) to differentiate it from the 
area preceding it thus highlighting the change in the mix of road users. 
3.13.10 Light conditions, illumination & weather conditions 
Lighting conditions were considered in a number of studies when looking at 
pedestrian safety with a variety of results. The severity of pedestrian crashes 
in rural Connecticut (Zajac & Ivan, 2003) was not found to be influenced by 
daylight, illumination or weather conditions. In Austria children were more 
commonly injured in crashes in the afternoon and early evening (Mayr et al, 
2003) while most site conditions were described as sunny and dry (63.1%). In 
the US Pitt et al (1990) used the data from the Pedestrian Injury Causation 
Study to focus on child injuries and it was found that the lowest injury 
severities occurred at noon and immediately after while the most severe 
injuries occurred early in the morning with the late afternoon taking a 
significant share of severe injuries. The morning period might account for 
more severe injuries due to driver tiredness and child pedestrians going to 
school. The increased severity of injury in the afternoon in both studies might 
be explained by increased fatigue by both drivers and child pedestrians 
returning from school at the end of the working day. Also the low angle of the 
sun in winter months might contribute to poor visibility conditions in some 
geographical areas. 
3.13.11 Intelligent Transport Systems (ITS) in relation to safety 
The advancement in communications technology and computing power 
combined with the reduced cost of electronic displays and data transmission 
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and the advance in vehicle weight, speed, and traffic density detection have 
all contributed to the development of what is known as Intelligent Transport 
Systems or ITS. The careful application of these technologies is said to make 
the transport system, as a whole, safer, more secure and efficient with a 
reduced environmental impact (Sayeg & Charles, 2005). The effect of the 
adoption of ITS on road safety is difficult to quantify as the system can include 
so many factors. Controlling for all of them is virtually impossible and there is 
no known situation where a road system is closed to use, “converted” to ITS, 
then re-opened and assessed thereafter. ITS measures can be applied 
individually or simultaneously and reviews of specific aspects of ITS have 
been found in previous work.  
The technology for voluntary and forced speed limiting devices in vehicles has 
been around for some time and research on the topic has included both 
simulation and real-world trials (Brookhuis & de Waard, 1999). Field studies in 
three European countries (the Netherlands, Spain and Sweden) indicated a 
good level of effectiveness in free driving conditions (Varhelyi & Makinen, 
2001). However negative behavioural effects were found such as slightly 
increased travel times and increased driver stress and frustration. One 
method of implementing speed limiting devices in a vehicle involves using an 
“active” accelerator pedal that resists being pushed further to break the speed 
limit in a specific area (Varhelyi, 2002). A large-scale trial in Sweden in 2000-
2002 found some acceptability of the usefulness of the system by drivers, 
however the majority of drivers preferred not to keep the system at the end of 
the trials (Adell & Varhelyi, 2008). The negative perceptions towards the 
device might be affected by factors such as technical malfunctions and 
increased emotional pressure during driving. Other technologies that have 
already been implemented in production cars are variations of adaptive cruise 
control that measures the distance to the vehicle ahead and maintains it at a 
driver-set limit. Manufacturers have various names for the systems. Some 
common names (Zou, 2001) are Distronic (Mercedes), Radar Cruise Control 
(Toyota), and Preview Distance Control (Mitsubishi).  
Variable message signs (VMS) are road side or overhead signs with 
messages that can be tailored to conditions and changed dynamically as 
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conditions change either automatically or manually. Drivers might be more 
responsive to a dynamic sign rather than a fixed one that might not be 
applicable or accurate all the time. Elvik & Vaa (2004) found a number of 
studies covering the measure that show a significant reduction in the number 
of crashes after deployment. Many were criticised for not controlling for 
regression-to-the-mean and for being at crash blackspots which increases the 
perceived effectiveness as opposed to a randomly-chosen location. The 
overall effect of this new technology does not appear proven, but the novelty 
of approach and the driver-empowerment with knowledge might be sufficient 
in improving the conditions of roads, especially during inclement weather and 
crash conditions. Ideally a well-executed ITS would alert drivers to delays on 
roads ahead in sufficient time to allow them to choose (or even suggest to 
them) a different route that is less congested. In extreme weather conditions 
like fog or ice, the dynamic alert might be more convincing to drivers than a 
static sign that is present all year round.  
A review commissioned by the Royal Automobile Club of Victoria, Australia 
(RACV) suggested a number of measures that had the potential to decrease 
injuries and fatalities by 10% like incident management systems, motorway 
control systems, urban traffic control and automated speed enforcement 
(reviewed earlier). The potential of current and future ITS applications to 
reduce crashes is emphasised and development of these systems must 
always take place with an eye on the overall safety effect on the road 
transport system (Regan et al, 2001). 
3.14 Post-crash safety measures 
The final stage of a traffic crash comes once the event is over and the 
process of rescue of the victims and recovery of the vehicles commences. 
Traffic management around the vicinity of the crash is key to avoid further 
crashes. International studies have shown that crash fatalities were potentially 
preventable where death occurs before arrival at hospital (Mock et al, 1997; 
Hussain & Redmond, 1994 in Peden et al, 2004). In comparing different 
countries, it appears that deaths tend to occur more frequently in low and 
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middle-income countries before arrival at hospital, when compared to higher-
income countries (Mock et al, 1998 in Peden et al, 2004). 
Post-crash care can be viewed in terms of a chain made up of the following 
links (Buylaert, 1999 in Peden et al, 2004): 
- Actions or self-help at the scene of the crash 
- Access to an emergency medical system 
- Help by emergency rescue services 
- Pre-hospital medical care provision 
- Hospital trauma care 
- Rehabilitative psychosocial care. 
These measures were not considered within the scope of this study. 
3.15 Summary 
This chapter reviewed methods of road safety management and problem 
solving from various regions around the world. Most methods were based on 
data analysis which emphasised the importance of collecting data. Major 
ongoing data collection projects related to crashes were found and described 
in the USA (NASS) and Europe (CARE, IRTAD and ERSO). Three general 
levels of detailed data were collected: base, intermediate and in-depth. Each 
detail level was useful for a particular purpose with the most functional level 
being the in-depth data (Sabey, 1990). This level was also the most difficult to 
collect due to the extent of information needed from various sources 
(hospitals, road users, etc). Base-level data was found to exist in Dubai. 
Collection of this data was started by the police in 1983.  
Knowledge transfer in general was a process that does not always happen 
within the same organisation let alone across different countries (Szulanski, 
2000). Knowledge transfer as related to road safety has been described in 
past work (Jacobs, 1986) so the methods were not entirely new. These 
methods of approaching the problem consist of three steps of which 
knowledge transfer is a key component of the central step. The process 
begins with problem identification through on-the-ground work to establish 
what data is available and what it covers and how reliable it is. Once this is 
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done this data (which is most often of the base-level) is analysed to identify 
the problems and classify them along with the causes if possible. The second 
key step consists of measuring up the problems identified with 
countermeasures that can be used to remedy them. Knowledge transfer is 
involved at this stage to identify the best countermeasures and the method of 
implementation. The third step was the measurement of the effect of a safety 
measure introduction or adoption and this can be done either directly where 
possible or by estimation or extrapolation of existing data on use and 
effectiveness. 
One example of this process that was found in previous work involves one of 
the most famous road safety countermeasures: the seat belt. In Dubai and the 
UAE seat belt use was not mandatory for front seat occupants of motor 
vehicles until January 1999. A before-after study was conducted from police 
data in Dubai (Abdalla, 2005) that showed a significant reduction in fatal and 
serious injury for vehicle occupants as a result of increased seat belt use after 
the new law came in force. In this case the direct effect of seatbelt use (on 
injuries) was measured after the countermeasure was applied and compared 
with the injury record before the enforcement of the law. The result was in 
accordance to previous research on seat belts which showed the success of 
this model of traffic safety problem treatment. 
This is the process that should be followed when any new measure is 
introduced be it pedestrian crossings, bridges, red light cameras or mobile 
and stationary speed cameras. International knowledge transfer allows the 
selection of appropriate countermeasures after key problem areas are 
identified. Once that is done the deployment of the countermeasure should be 
followed by monitoring and appraisal as described in the previous example. 
This thesis is mainly concerned with the identification of problems and 
matching them with countermeasures. Further work in the future needs to be 
carried out for evaluation and appraisal. 
The effect of development and environment on road safety scenarios was 
described. Increased wealth generally led to increased growth (Barro, 1996). 
Motorisation followed not long after. International development agencies 
targeted road safety in some of their work in developing countries due to the 
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scale of the problem there (Dinh-Zarr, 2008). Religion and values may have 
an effect on the level of road safety (Melinder, 2007). Rapid increase in the 
material wealth of the Gulf nations created a somewhat unique situation both 
in terms of economy and development (Davidson, 2006; Gause, 1994). 
The final part of the chapter was a global overview of some of the main traffic 
safety interventions. This revealed a wealth of data on a whole range of 
safety-improving countermeasures which have been useful in many areas of 
the world and that might be effective if used in areas where they are not 
currently in use. The number of measures is far too large for an exhaustive 
survey – that would require a separate volume on its own – so measures were 
chosen based on their level of effectiveness as shown from previously 
published academic studies. Most of the studies of countermeasures were 
found from highly motorised regions. As the thesis only deals with the 
problems found in Dubai (according to the data analysis in following chapters) 
most countermeasures that do not relate directly to the main problems were 
excluded even if they were highly effective in another context. Differences in 
climate, road environment and culture were among the factors that led to the 
exclusion of some measures.  
Measures were divided into three general sections (table 14) according to 
what factor they dealt with. The three sections were used to group factors 
according to what area they act on or relate to under the headings of Human, 
Vehicle and Environmental factors.  
Further divisions were made within the different sections along the lines of 
passive and active safety according to the effect of the countermeasure and 
whether it was injury-preventing (passive safety) or crash-preventing (active 
safety). Examples of measures within the Human factors section were driver 
education; school education and professional driver training. Factors that 
concern the vehicle were the fitment of Electronic Stability Control; seat belts; 
and vehicle crashworthiness. Environmental factors that were reviewed 
include exposure control; enforcement and central barriers and crash 
cushions. 
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Table 14: Division of literature reviewed measures 
No. Chapter 
Section 
Factor Measure 
1 3.11.1.1 Human School education (pre-driving) 
2 3.11.1.2 Human Professional driver training & the effect on 
crash involvement and driver behaviour 
3 3.11.2 Human Driving age limit 
4 3.11.3 Human Driving tests 
5 3.11.4 Human Offending driver punishment 
6 3.12.1.1 Vehicle Electronic Stability Control 
7 3.12.2.1 Vehicle Seat belt wearing and legislation 
8 3.12.2.2 Vehicle Vehicle crashworthiness & consumer testing 
9 3.13.1 Environmental Exposure control 
10 3.13.2 Environmental Police patrol effectiveness 
11 3.13.3 Environmental Blood alcohol concentration legislation 
12 3.13.4 Environmental Drink-driving enforcement 
13 3.13.5 Environmental Speed limits 
14 3.13.6 Environmental Automatic speed enforcement devices 
15 3.13.7 Environmental Central barriers, guardrails & crash cushions 
16 3.13.8 Environmental Speed-reducing devices (speed humps & 
rumble strips) 
17 3.13.9 Environmental Measures for protecting pedestrians 
18 3.13.10 Environmental Light conditions, illumination & weather 
conditions 
19 3.13.11 Environmental Intelligent Transport Systems (ITS) 
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Chapter 4 Methodology  
4.1 Introduction 
4.1.1 Data sources and types 
Data was needed to explore the causes of road crashes and their subsequent 
effects on road users (mainly in injury terms) before remedies could be 
suggested. A large sample of injury crash cases was taken from crashes 
known to the police traffic department and roads authority in Dubai. This 
sample represented the majority of crashes that occurred on the roads due to 
reasons highlighted in later chapters. At first the base-level data was looked at 
in the macroscopic sense – that is in a general manner to garner an initial 
diagnosis of the situation from past years. This was performed with data that 
encompassed twelve years of all reported injury crashes in the population. 
Secondly the situation was looked at in more depth (microscopically) to focus 
on the main problem areas but due to the greater depth, the date range of 
data coverage had to be reduced. Thus the microscopic analysis focused on 
the year 2006 and the first three months of 2007. The second sample 
contained more detailed data on serious and fatal crashes investigated by a 
dedicated team at the police. This sample’s relation to the overall crash 
population was demonstrated by weighting the different crash severities to 
those known from the overall crashes of 2006 (from the macroanalysis). Cost 
estimates for crashes were used from the UK Department for Transport (DfT, 
2007b) which adopted the “willingness to pay” method in calculating the 
potential savings from the prevention of accidents. 
4.1.2 Benefits of microscopic data view 
The micro-level analysis served to verify the findings of the macroanalysis (to 
check if they still apply to the latest available data at a more detailed level) 
and to establish whether the preventative measures already suggested 
correlate with suspected crash causes. With more in-depth data available this 
allowed more assertive matching of countermeasures to crash types. 
In addition more details that were not available from base data were collected 
and presented. Data that showed similar trends to those found in 
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macroanalysis were not reviewed in the results to avoid repetition and to allow 
for the presentation of new findings. Weighting of the data from the sample of 
in-depth crashes was possible because the whole population of reported 
injury crashes was recorded in the first part of the analysis so any projected 
benefits of countermeasures can also be weighted to the whole crash 
population (of the year under study). 
4.1.3 Process of estimating possible improvements 
Countermeasures for improving safety were matched as closely as possible to 
the top crash causes in the sample. With the known estimated effectiveness 
of measures from previous studies it was possible to make  best estimates of 
safety improvement as reviewed in the literature.  
4.2 Crash data collection process in Dubai and the UAE 
Policing in Dubai is divided into 12 geographical areas (see next figure) and 
each area deals with crashes occurring in their division. The areas are: Airport 
(covering Dubai International), Alhbab, Bur Dubai, Al Rifaa, Hatta, Alfuqaa, Al 
Muraqabat, Nayef, Ports (dealing with the sea ports of Rashid and Jebel Ali), 
Al Qusais, Al Rashidiyya and Jabal Ali. When a crash notification is received 
by the police command and control room it dispatches a police patrol from 
those operating in the area and contacts the necessary emergency services if 
needed. The attending officer fills in a crash report form (Appendix B) and if 
the crash is severe or involves some ambiguity the technical crash 
investigation division is called in (by the Public Prosecution). The technical 
investigation division is a small division within the traffic department made up 
of crash investigators trained in reconstruction techniques. They are on call 24 
hours a day and collect data from the scene using an additional form and their 
own photographs as well as taking appropriate measurements needed to 
reconstruct the crash on computer reconstruction programs which they have 
been trained to use. These include PC Crash (DSD, 2009) and Vista (Visual 
Statement, 2009). Detailed reports and reconstructions are used for court 
cases or to establish liability in the case of fatal crashes. 
After a crash occurs and the attending police officer returns to his respective 
station, the statement of the incident is filed electronically. The crash form is 
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forwarded to the road safety section where an analyst inputs the data into the 
MS Access database and validates entries during this process. A software 
program called GeoMedia by Intergraph Corporation (Limp & Harmon, 1998) 
is used to locate the crash on a digital base-map of Dubai which is tied to the 
crash file using location coordinates. This in turn allows the display of crashes 
of any selected criteria on a map. 
This can be used to inform policy in such matters as locating speed cameras 
(generally called “radars” in the UAE). Once the electronic statement is filed at 
the receiving station this is used by the analyst to clear up any mis-coding. 
 
Figure 15: Map showing the main Dubai Policing Regions (RTA, 2006a). 
Hospital data is also supplied for injured individuals. This is added on to the 
file once received to assess the degree of injury (fatal, serious, moderate or 
slight). The system as described has been running since approximately 2004. 
Most of this data was known to exist at the commencement of the study via 
numerous field visits to the general directorate of Traffic, Dubai Police. 
Contact was established with the different personnel to introduce the study to 
the police and to ascertain what crash data might be made available for study 
and how it could be delivered along with the possibility of accessing any of the 
archived data from past years. 
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4.3 Data description 
4.3.1 Base-level data for macroanalysis 
Initially the data for all fatal crashes of the past year (2005) was requested. 
After obtaining the permission of senior management the data was granted in 
electronic format (on USB flash memory disk) for all 2005 fatal crash cases 
but each case contained the crash form data only (see appendix B) with no 
personal or injury details. After conducting some analysis on the given cases 
(around 211 cases with 236 fatalities) it was clear that further data was 
needed to understand crash causation and to be of use in describing the long-
term trends and analysing the problems of the past few years. A larger 
sample size would make statistical analysis more significant. 
In the year 2005 a major change had taken place in the government 
departments responsible for the roads in Dubai. The Roads and Transport 
Authority (RTA) was established in November 2005 to take over all 
responsibility for road and infrastructure design, construction and 
maintenance, and vehicle and driver licensing. Certain departments were 
transferred from Dubai Police namely the safety and road engineering section. 
Most of the new RTA was made up of departments formerly managed by 
Dubai Municipality (DM). This meant all of the crash data was now jointly kept 
by the RTA and Police. Contact was established with the relevant 
departments in the new organisation but this task was made difficult because 
of the sudden birth of the RTA. A lot of areas of responsibility remained in 
between the Police and RTA while the finer details were sorted out. 
Eventually and with the move to the new headquarters (and associated 
equipment moving) completed the crash data input was resumed and field 
visits were again conducted to find the transferred personnel from the Police 
and find out the new responsibilities now assigned to them. As familiarity was 
gained with the fatal crash dataset of 2005 further attempts to expand it were 
made in 2006. These efforts culminated in a much larger and improved 
dataset from the new RTA now covering a 12-year series (1995 to 2006 
inclusive) and including all fatal, injury and property damage crashes with 
basic injury records (degree of injury). The authorities regularly use the data 
to produce annual reports and inform the decision-making process but this 
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was the first time that this data had been exclusively analysed from an 
academic viewpoint. 
4.3.2 In-depth data for microanalysis 
To better understand the in-depth data that was available an example of the 
crash files that were the source of this data are illustrated from a sample 
anonymised case on the following few pages. The main sources of 
information were the police control room summary, the formal case reports 
(submitted to the Public Prosecution or the police station requesting the 
investigation), the scene plan drawings and photographs of the location, 
vehicles and victims involved and any relevant features of the surroundings. If 
the case involved a fatality then the coroner’s report was often attached 
detailing the injuries and apparent cause of death.  
 
Figure 16: Example of police control room summary report. Translation: At 
approximately A hours B minutes on the evening of X day a report was received that at 
the street mentioned above a crash had occurred. Officers A & B attended the scene as 
did officer C from traffic investigation. The representative of the prosecutor was 
satisfied with the actions of the police. After investigation it transpired that the error 
was from the driver of vehicle A (named) belonging to (named entity) due to his losing 
control while driving on the exit ramp and veering to the left where the vehicle 
impacted the steel barrier then rolled over and struck a lamp post and the container fell 
off the back of the trailer (a distance of X metres). Due to the crash the driver was 
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severely injured and succumbed to his injuries while a passenger with him (details 
supplied) suffered medium injuries and was transferred to hospital. Severe damage 
was suffered by the vehicle in all parts as well as the container while the lamp post 
suffered medium damage and the steel barrier was damaged (length 25m). The driver’s 
body was taken to hospital and then to the coroner to prepare for handing over to the 
family of the deceased and all the required actions were taken. 
 
Figure 17: Examples of photographs from a case. 
 
Figure 18: Example of scene plan drawing for a crash case. 
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Figure 19: Extract from formal police case report. 
4.4 Data adaptation 
4.4.1 Base-level data description 
As the original data was supplied in MS Access database format, a dedicated 
statistical analysis package was needed to perform the sorting, validating and 
mathematical work on the data. The Statistical Package for Social Sciences 
(SPSS Inc, 2006) was used for most of the data analysis along with Microsoft 
Excel when the required graphs were not easily produced in SPSS. 
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Training sessions on the use of SPSS were attended and numerous online 
and printed manuals and tutorials were consulted to achieve competency in 
use of the package for this purpose. In addition, regular consultation with 
VSRC staff more experienced in using the package were held. 
The first step was to create the necessary programming commands, or 
‘syntax’, for importing the files and converting them into SPSS format. This 
was needed to convert most of the fields (that were numeric) into the 
equivalent text value based on the translation of the original crash form from 
the Arabic language. Most syntax files used for this purpose are attached in 
Appendix C. Some problems were faced in importing data that contained 
missing values as was the case when a data field was only recently 
introduced (in the 2002 form revision, for example) and this had a significant 
effect on skewing the data and distorting the picture. A prime example of this 
was in the crash causation field where alcohol intoxication is listed as a 
cause. Analysis for all 12 years showed that as an infrequent causation but 
further investigation revealed that coding for alcohol intoxication was only 
performed in the years 1999 and 2004-2006. When the year 2006 was taken 
separately alcohol intoxication was the second leading cause of crashes, 
which was a more accurate reflection of this problem than that found by 
analysing all 12 years of data. More details are provided in the relevant 
chapter and the data analysis was conducted with this factor always in mind. 
This required an iterative process of filtering certain data out before 
conducting analyses of specific factors to avoid distortion by outside factors 
(like missing values in certain years).  
4.4.2 Base level data adaptation and processing 
The extended (12-year) data was supplied in three main tables; (i) a crash 
case file; (ii) an injury file and (iii) a driver/vehicle file. These were linked 
together by a relationship created in MS Access. These files were then 
merged in SPSS with some variables from different tables as some key 
variables (time, date) were not available in all the tables. Casualty-level 
analysis was performed using syntax adapted from existing experience in the 
VSRC (Vehicle Safety Research Centre, Loughborough University, UK) that 
was used for merging large data sets in the past. The files included non-injury 
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cases that went to court (due to property damage) so the analysis required 
the separation of these non-injury cases to concentrate on injury-producing 
crashes. The total number of cases supplied and their divisions were outlined 
in the following table. These were collected over a 12-year period and 
included all crashes reported in the jurisdiction of Dubai Police. 
Table 15: Description of file types and numbers in database 
File type Vehicle/driver Casualty Crash file 
Total files 48,960 30,942 26,067 
Injury files 29,856 (61%) 30,942 (100%) 18,142 (70%) 
The personal data on injuries sustained by the individuals involved in these 
18,142 cases was later combined from the same sources for a total of 30,942 
casualties. The vehicle/driver files contained 48,960 cases as most crashes 
involved more than one driver. Not all cases (especially from the end of 2006) 
might have made it into the files due to delays with receiving hospital records 
and filing statements by the police so the 2006 injury figures might not be 
complete.  
The analysis of the provided variables (that were more or less complete and 
understood) of gender, nationality, age and degree of injury provides further 
detailed information related to the injured parties rather than the crash cases 
as a whole. This analysis permitted the highlighting of major trends and issues 
to arrive at the underlying problems that were present in many of the injury 
crashes. Many of these problems were common to more motorised countries 
with a better safety record (and have been covered in previous research as 
seen in the literature review) so the methods used to solve these problems 
were then evaluated with an eye on the local context and what might affect 
applicability in Dubai. If extenuating factors related to specific 
countermeasures were encountered that rendered them unsuitable for the 
Dubai situation then they were excluded. A prime example of this is the 
countermeasure of fitting studded tyres in winter (Elvik & Vaa, 2004). This 
may be beneficial in Scandinavian winters with extremely low temperatures 
but would be pointless if applied in a hot desert climate. Ideally a calculation 
of safety improvement or the reduction of casualty figures or severity was the 
intended outcome. In many cases the countermeasure effectiveness is not as 
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simple to calculate but in no case was a countermeasure suggested when it 
was thought that it might lead to a reduction in safety. Monitoring will provide 
the ultimate vindication. An example of where a countermeasure might have 
the opposite effect is introducing a zebra crossing to a frequent pedestrian 
crossing location (in a driving environment where drivers do not generally 
yield to pedestrians). This might lead to giving pedestrians more confidence to 
cross thus increasing their exposure to harm. 
4.4.2.1 Missing values in base-level data and under-reporting 
Missing values were encountered with a number of variables including speed 
limit, road layout, and site proximity to landmarks among others. Adjustments 
for this were made in the coding before analysis by setting missing value 
parameters for every variable in SPSS so missing values can be listed as 
independent categories (as seen for variables such as “central reservations 
and lane separation” and “number of lines or type of junction”). Details on the 
key variable names and properties used in the crash case files (excluding the 
casualty and vehicle/driver files) are shown in table 16 and in the section on 
limitations. Some fields that were not used included LINK; NODE; NORTH; 
EAST as they did not contain any information. These were probably used to 
describe the location of cases. These indicated the type of road involved and 
geographical coordinates but the relevant data for these fields were not 
supplied. 
Under-reporting of crashes is a frequently reported problem with police figures 
as explained in Chapter 1 (DfT, 2006a). Some medical sources in the UK (e.g. 
Gill et al, 2006) attribute the fall in injury crashes as reported by police data, to 
less reporting rather than improved road safety. This is because the figures do 
not match up when comparing police and hospital records for road traffic 
crashes in general. 
In Dubai the data was assumed to contain most of the injury crashes that 
occur there with very little under-reporting due to laws that prevent the repair 
of any MV by a garage unless accompanied by a police crash report and strict 
penalties for violators (Abdalla, 2005; El-Sadig et al, 2002). It is likely that any 
injury-producing crash will involve some vehicle damage.  
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4.4.3 In-depth data adaptation and processing 
To analyse the in-depth data a new database was created based on the 
information held by the crash investigation section at Dubai Police Traffic 
Department for which access was granted exclusively for the purposes of this 
research. The new database was required to contain all the relevant data 
available in the Arabic reports, so that it was easily analysable and 
retrievable. The existing files were digitally archived in PDF and printed form, 
written almost entirely in the Arabic language. This required the extraction of 
relevant details followed by translation and input into an SPSS (SPSS Inc, 
2006) database created specifically for the task taking into consideration the 
outcomes required. This database had to allow for the preventative measures 
(based on possible countermeasures) to be easily input and subsequently 
ranked according to frequency of occurrence, to highlight the most commonly-
occurring measures. 
A number of new fields were introduced that were not included in the original 
files but that could be deduced from the existing crash description or photos. 
Such an example was the daylight conditions that were assigned to one of 
Table 16: Variable names & types in the crash case file along with 
encountered missing values 
Name in database Description 
Type (from 
SPSS) Comment 
DATE Date of occurrence Date  
TIME Time of crash occurrence  Numeric  
NUMBERVEH No. of vehicles involved Numeric  
NOPERINJ No. of persons injured Numeric  
DEGINJ Degree of injury (fatal, serious, etc) Numeric  
LOCATION Location of crash String  
CAUSE 
Crash causation as listed by the 
police Numeric  
TYPE Crash type (see figure 36) Numeric  
SPDLIMIT Speed limit on road Numeric 
1833 
unknown/invalid 
SITECOND Number of lanes/type of junction Numeric 
4 missing, 1036 
unspecified 
SITENRTO Site proximity to (landmark etc) Numeric 
5057 missing, 7251 
unspecified 
CNTRESV Central reservation/barrier type Numeric 5254 missing 
LIGHT Lighting conditions Numeric 3 missing 
TCONTROL Traffic markings and signs String 1060 missing 
WEATHER Weather condition Numeric 
9 missing, 22 
unspecified 
RDSURF Road surface condition String 
13 missing, 134 
unspecified 
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three variables: daytime, night-time, or dusk/dawn (half an hour after dusk, 
and half an hour before sunrise). 
The new database enabled the matching of crash causation with reasonable 
certainty to suitable preventative measures for the most serious and common 
crashes. After this was done for all the crashes in the database a few 
preventative measures stood out because they were assigned to a large 
number of crashes and were not currently in extensive use in Dubai. Hence 
they would not be redundant. Such measures formed the basis for suggesting 
improvements to the existing safety standards and strategy in Dubai. 
Key elements like crash mechanism and crash causation were assessed 
according to a study of all the data available on the crash, including 
photographs, scene plans, witness statements and the technical report of the 
investigation team along with discussions with members of the team who 
attended where possible. 
4.4.3.1 Preventative measures validation 
The preventative measures that were likely to positively affect each crash 
case were selected based on gaining a thorough understanding of all the data 
available on each case from the police electronic files and hard copy. 
Anything that needed clarification was discussed with the police investigators 
while collecting the data (as they worked in the same office). In many cases at 
least one investigator remembered the details of the case and could shed 
more light on the subject. After this was done a sample of 10 cases of various 
types was shown to crash investigation experts to test the validity of the 
preventative measures assigned by the researcher as compared to the 
experienced crash investigators and reconstructionists.  
4.4.3.2 Crash investigator experience 
The seven subjects who were used for the validation all had many years of 
experience in crash investigation and/or research mostly in the UK with some 
of them having investigated crashes internationally. More detail on their 
experience is provided in table 17. 
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Table 17: Crash investigator experience and characteristics 
No. Organisation Gender Age 
group 
Level of 
experience 
Training &
qualifications 
1 Loughborough 
University 
M 40-50 Crash investigation 
in UK, Australia, & 
UAE. Management 
of relevant projects 
in European 
countries to 
harmonised 
protocols for 20 
years 
PhD in crash 
safety 
2 Loughborough 
University 
M 40-50 Involvement with 
real-world crashes 
(investigation; 
analysis) for 20 
years in UK, US & 
Germany 
PhD in crash 
safety 
3 Loughborough 
University 
M 40-50 Full-time OTS 
investigator (9 
years), CCIS 
investigator (9 
years) 
AITS 
MITAI 
DipASM 
LCGI 
MAIRSO 
HGV Class 1 
4 Loughborough 
University 
M 25-35 Full-time OTS 
investigator (5 
years) 
AITS 
5 Loughborough 
University 
M 25-35 Full-time OTS  & 
European 
SafetyNet 
investigator (4 
years) 
AITS 
ITAI affiliate; 
Road safety 
audit training for 
highway 
appraisals 
6 Loughborough 
University 
M 25-35 Full-time OTS 
investigator (3 
years) and data 
collection & 
management 
AITS 
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No. Organisation Gender Age 
group 
Level of 
experience 
Training &
qualifications 
7 Nottinghamshire 
Police 
M 35-45 Police traffic patrol 
& crash 
investigation (15 
years) and OTS 
police officer (5 
years) 
AITS; 
Road Safety 
Audit 
Forensic Light 
Bulb 
Examination 
Experience of 
various software 
(Total Station 
GPS; PC Crash; 
PenMap & FX3 
CAD) 
Police advanced 
driver 
Note: CCIS= Cooperative Crash Investigation Study; OTS=On-the-Spot crash study; AITS= 
Accident Investigation Training Services course in Forensic Collision Investigation; MITAI= 
Member of the Institute of Traffic Accident Investigators; DipASM= Diploma in Road Safety 
Management & Accident Investigation; LCGI= Licentiateship; MAIRSO= Member of the 
Association of Industrial Road Safety Officers; HGV Class 1= Heavy Goods Vehicle class 1 
licence.   
Most experts were actively involved in crash investigation as part of their job 
description. A number had completed training and courses in investigation 
and reconstruction. However, the majority had never been to the UAE and 
hence would not have witnessed the road environment first hand so it is 
acknowledged that in some cases the crash scenario itself might not have 
been easily imaginable. 
4.4.3.3 Questionnaire style 
The 10 cases were presented with most of the information available to the 
researcher (but not all of it) as some of the files in Dubai were not copied in 
order to avoid any possible data protection issues. Thus the experts could 
achieve some understanding of the crash scenario but without the important 
component of local knowledge of the areas involved.  
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The following scale was used to rank each factor entered by the researcher 
with a brief explanation: 
 
The experts were taken through the case summaries and photographs one by 
one taking time to process the information before filling a form assessing the 
factors related to each case. The results were anonymously analysed to show 
the extent of agreement with the researcher’s assessment. 
4.4.3.4 Vehicle size and segment classification 
Vehicle exposure data (traffic counts or number of registered vehicles of each 
type, or millions of kilometres travelled) was not available for the purposes of 
this study despite several attempts to gain access to traffic counters data. 
Instead manufacturer’s sales data was kindly provided by Auto Strategies 
International who specialise in the field of collecting and marketing this data 
internationally from their base in the United States.  
The data provided was new vehicle sales for the whole UAE market so it was 
assumed that the Dubai market is similar in proportion as it makes up a 
sizeable share of vehicles in the national market. It was also assumed that 
new vehicle sales reflected the composition of the whole fleet, as the biggest-
selling vehicles will make up the biggest proportion of the existing fleet. Only 
the overall number of registered vehicles in Dubai was found in the public 
domain (Al-Theeb, 2008a) and that corresponded to 853,827 in 2007, and 
739,547 in 2006 the main year for microscopic analysis. 
Table 18: Vehicle size categories 
 
 
 
 
 
Vehicle make and model information provided from the database was used to 
assign vehicles to their relevant size and body type categories in a simplified 
Category Example 
Cars  Toyota Corolla 
Sport Utility/4x4 BMW X5 
Trucks Mercedes Actros 
Buses Scania Bus 
Pickups Mitsubishi Fuso Canter 
Others Ex. Large utility van 
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classification based on the Auto Strategies classification (Auto Strategies 
International, 2008) to enable direct comparison of a vehicle model’s 
dominance in crashes to that vehicle’s standing in the whole market.  
4.5 The necessity of in-depth data 
The macroanalysis of base data allowed the characterisation of injury crashes 
reported by the authorities according to numerous fields including time of 
occurrence and causes. The causes and mechanisms of crashes could not be 
further analysed or verified due to the limited volume of information supplied 
for every crash. For microanalysis, though the number of crashes analysed 
was much smaller, the volume of information supplied and reviewed for every 
crash was significantly higher than for the base data. This meant that crash 
causes, mechanisms, scene descriptions and court evidence could all be 
used to verify the crash report data. With this in-depth knowledge the 
countermeasures and interventions were more accurately matched to injury 
crashes and their effectiveness in the prevalent conditions could be 
established with greater accuracy. 
4.6 Approach and methods to analysis 
4.6.1 Macroanalysis of base data  
The three main tables of data (crash, injury, and driver/vehicle tables) were 
initially dealt with separately for analysis. The variables within these tables 
were individually assessed through frequency counts and comparison with  
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Figure 20: Pyramid clarifying data analysis levels used 
other countries where appropriate to discover unusual traits and highlight 
problematic trends (first-level analysis). For every variable further tests were 
conducted with the categories of these variables if it was found that this could 
assist in understanding the crash situations encountered (second-level). For 
example, the initial analysis of crash severity reveals the proportion of each 
crash severity evident in the sample (fatal, serious, etc). Following this, the 
fatal category was subjected to more scrutiny as the type of fatal crashes was 
analysed (for example: Which is the most frequent fatal crash type? What 
time periods are fatal crashes concentrated in?) For a few select variables 
third-level analysis was conducted if this could support or negate the severity 
of particular problems. For example, for crashes with a reported fatal severity 
that involved pedestrians, what was the most frequent location(s)? 
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4.6.2 Microanalysis of in-depth data 
For serious crashes or when there is a significant dispute over blame a 
special court looks into the matter (a dedicated traffic court, situated in 
premises next to the Traffic Department). It is this court that often requires a 
technical report into the crash from the Crash Investigation Team at Dubai 
Police. This report normally included estimates of crash speeds and probable 
crash scenarios when conflicting statements are made by witnesses to 
ascertain from the evidence what the most likely interaction was between the 
different parties. Sometimes police stations ask the investigation team for a 
report into a crash of ambiguous circumstances. In this case a report will also 
be made on the crash using the station’s photographs and scene plan. The 
investigation team may make their own plans depending on how long ago the 
crash occurred and whether or not any of the team members attended the 
scene. 
This data was collected for the whole year of 2006 and the first three months 
of 2007 with a total of 300 cases reviewed. The data was input into a new 
database created specifically for this purpose in SPSS (SPSS Inc, 2006) with 
around 150 fields. The data input was canvassed from the various sources of 
information mentioned earlier in this chapter. As this data set contained more 
variables from different sources it contributed to a more in-depth picture of 
each crash. These data fields included many new variables that were not 
available for the base-level database. Such variables include vehicle types 
and registration; visual obstruction presence; vehicle direction of travel; 
estimated impact speed; crash mechanism (separate from crash causation) 
and many others. 
Minor discrepancies were found within the reviewed data between the filed 
court reports and the event summary from the emergency call centre. When 
this occurred, the data from the emergency call centre was chosen as advised 
by the officers who author the reports. The accuracy of the data entered was 
validated, where possible, by secondary means (e.g. day of week can be 
double-checked from the date). 
The table of suggested preventative measures and their estimated 
effectiveness was carefully put together by looking at the countermeasures 
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from the base-level data then selecting all the cases that may apply from the 
in-depth sample (using the preventative measures that were derived and 
validated by expert opinion). Then every case was filtered by type to see 
whether it was a suitable candidate for the chosen countermeasure. For 
example 46 crashes were listed with a preventative measure of “central 
barriers, guardrails & crash cushions”, however these represent a number of 
different interventions. The crashes were narrowed down to match one 
measure whose effectiveness is known from previous studies (e.g. Elvik & 
Vaa, 2004), either “guardrails along the roadside” or “median guardrail on 
multi-lane divided highway”. Each of these measures has an estimated 
percentage reduction for fatal injuries so that was then applied to the selected 
crashes to derive the expected reduction for this sample. This was then 
weighted to represent all the crashes of that year to arrive at an overall 
effectiveness of that particular intervention. This weighting is performed 
according to severity as serious and fatal crashes are over-represented in the 
sample so each severity is given a different weight (as explained in the next 
section). 
When a countermeasure’s effectiveness was only found for the whole crash 
population (including non-injury crashes) or for a particular crash sub-type 
(like fatal crashes) then the estimates were adjusted based on the cost and 
prevalence of that type only. Key examples of this were offending driver 
punishment which had a measured effectiveness on all crashes – injury and 
damage-only, as well as ESP/stability control which had a measured 
effectiveness on fatal crashes only.  
4.7 In-depth sample’s representation of the whole population 
The in-depth sample (January 2006 – March 2007) contained only 300 cases 
(240 in 2006 and 60 in the first quarter of 2007) whereas the number of all 
injurious crashes from January to December 2006 amounted to 1757 
according to the base-level data collected earlier (figure 21).  
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Figure 21: Graphical representation of the sub-set of in-depth cases in 
relation to the overall injury cases reported to the police. 
It is important to note here that the final data from the RTA for 2006 actually 
showed 1,812 injury crashes in that year which probably includes cases that 
were still being processed when the base-level data was collected from the 
RTA. To find out how representative the data from the in-depth sample was of 
all the injury crashes in that year the different severities of crashes were 
compared. It was found that the in-depth sample can be weighted to be 
representative of the overall population by dividing the number of cases of a 
specific severity in the whole population of  crashes by the number of crashes 
of that severity in the in-depth sample. For example, 259 fatal crashes were 
reported in total in 2006 while only 166 were found in the in-depth sample. By 
dividing 259 over 166, a factor of 1.56 is obtained. To find out how many fatal 
cases occurred in the general population for every case in the sample, it is 
enough to multiply the number of cases (in the sample) by 1.56. This was 
useful in later stages when preventative measures were estimated to 
“prevent” a certain number of in-depth cases and this “prevention” was then 
weighted to represent the effect on the whole crash population. The results of 
these weight calculations are shown in table 19. This basic weighting method 
was used due to the absence of more detail in the base data set. There was 
no sampling system used by the in-depth crash team to select cases for 
investigation. Instead, selection was made based on a number of factors such 
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as court orders; police station requests; and unusual or severe crashes. This 
process resulted in more serious crashes being investigated and thus 
included in the in-depth database when compared to the overall cases 
reported in the year. 
Table 19: Weighting microscopic sample to population 
Severity Cases in sample Overall 2006 sample Weighting factor 
Fatal 166 259 1.56 
Serious 23 155 6.74 
Medium 23 600 26.1 
Slight 8 743 92.9 
The severity of crashes was taken from the base study sample. As the sample 
was collected earlier on in the work, it did not contain all the cases in the in-
depth sample for 2006 as they were still being processed by the Dubai 
authorities (with a difference of 12 cases). Thus the severity of those 12 cases 
was not available so the weighting was based on the cases with known 
severity and is only approximate.  
The overall difference in severity between the two studies is better illustrated 
in the following figures based on reported severity. 
Severity comparison, 2006 injury cases
172
68
259
1498
0
300
600
900
1200
1500
1800
Fatal Non-fatalSeverity
N
o.
 o
f c
as
es Indepth
All injury cases
 
Figure 22: Severity comparison for all 2006 injury cases. 
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Figure 23: Severity comparison of studies 1 & 2 by reported police severity. 
4.8 Estimating the effects of inaction 
Using the available population data and a road safety performance guide that 
has remained constant over the years (fatality risk or fatality rate) it was 
possible to estimate the fatality or casualty situation for the coming years 
based on the growth seen in previous years and assuming that nothing is 
done. Factoring the projected crash savings into the estimated figures it can 
be shown how the traffic safety situation can be significantly altered if the 
countermeasures suggested were applied. 
4.9 Limitations  
4.9.1 Macro-level data and analysis  
The crash forms kindly provided by Dubai Police show a number of fields of 
data that were not supplied but that would provide very useful insights into 
crash or injury causation especially if compared with other values (like 
comparing injury severity with seat belt use). In some cases these fields were 
completed but the confidence in their accuracy was low due to limited 
understanding of how they were coded. The key fields include: seat belt use, 
tyre condition, vehicle classification (type), year of manufacture and vehicle 
make. Other data was also supplied but contained many cases of uncoded 
variables (where there is an option to choose “other” as an option, and “other” 
was not supplied; a case in point is the field describing crash proximity to local 
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feature). Review of such data revealed “other” as the most frequent 
occurrence which was not useful in adding to the understanding of crashes. If 
these fields could be obtained they would add another dimension to 
understanding the problem. Some of the variables that contained missing or 
unspecified variables were explained by the RTA as being due to changes in 
database structure over the years which is natural as the database evolves. 
This useful feedback was received from the RTA following a presentation on 
the macroanalysis results to the staff concerned in Dubai as soon as the 
results were available. Between 1995 and 1997 the data collection media was 
different so when the old data was migrated to the new database the mapping 
of some variables was not complete resulting in a number of missing or 
unspecified values. 
Further data that was supplied with the files but not used in this study included 
GIS (Geographical Information System) data that pin-pointed the location of a 
crash in XY coordinates. Efforts were made to import the data into software 
that could read it (ArcGIS was found to be installed on computer labs in the 
University campus). Despite numerous consultations with postgraduate 
researchers that had used such data before the efforts to locate crashes on a 
map of Dubai to try and visualise black spots and trends with different crash 
types did not succeed fully.  
4.9.2 Limitations with micro-level data and analysis 
Some limitations to the usefulness of the in-depth data were related to driver 
experience: the driver licensing date is useful for determining the experience 
of a driver, except in a few cases were the driving date is misleading. The 
system of licensing dictates a 2-year probational period (with annual renewal) 
after which a licence is granted with a validity of 10 years. In some cases if a 
licence is granted for 1 year only this was difficult to code in the database. In 
addition the licence issue date is not always representative of experience as 
the driver might have driven for many years outside Dubai before getting a 
Dubai licence. 
Some variables that were collected in-depth were not analysed due to the 
limited projected usefulness of such analysis for the purposes of this work. 
Such variables include the report authoring date, which is useful to measure 
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the time between a crash occurring and the report being submitted, but it is 
subject to many other variables (like the workload level and the date of 
request of the report which can be any time from immediately after the crash 
to a few months after). This makes it a possible performance indicator for the 
efficiency of the investigation team but this is not a focus of this research. 
The issuing authority of licences was mostly Dubai Police. Some instances of 
cases with no issue date were explained by deceased or injured drivers that 
did not present a licence or who did not hold a valid UAE licence. Since 
January 2008 licences were formally issued by the RTA instead of the Police. 
Ideally a database built from data collected by investigators trained to a 
similar (known) standard would be desirable but this is also outside the scope 
of the work. 
A lot of insight on the safety and involvement of different road users could be 
derived if this data was included along with injury levels. More information on 
vulnerable road users (pedestrians both young and old, drivers/occupants of 
small stature, cyclists, etc) could highlight the extent of their involvement and 
safety in the transport system compared to other users and other countries. 
4.10 Summary 
The collection and storage of crash data by the authorities in Dubai was 
described in some detail. This was based on observations of the author and 
numerous field visits to the Police and Road Authorities. A technical crash 
investigation division exists within the traffic police department that 
investigates crashes in more depth when required to do so by the Public 
Prosecutor or another police station or when there are unusual 
circumstances. They keep their own independent records of these 
investigations. 
The following flowchart illustrates some of the key steps in data collection and 
processing undertaken as part of this research. 
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Figure 24: Macro-analysis flowchart 
 
 
Figure 25: Micro-analysis flowchart (300 cases) 
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Initial data collection began with all the fatal crashes from one year (2005). 
This paved the way for collection of the complete twelve-year series of 
reported injury crashes held by the police and RTA containing basic injury-
level information. In this way previously unanalysed data was obtained, then 
converted, translated and modified for original statistical analysis, taking care 
not to mis-interpret data due to missing or time-sensitive entries. 
Further data of more depth was then collected for microanalysis. This 
included (in addition to the police report forms) formal case reports for court 
cases, scene plan drawings, photographs and the occasional coroner’s report. 
This additional depth meant not as many cases could be collected because 
the level of detail was so great.  
The base-level data used in macroanalysis was supplied in MS Access 
databases which required importing into MS Excel and SPSS for descriptive 
statistics and analysis. A total of 18,142 crash circumstance files were 
available along with 30,942 casualty files and 29,856 vehicle/driver files. 
The given variables were reviewed using various methods (frequency counts, 
pie charts, bar and line graphs, etc) appropriate to the categories and nature 
of variables. This served to highlight major trends and issues like peak crash 
times and the top reported causes. Countermeasures were matched to major 
problem areas where they were not currently in use and were likely to be 
highly effective. The effectiveness of these countermeasures (as found in 
previous studies in the literature review) was used to calculate estimates of 
the expected benefits. Benefits were quantified in terms of crash or casualty 
reduction and financial savings. The total economic savings for a year and for 
the whole study period (twelve years) was calculated to quantify the immense 
gains achievable by the transfer of knowledge in this area. 
The in-depth data collected for microanalysis was input on a custom-made 
SPSS database with as much relevant information as possible. This was 
piloted using a small number of cases to ensure the database made use of as 
much information available as possible. The sources of information (in 
addition to those in the base-level data) were formal court reports by a 
dedicated investigation team at Dubai police, scene plans, incident 
summaries from the police control room, photographs, witness statements 
and the occasional interview with an investigator who attended the crash. This 
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better understanding of crashes meant specific interventions could be used to 
address the most pressing issues as highlighted from the descriptive analysis 
of this data. The increased depth of data collected was used to assign up to 
eighteen preventative measures in one of three categories (human, vehicle 
and environment) to every individual case according to the available 
information. This procedure was verified for accuracy by having experienced 
crash investigators assess the factors independently. The choice of 
preventative measures was then narrowed down according to the most 
prevalent measures that applied to the greatest number of cases. These 
measures were then used as the basis for calculating expected benefits with 
greater accuracy as they were matched to individual cases then weighted to 
the overall population of crashes in one year. 
The microscopic view provided by in-depth data broadly followed the analysis 
process for macroscopic data but avoided the repetition of similar results so 
only new information was reviewed. Specific interventions were matched to 
problems with better accuracy due to the greater level of detailed information 
available on the crashes. These interventions were chosen from the broad 
spectrum of countermeasure areas as used in the macroscopic study. The 
benefits of these interventions were again calculated for the given sample and 
for the whole population of crashes by weighting of crashes according to 
severity.  
Projections of the future trends of road fatalities were made. They show what 
the situation might be like in a few years if the status quo was maintained and 
no new interventions or countermeasures were implemented. 
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Chapter 5 Results: Analysis of vehicle crash data  
5.1.1 Introduction: Macroscopic review of Dubai base-level data 
Base-level data from cases of traffic crash reports from Dubai authorities for 
all available injury and fatal cases that occurred between 1 January 1995 and 
31 December 2006 inclusive was reviewed. In-depth data from 2006 and 
2007 crashes was reviewed in the next section. The results of the review as 
described in the methodology section are presented next. The results were 
presented according to the order of analysis performed which was normally 
according to the order of variables in the database. 
5.1.2 Crashes by severity, day, time and date 
5.1.2.1 Crash severity 
The severity of a crash in Dubai was recorded as one of four ratings 
according to the degree of injury of the most severely injured person involved. 
Medium severity is not used in the UK annual publication “Road Casualties 
Great Britain” which means some of the crashes recorded as slight and 
serious in the UK would belong to the Medium category as used in Dubai. 
This might explain the large difference in the percentage of slight-severity 
crashes between the two. 
The most common type of injury crash rating was “slight” and the most rare 
injury crashes were “serious” ones (table 20). Differences in the definition and 
classification of crash severities between Dubai and the UK mean that these 
categories are not compatible with each other. However the differences are 
still of sufficient size to contrast the two regions in terms of the severity of road 
traffic crashes. One major difference is that a fatal crash in Dubai is recorded 
for a death that happens up to four months after the event (RTA, 2006a) while 
in the UK a 30-day definition is used. 
Table 20: Crash severity, Dubai v. UK (2005) 
 Crash severity Dubai Percent UK* Percent 
Fatal 211 13.5% 2,913 1.4%
Serious 130 8.3% 25,029 12.6%
Slight 648 41.4% 170,793 86%
Medium 577 36.8% - -
Total 1566 100% 198,735 100% 
* Estimated. Source: DfT, 2006b; RTA, 2006b. 
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Injury crash numbers during the time under study vary considerably but there 
is no clear pattern of increase or decline as shown in figure 26. It is difficult to 
find any satisfactory external explanation for this variation, but it may be 
related to internal factors in the method of data gathering and recording, as no 
adopted definition of crash severities was found in Dubai while conducting the 
studies except as mentioned earlier. This is discussed in more detail in 
section 7.3.1.  
Dubai injury cases by severity 1995 - 2006
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Figure 26: Injury crash cases by severity in the Emirate of Dubai, 12 year series 
(Source: RTA and Police data). 
It is worth noting that slight-injury crashes first declined between 1995 to 2000 
(from 1254 to 654) and then increased between 2001 and 2006 (from 674 to 
743). However serious crashes have not witnessed any significant decline 
over the same time period instead trebling over 12 years (from 50 to 155). 
Fatal crash cases have more than doubled in the same period from 110 in 
1995 to 259 in 2006. The proportion of fatal crashes (when expressed as a 
percentage of all injury crashes) was very high compared to the UK for the 
year 2005 (table 20). The incidence of non-fatal crashes, however, is more 
comparable to the figures for the UK (if medium and slight severities are 
considered together). The differences between years for all casualty levels 
were statistically significant (χ2 = 335, df = 11, p<0.01). 
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Almost half the injury crashes in the sample were of slight severity as rated by 
the police (figure 27). Medium, serious and fatal severity crashes make up the 
other half. This means that a large proportion of injury crashes have multiple 
consequences on those involved beyond the immediate injury. Such 
consequences include but are not limited to mental and physical health, 
financial condition and the effect on family and friends (Barnes, 2006). The 
proportion of fatal crashes in 2005 was more than the 12-year average while 
slight severity crashes were below the average. 
 
Figure 27: Primary degree of injury for all injury crashes, 1995-2006. 
5.1.3 Crashes by time of day with day of week 
Cross-tabulation of the time of day (3 hour intervals) with the day of week for 
the macroscopic sample results in the following table (21). The daily peaks 
occur exclusively in the afternoons and evenings between 1300 and 2100. 
Hourly peaks occur also in the afternoon and evening for most days except 
the weekends, which account for the most crashes in the early hours of the 
morning (Thursday, Friday and Saturday). 
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Table 21: Cross-tabulation of time of crashes (by 3 hour interval) as a percentage with 
day of week, 1995-2006 sample. 
Time 
(hours) Sunday Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday Saturday 
01-03 6.7 7.4 7.3 8.1 9.2 13.5 8.6 
04-06 6.3 6.1 5.7 6.2 6.6 10.8 5.9 
07-09 12.7 13.4 13.0 12.9 10.4 7.3 13.3 
10-12 15.0 13.5 13.4 13.1 13.1 7.7 13.5 
13-15 15.8 17.0 16.9 15.9 13.9 11.9 16.5 
16-18 14.3 15.3 17.1 15.7 15.8 17.3 16.1 
19-21 17.3 15.0 15.0 16.9 16.9 17.0 14.8 
22-24 11.9 12.2 11.5 11.2 14.0 14.4 11.3 
Total % 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Total 
cases 2534 2528 2478 2565 2897 2531 2609 
Note: Maximum percentage for each day in bold. 
 
Figure 28: Distribution of injury cases by day of week. 
Thursdays witness a disproportionately high number of crashes compared to 
the rest of the days of the week (figure 28) and the difference between the 
days is statistically significant (χ2 = 45.6, df = 6, p<0.01). The weekend in the 
UAE used to be Thursday (half day for some institutions in the private sector) 
and Friday for the large majority of the time period considered (with the 
exception of September – December 2006).  
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5.1.3.1.1 Effect of weekend switch in 2006 
The weekend changed in September 2006 to Friday and Saturday for all 
government ministries and public departments. With further data it would be 
possible to see if the surge in crashes is a “weekend effect” that transfers to 
the new weekend or remains on Thursday and thus may be attributable to 
reasons other than weekend effects. The current availability of data is only for 
4 months following the introduction of the new weekend arrangements so it 
was not comparable to the 11 years 8 months of data during which the old 
weekend arrangements were in effect. Instead the last four months of 2006 
were compared to the same period of the previous year, 2005 (figures 29 & 
30).  
 
Figure 29: Distribution of injury cases in the last 4 months of 2005 (the last year before 
Friday-Saturday weekend shift). 
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Figure 30: Distribution of 2006 injury cases (4 months) after Friday-Saturday weekend 
shift. 
Prior to the weekend shift Thursday and Friday had the most crashes. After 
the new weekend arrangements came into effect crashes were reduced on 
Wednesday, Thursday and Saturday while they increased for the remaining 
days of the week. Wednesday and Saturday now had the lowest number of 
crashes. The differences between weekdays from September to December 
2005 were as expected for an equal distribution and not statistically significant 
as the Chi-squared statistic indicates the null hypothesis (of equal 
distributions) can be accepted at the lowest level (χ2 = 5.87, df = 6, p<0.01). 
However the Chi-squared statistic for the September to December 2006 
sample indicates a significant difference between week days (χ2 = 14.96, df = 
6, p<0.05). 
5.1.3.2 Crashes by month 
Injury crashes according to the month of occurrence were also studied and 
these are shown in figure 31. Crashes appear to be less frequent during the 
height of summer (months 7, 8 and 9) and most frequent during spring and 
winter (3, 4 and 10-12). The heat experienced during summer-time in Dubai 
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and the region might drive pedestrians (who make up the largest share of 
casualties) to shelter from the heat outside, thus reducing their exposure to 
traffic. The heat might also deter other road users from going out resulting in a 
decrease in activity. Similarly cooler months might have the opposite effect. 
Differences between the months were statistically significant and not as would 
be expected from an equal distribution (χ2 = 113, df = 11, p<0.01).  
 
Figure 31: Injury cases by month of the year, 1995- 2006 (1=January). 
Injury crashes cross-tabulated by month and time (3-hourly intervals) show 
the greatest number of crashes to be concentrated in the afternoon and 
evening periods in all months of the year. 
Table 22: Injury crash numbers (1995-2006) by month and hour of day (3-hour intervals) 
Note: Highest category for month is in bold. 
TIME/Month JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC
01-03 10.0 9.9 9.1 7.8 7.2 9.3 10.1 9.8 8.5 7.2 6.6 9.3
04-06 6.1 6.2 7.0 6.8 6.3 7.5 8.2 7.8 8.6 5.9 6.0 6.0
07-09 11.2 12.8 11.6 10.6 12.8 12.1 12.1 11.6 12.3 11.5 13.0 10.8
10-12 13.3 12.7 12.3 13.8 13.7 13.3 13.2 12.2 11.8 11.6 13.3 11.8
13-15 14.9 15.2 14.2 17.4 15.1 13.5 13.5 14.9 16.5 17.6 15.2 16.3
16-18 17.3 15.2 17.2 15.4 15.9 15.7 15.2 14.3 14.8 16.8 16.9 15.9
19-21 15.2 15.2 15.8 15.1 15.9 16.0 16.0 17.8 15.9 17.9 17.1 16.3
22-24 12.0 12.9 12.6 13.1 13.1 12.6 11.7 11.7 11.6 11.7 11.8 13.5
Total % 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Total(cases) 1594 1543 1653 1606 1500 1426 1359 1289 1361 1588 1559 1664
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Early morning crashes appear most frequent in the winter months (December 
– March). 
5.1.4 Crashes by location and number of parties involved 
5.1.4.1 Crashes by number of people and vehicles involved 
As seen in figure 32 single-vehicle injury crashes are the most frequent 
(8,843; 49%) followed closely by 2-vehicle crashes (7,593; 42%). Most cases 
have one injured person (12,313; 68%). This was not far from official statistics 
for Dubai in 2007 (Dubai Police, 2008a) which show that 2-or-more-vehicle 
crashes made up 48% of the crashes for that year.  
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Figure 32: Number of vehicles and injured people involved in injury crash cases. 
Crashes with a large number of people injured and vehicles involved are rare 
and few of them occurred in adverse weather conditions (fog or wet road 
surface) most occurring on dry roads and in fair weather.  
The mean number of vehicles involved per case is 1.65 and the mean number 
of people injured per case is 1.71. Only one case involved 14 vehicles. 
However 45 cases involved 14 or more people which indicates that a heavy 
vehicle (bus or coach) carrying many passengers was implicated in a crash. 
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5.1.4.2 Crashes by location 
Location classification in crash reports is by road and area name and this 
provides an imbalanced opportunity for assessment as roads differ by length, 
type, configuration and traffic exposure. Bearing this in mind half the top 6 
locations (figure 33) were motorways typically well illuminated and well 
maintained. Unfortunately these did not include facilities for vulnerable road 
users like pedestrians or cyclists except that all new projects since the 
creation of the Roads and Transport Authority in 2006 were supposed to 
include such provision (RTA, 2006c). One non-road location shows up in the 
top 6, Bur Dubai, and with reference to an old map of Dubai (Dubai 
Municipality issue, circa 1995) this is shown as part of the old market area of 
Dubai which has very heavy pedestrian traffic and dense vehicle traffic.  
 
Figure 33: Injury crash frequency by location (top 6 locations), 1995 - 2006. 
Another possibility which must be borne in mind is that this area description 
was used for new or unnamed streets or when the street name was unknown. 
“Bur Dubai” is also a generic term for the western part of Dubai separated by 
the creek from the east side known as Deira. To show that this is not the case 
with the other top locations the same analysis run on all 6 locations shows 
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pedestrian collisions as the fourth most common type after head-to-tail, 
rollover and stationary object impacts. Some of the locations can be seen 
more clearly in the map in section 2.3. 
Table 23: Cross-tabulation of crash type by location for top 6 locations 
(note: numbers after location indicate position on the map in section 
2.3). 
Crash 
type/location 
AL-
ITTIHAD 
RD 
BUR 
DUBAI 
AREA 2 
DUBAI 
AL-AIN 
RD 1 
EMIRATES  
RD 
SHEIKH 
RASHID RD 
3 
SHEIKH 
ZAYED 
RD 4 
Stationary 
object impact 59 27 136 64 71 291
Pedestrian 
collision 53 102 14 77 80 172
Rollover 34 78 246 130 41 273
Impact with 
animal 0 12 18 0 0 0
Falling off 
moving vehicle 1 12 0 1 0 5
Head to side 
impact 11 19 7 11 4 19
Hit while turning 4 24 1 2 12 11
Side to side 73 48 38 84 62 206
Head to tail 124 29 141 110 134 439
Head on 9 37 7 5 12 11
Cross tabulation of the top crash locations by crash type show the most 
common crash types at different locations (in bold). In the single low-speed 
location (Bur Dubai) pedestrian collisions were most evident. In high-speed 
roads, rollovers and head-to-tail crashes were most evident. 
Table 24: Injury rates on the main highways in Dubai 
Road name Length (kilometres) Injury crashes/km 
Sheikh Zayed Rd 96 (48 each way) 14.8 
Dubai Al-Ain Rd 120 (60 each way) 5.0 
Emirates Rd 134 (67 each way) 3.6 
The lengths of the three top locations were known (Dubai Police, 2004) and 
the injury crash rate per kilometre was calculated (table 24) for the time period 
under study (lengths of other roads were not known). Sheikh Zayed Road 
leads in the number of injury crashes per kilometre despite being the shortest 
of the three roads under comparison. It is also the closest road to the coast 
and the centres of urban concentration in Dubai and neighbouring emirates. 
Being the closest of the main highways to the coast means it is the shortest 
express route to cross Dubai when coming from other emirates. Traffic 
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exposure might reasonably be expected to be higher than the two other 
roads, which might subsequently affect the crash rate per kilometre. 
5.1.5 Crashes by causation and speed limit 
5.1.5.1 Crash causation 
Table 25 summarises the 31 crash causes used on the police crash report 
form (Appendix B). These were recorded by the attendant police officer based 
on his judgement and training.  
Table 25: Crash causation as reported by the police 
   
Cause No. of cases with this cause Percentage 
Lack of consideration for other road users 4849 26.77
Violating speed limit 2287 12.63
Entering carriageway without checking for 
traffic 2047 11.30
Following too close to vehicle in front 1779 9.82
Lack of lane discipline 1561 8.62
Jumping a red light 1418 7.83
Carelessness and lack of attention 1214 6.70
Sudden change of direction 764 4.22
Dangerous driving 591 3.26
Effect of taking alcohol 404 2.23
Tyre blow out 288 1.59
Reversing without due care 245 1.35
Going against traffic 146 0.81
Other 124 0.68
Wandering animal 86 0.47
Incorrect overtaking 82 0.45
Wrong turn 65 0.36
Failing to give way 56 0.31
Doors not securely closed 30 0.17
No knowledge of driving and no licence 19 0.10
Effects of natural or environment factors 16 0.09
Shedding of load 10 0.06
Excess loading 9 0.05
Entering a no-entry zone 8 0.04
Tiredness and sleep 5 0.03
Trailer separation 3 0.02
Presence of obstacles in road 2 0.01
Speed humps 2 0.01
Unroadworthy vehicle 1 0.01
Faulty road 1 0.01
Effect of taking drugs 1 0.01
Total 18113 100
By far the most prominent recorded cause is the lack of consideration for 
other road users (26.8%) followed by violating the speed limit (12.6%) and 
entering the carriageway without checking for traffic (11.3%). The first cause 
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is open to interpretation as it was not known whether this lack of consideration 
is intentional or unintentional (a separate cause of “dangerous driving” is 
available on the form) while the other two causes were more precise in 
description. 
Further down the list a couple of factors pertinent to the environment and 
surroundings of Dubai were tyre blow outs (due to elevated summer 
temperatures when air temperatures can reach 50˚C, road surface 
temperatures are even higher) and wandering animals (due to highways 
sometimes cutting through virgin desert that is used by camel herds for 
feeding).  
The effect of alcohol intoxication as a causative factor is not very clearly 
defined from the earliest data but from the latest data in 2006 causation 
analysis shows a different result to the 12-year picture (table 26); alcohol-
intoxication was in fact the second leading cause of injury crashes in 2006. 
Compared to the 2006 data publication by authorities (RTA, 2007) the top 
causes occur in the same order and in similar percentages. Any minor 
difference might be due to more complete data received by the authorities. 
Table 26: Crash causation - 2006 cases only 
   
Cause No. of cases with this cause Percentage 
1  Lack of consideration to other road users 519 29.54%
23  Effect of taking alcohol 202 11.50%
3  Entering carriageway without checking for 
traffic 183 10.42%
4  Following too close to vehicle in front 157 8.94%
6  Violating speed limit 146 8.31%
5  Jumping a red light 133 7.57%
2  Lack of lane discipline 118 6.72%
32  Sudden change of direction 87 4.95%
7  Dangerous driving 58 3.30%
34  Other 57 3.24%
15  Carelessness and lack of attention 38 2.16%
19  Reversing without due care 15 0.85%
8  Tyre blow out 12 0.68%
17  Going against traffic 11 0.63%
10  Failing to give way 5 0.28%
16  Wrong turn 5 0.28%
18  Incorrect overtaking 4 0.23%
30  Wandering animal 4 0.23%
28  Shedding of load 2 0.11%
13  Doors not securely closed 1 0.06%
Total 1757 100%
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There was a short unusual series of crashes (27) with the cause listed as 
“alcohol intoxication” from 1995 to 2003 (none reported at all in 2002) then 
from 2004 to 2006, reporting appeared to improve. That cause made up the 
majority of cases (377 out of the total 404).  
 
Figure 34: Time of occurrence of crashes caused by alcohol intoxication (404 cases), 
1995-2006. 
Analysing the time of occurrence of these crashes shows a rise in the early 
morning period (1 – 5 am) and a distinct peak at 4 am (figure 34). This peak 
was also found in 2007 police data (Dubai Police, 2008a) for both injury and 
non-injury (serious property damage) crashes. Informal enquiries led to an 
association between this 4am peak and closing times of alcohol-serving 
venues at around 3am.  
5.1.5.2 Speed limits at crash sites 
Roads with a speed limit of 60 km/hr (37.5 mi/hr) accounted for the largest 
number of injury cases (40.6%, figure 35) followed by roads with higher 
speeds (80 and 120 km/hr, 32.6% combined). There was a large number 
(~10%) of invalid reported speeds (2, 3, 4 etc) and missing values (no entry in 
form) which indicates that reporting of speeds can be improved significantly. 
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With more advanced techniques that require GPS (Global Positioning 
System) coordinates to be reported on the crash form it will enable the 
validation of speeds in a more accurate manner at the RTA (Roads and 
Traffic Authority) where the road speed limits and class are set in the first 
place. Speed limits at crash sites were not reported in official data 
publications by the Police and RTA. 
 
 
Figure 35: Speed limits reported on sites of injury crashes, 1995-2006. 
5.1.6 Crashes by type 
Crash types were recorded as any of 10 general categories as shown in figure 
36. Pedestrian crashes were the leading type prevalent followed by head-to-
tail collisions and side-to-side or side-swipe collisions. Together these three 
account for over half the crash types occurring in the study period. Other 
significant types (with more than 10% representation) were rollovers and 
stationary object impacts. The data released by authorities for the year 2006 
only (RTA, 2007) shows a different ranking of crash types as it uses a 
different classification. All vehicle-to-vehicle collisions were grouped together 
which makes them the most prevalent crash type followed by pedestrian 
collisions. If the vehicle-to-vehicle collisions in the preceding pie chart were 
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grouped together they will also surpass the percentage of pedestrian 
collisions but then the detail of the vehicle collision crash types will be lost. 
 
 
Figure 36: Injury crash classification by type, 1995-2006. 
5.1.6.1 Pedestrian crashes 
The single crash type that occurred most often was the pedestrian collision 
followed by the head-to-tail scenario. In later years the percentage share of 
pedestrian crashes reported was higher than the 12-year average found from 
the data. This indicates that this class of crashes was increasing in proportion 
to overall crashes reported.  
Most injuries from pedestrian crashes were rated as being of slight severity 
but a significant proportion (21%) were serious and fatal. From looking at the 
most recent official data for the proportion of serious and fatal pedestrian 
injuries the severity of these crashes is increasing: 28% in 2006 (RTA, 2007) 
and 29% in 2007 (Dubai Police, 2008a). This was consistent with the 
assumption that low-severity injuries occur on low-speed roads and high-
severity ones occur on high-speed roads. This was supported by analysis of 
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the severities of the top high-speed location (Sheikh Zayed Rd, over 50% of 
injury crashes are fatal) and the top 3 low-speed locations (Bur Dubai area, 
Beni Yas St, Khalid Ibn Al-Waleed Rd, over 50% of crashes were slight). To 
put things in perspective the top 4 locations account for only 10% of all 
pedestrian crashes and a large number of crash locations were named only 
once in the database hence they are the site of only one pedestrian injury 
crash in 12 years. 
5.1.7 Crashes by road layout and proximity to landmarks 
5.1.7.1 Road layouts and excessive crashes on dual carriageways 
The UAE in general and Dubai in particular benefit from a modern road 
system mainly built around the travel needs of motorised traffic until recently 
when consideration has been given to other vulnerable road user types as 
well (RTA, 2006c). Most injury crashes occur on dual-carriageways 
(highways) with three lanes on each side followed by single-carriageways with 
one lane on each side followed closely by dual carriageways with two lanes 
on each side. 
 
Figure 37: Crash occurrence by road layout, 1995-2006. 
 144
In the UK highways or motorways (dual carriageways with 2 or more lanes in 
each direction where the national speed limit of 70mph applies) were 
considered to be some of the safest roads with the least number of fatalities 
occurring on them (DfT, 2006b). In Dubai it is the opposite with 4 of the top 6 
crash locations being motorway-equivalent (2 or 3 lane high speed dual-
carriageways) and only one being in a known pedestrian area. Pedestrian and 
head-to-tail crashes are almost equally evident as the most common collision 
types on dual carriageways with three lanes in each direction. The speed 
limits on such roads where the collisions took place are split between 120kph 
and 60kph, with the majority having the latter as a speed limit. This might 
explain the presence of large numbers of pedestrians as a 3-lane dual 
carriageway with a 60kph speed limit is certainly not a motorway. Pedestrian 
collisions are the most evident collision type on single-carriageway roads 
which generally had lower speed limits.  
5.1.8 Central reservations, barriers and lane separation 
The presence and type of barrier that separates traffic in opposite directions 
was noted on the crash form (figure 38) however this seems to be a new 
development as the majority of cases do not have this encoded. Of the 
encoded cases no barrier was present in the majority of cases. The wording 
(in Arabic) of the field makes it clear the field is not for barriers at the side of 
the road. This might be equally important to record if a vehicle hits a solid 
object not between the opposing lanes of traffic but outside the carriageway. 
This data was not otherwise published by authorities in Dubai. 
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Figure 38: Presence and type of central reservation or lane separation. 
5.1.9 Environmental conditions (lighting, road markings and weather) 
5.1.9.1 Light conditions 
The hours of daylight vary during the year from 11 in winter to about 13.5 in 
the summer (figure 39). The lighting conditions listed on the police form were 
translated as: 
? Daylight hours (crash occurred when daylight was sufficient for good 
vision). 
? Night time – sufficient lighting (crash occurred at night but in an area 
where lighting was sufficient for good vision). 
? Night time – poor lighting (crash occurred at night in a lit area but the 
lighting was not sufficient for good vision). 
? Night time – lighting not switched on (crash occurred at night in darkness 
as no lighting was in use). 
“Poor light” conditions and “no light” were very rare occurrences in injury 
crashes together accounting for less than 5% of the cases presented. 2006 
data (RTA, 2007) showed that daylight crashes account for 55% of the total 
which is within 3% of the 12-year series.  
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Figure 39: Lighting conditions in injury crashes. 
5.1.9.2 Road markings and signs 
Signage and road markings at the site of the crash were noted on the police 
form according to one of four situations (translated): 
? Markings exist: markings (showing direction of travel or priority for 
instance) are painted on the road. 
? No road markings or signage: no road markings or road signs exist at the 
location. 
? No road markings: no road markings exist at the location. 
? No signage: no road signs exist at the location (like STOP signs or give-
way inverted triangles). 
Road markings and signs existed at the majority of sites as shown in figure 40 
although about a third of crash sites do not have them. It was not specified in 
the data whether the markings or signs are out of view, vandalised, or 
markings washed out, or there were none to begin with. Data for these 
measures is not published by Dubai authorities thus comparison was not 
possible. In the UK OTS study for the first 3 years (Lenard & Hill, 2004) 
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pedestrian crashes were seldom affected by inadequate signing at the site of 
the crash with one exception. 
 
Figure 40: Traffic markings and signage at crash sites. 
5.1.9.3 Weather conditions 
The state of weather at the time of the crash (figure 41) is noted on police 
forms as one of five translated below: 
? Fair: fine and dry with good visibility. 
? Rainy: rain was falling at the time of the crash. 
? Foggy: fog had affected visibility (not further specified). 
? Sand storms: sand storms were evident in the area of the crash (possibly 
affecting visibility, stability from crosswinds and the road surface from sand 
deposits). 
? Other: a field to specify if other conditions other than those above exist. 
This was not provided as part of the data as it was manually encoded on 
the crash form and difficult to encode on the electronic database. 
Weather conditions were fair for the vast majority of cases (>98%) which was 
expected given the hot and precipitation-less climate that prevails for most of 
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the year. This was similar to the 2007 cases (Dubai Police, 2008a) where 
99.5% of crashes were recorded in fair conditions.   
 
Figure 41: Weather conditions at injury crash sites. 
5.1.9.4 Road surface conditions 
Classes of road condition on the police form (figure 42) are recorded as one 
of five conditions translated below: 
? Dry: the surface of the road was dry and free from that which may affect 
grip. 
? Wet: surface of the road was wet (normally with water from rainfall). 
? Sand-covered: the road surface was covered with sand (could be blown 
over by wind from the side of the road or from a sandstorm). 
? Petroleum or chemical substance: a petroleum substance (e.g. diesel) or 
chemical (from a shed load for instance) was on the road surface. 
? Other: a field was provided for other conditions or substances that may 
affect the road surface. However this was not provided as part of the data 
as it was manually written on the crash form and difficult to encode on the 
electronic database. 
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Figure 42: Road surface condition at injury crash sites. 
Road surface conditions were recorded as less than ideal (wet, oily or sand-
covered) in 3% of cases; a very small percentage of the total. Similar data for 
comparison was not normally published in Dubai.  
5.1.10 Profile of the casualties involved 
5.1.10.1 Gender and nationality divisions 
Analysis of the casualty data provided (figure 43) was used to evaluate the 
profile of those injured in road crashes and to compare the data with previous 
studies. Official data releases from 2006 and 2007 show the male:female 
proportion around 83%:17% (RTA, 2007; Dubai Police, 2008a) which was 
very close to the 12-year study findings. The gender division of the driving 
population was not found in the public domain for the emirate of Dubai. 
However males appear to be mostly injured as drivers while females were 
injured mostly as vehicle passengers (figure 43). 
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Figure 43 Gender and type of casualties in all injury crashes, 1995-2006. 
The nationality most represented in casualties was Indian (figure 44) followed 
by Emarati (an adjective to describe a UAE national) then Pakistani. The 
percentages show a slight variation from recently released data for 2006 and 
2007 which shows the Indian nationality makes up approximately 33% 
(increased), the Emarati 12% (decreased) and Pakistani 15% (static) of the 
total (RTA, 2007; Dubai Police, 2008a). Indians tend to be injured as 
pedestrians most (figure 45) and around the time of 8am - this peak is not 
seen for other majority nationalities so this might highlight a specific problem 
that can be determined in more detail through further investigation. 
It can be seen that Emaratis and Pakistanis were mostly injured as vehicle 
drivers while other nationalities were mostly injured as vehicle passengers 
(figure 45). Pedestrians make up the smallest section of road user type 
injured, however the numbers are still significant (and in the thousands). 
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Figure 44: Nationalities most represented in casualties (n=30,942) 
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Figure 45 Nationality and classification of casualties. 
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5.1.10.2 Age range of injured parties 
Figure 46 shows that over a quarter of casualties are under 22 years of age 
with a significant number below the legal driving age in the UAE (18 years). 
Those above 50 years make up a small percentage of the total (5.4%) and 
with respect to their proportion in the population of the UAE (6.9%) are slightly 
underrepresented. This might be explained by not all of them driving. RTA 
published figures (RTA, 2007) show the above-51 age category to make up 
5.7% of those injured in 2006 which was very close to the 12-year data set. 
Police published data use different age categories making it difficult to 
compare directly with the above. Slightly-injured casualties make up the 
largest proportion of both casualties and crash cases as seen previously 
(figure 27, page 129). 
 
 
Figure 46: Age range of casualties (licensing age 18), 1995-2006. 
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5.1.11 Driver attitudes and characteristics 
5.1.11.1 Seat belt usage 
Surveys of seat belt usage such as those performed in the UK annually (TRL, 
2004) were not common in the UAE nor in Dubai. However a few roadside 
surveys (table 27) were conducted at a busy main road during the mid-day 
rush hour in 2002 (3 years after the enforcement of the front-passenger 
seatbelt legislation) and 2005 with the results being supplied with the crash 
data. 
Table 27: Surveys of seatbelt use  
Date 28/01/2002 28/01/2002 22/06/2005 
Start 11.20am 12.10pm 11.30am 
Finish 12.00pm 12.45pm 12.45pm 
Drivers    
Sample size n=468 n=631 n=556 
% wearing seatbelt 88% 85% 65% 
Front seat pass.    
Sample size n=183 n=220 n=194 
% wearing seatbelt 86% 81% 25% 
  Source: RTA 2006c 
The percentage of drivers and front seat passengers using seatbelts stood at 
a reasonably good level (>80%) in 2002 which is three years after the public 
enactment and enforcement of the seat belt law. However by the year 2005 
usage levels had dropped for drivers but even more so for passengers, with 
only one in four front seat passengers wearing a seatbelt. The publicity that 
accompanied the enactment of the legislation combined with the highly visible 
enforcement efforts (Abdalla, 2002; El-Sadig et al, 2004) might have become 
a distant memory in the mind of the motorist in 2005 compared to the motorist 
of 2002, contributing to the lower usage rates seen. It may be the case that 
the longer the time period elapsed since enforcement, the more usage rates 
will drop, but this can be verified by future surveys. Also the driving population 
in 2005 might be different to that in 2002, and might not have witnessed or 
even have knowledge of the seat belt legislation passed in 1999.  
5.1.11.2 Driver education and behaviour 
The lack of consideration for other road users comes firmly on top of the injury 
crash causes cited by police in this dataset as well as in 2007 (Dubai Police, 
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2008a). This suggests a lack of discipline, knowledge, attentiveness and care 
to others which is more of a behavioural problem than an educational one. 
Behavioural issues should be considered when suggesting traffic safety 
interventions due to the large role they play (Oxley et al, 2004).  
5.2 Microscopic view of in-depth data 
The following sections present the results from in-depth crash investigations 
undertaken by the police for (mostly) severe and fatal crashes as requested 
by the Public Prosecution for court cases or by individual police stations. 
Variables that showed results similar to the macroscopic study were not 
included to avoid duplication. Seat belt use was not analysed due to the non-
reporting of this variable in most cases (296/300). 
5.2.1 Case breakdown by month, hour and day 
A sizeable variation existed between different months of the year (figure 47) 
especially the last three (October – December). This is due to the nature of 
the investigation team’s function that supplements the standard crash 
investigation procedure and hence they are not called to every single fatal or 
serious crash that occurs. The chances of being called out to a crash are 
affected by the type of crash and the extent of damage incurred to road users, 
vehicles and other structures. They are also subject to the judgement of the 
Public Prosecution representative who attends fatal crashes and might 
request the report to support court proceedings. Individual police stations may 
request an in-depth investigation where the experience and training of the 
investigation team are called upon. All these factors affect the number of 
crashes investigated per month, in contrast to the base-level database which 
contains all injury crashes reported regardless of such external factors. 
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Figure 47: Case breakdown by month, 2006 only. 
The plot of crashes by hour of day (figure 48) showed three distinct peaks at 6 
am, 5 pm and 8 pm. The least number of crashes happen around 4 am and 
10 am, which was similar to the findings of the macroanalysis. The peaks 
appear to coincide with high volumes of traffic at different rush hours but 
exposure data was not available to verify that relationship. Wednesday (figure 
49) stands out as the day of the week with the least crashes just before the 
weekend of Thursday and Friday for some organisations or Friday and 
Saturday for others (all public departments and some private companies). 
Most other week days have between 41 and 48 crashes in the year. The 
timing of crashes might be related to the decrease in crashes on Wednesdays 
compared to other days. From Saturday to Wednesday most of the crashes 
happen during the day. Only on Thursday and Friday do more crashes 
happen at night than during the day. There is a clear difference in serious and 
fatal crash times during the weekend compared to week days which may be 
influenced by work patterns. Traffic exposure data with time is needed to 
verify the relationship between these factors. 
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Figure 48: In-depth cases by hour of occurrence. 
 
Figure 49: In-depth crashes by day. 
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Cross-tabulation of the most frequent crash times and days results in table 28. 
This shows the days with the most frequent early-morning crashes to be 
Monday, Tuesday and Saturday. Saturday and Sunday tend to have more 
mid-morning and afternoon crashes while Thursday, Friday and Saturday 
have the most evening and late crashes. All days have peaks in the afternoon 
and evening. This might point to a problem with tiredness and fatigue as the 
morning periods seem to be free of fatal and serious crashes. 
Table 28: Cross tabulation of in-depth crash times and days (percentage 
-bold numbers are the largest category by day). 
Hour/day Sunday Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday Saturday 
0-3 4.5 14.9 7.3 7.4 11.1 12.5 14.6
4-6 11.4 14.9 17.1 11.1 13.3 10.4 6.3
7-9 11.4 14.9 9.8 14.8 11.1 4.2 12.5
10-12 13.6 2.1 12.2 3.7 4.4 4.2 16.7
13-15 18.2 14.9 12.2 18.5 0.0 12.5 8.3
16-18 15.9 25.5 26.8 18.5 15.6 16.7 29.2
19-21 20.5 10.6 7.3 14.8 31.1 27.1 12.5
22-23 4.5 2.1 7.3 11.1 13.3 12.5 0.0
Total(%) 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Total 
cases 44 47 41 27 45 48 48
 
5.2.2 Top 6 Locations 
The top 6 locations or road names where a majority of serious crashes occur 
(figure 50) were mostly high speed motorway-class dual carriageways made 
up of 3 lanes or more. Four of the locations correspond to top locations from 
macroanalysis but the other two were different: Al Khail road only opened 
recently which might explain its absence from the base-level data. Al 
Muhaisna 2nd is a residential labour camp area with heavy pedestrian traffic 
and the only location to have a relatively low speed limit in the top six. 
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Figure 50: Top 6 locations - In-depth cases. 
5.2.3 Vehicle speeds, speed limits and speeding 
The occurrence of speeding (figures 51 and 52) was evident where the road 
speed limit was exceeded by the reported or calculated vehicle speed. It is 
important to note that if no vehicle speed was available (due to lack of 
evidence) then that instance of speeding was not recorded. V1 and V2 (first 
and second vehicles involved) show a high incidence of speeding despite the 
use of stationary speed enforcement (speed cameras) on a lot of the top 
crash locations. However if speeding was present in a crash it was not always 
recorded as a causative factor (see sub-section on crash causes). 
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Figure 51: V1 occurrence of overspeeding. 
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Figure 52: V2 occurrence of overspeeding. 
Vehicle speeds were estimated by the investigation team based on evidence 
(tyre marks) and the statements of people involved. These were compared to 
the speed limit in force in the area (where applicable except in car parks or 
unpaved areas) to determine whether the vehicles were speeding or not. Few 
estimates for V2 and V3 were found (41 and 7 respectively). For V1 190 
entries of an estimated speed were recorded. 
283 cases with recorded speed limits were analysed (figure 53) as the rest 
were not on roads (i.e. desert area or construction site) or the speed limits 
were not known. The greatest number of cases occur on roads with an 
80km/h limit which mostly applies to inner-city roads in lightly built up areas or 
connectors between commercial or residential areas. 
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Figure 53: Speed limits at crash locations. 
A 120km/h limit indicates a motorway or outer-city route which was the 
second most common reported limit.  
5.2.4 Crash mechanisms and causes 
Some crashes were straightforward with only one crash mechanism (for 
instance hit another car and stopped) however many cases had multiple crash 
mechanisms especially if high speeds were involved. All cases had a first 
crash mechanism recorded while 69 had a second mechanism and only 27 
had three unique crash mechanisms recorded. For simplicity only the sum of 
crash mechanisms is presented in figure 54. One crash defied classification 
as it did not involve the vehicle crashing; rather the passenger fell off due to 
inappropriate seating in the cargo area of a pickup truck. 
The crash mechanism of the majority of cases was a movable object impact 
(typically another vehicle or pedestrian) followed by the loss of directional 
control. The most prominent secondary crash mechanism was impact with a 
fixed object such as a fixed barrier or lamp post which would be common after 
impact with a movable object or loss of directional control. A fixed object 
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impact and loss of stability were rarely recorded as primary crash 
mechanisms more often occurring as secondary and tertiary mechanisms. 
Loss of traction and the loss of directional control were never recorded as a 
tertiary crash cause which makes sense considering these events typically 
are the precursor to an impact that most drivers would want to avoid.  
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Figure 54: Crash mechanisms by frequency reported. 
The first crash cause (figure 55) most often reported was driving without due 
care, while the secondary crash cause most reported was the presence of a 
pedestrian or cyclist near or in the road. Other causes in the top four (by 
frequency) were excessive speed and entering the road without checking if it 
is safe to do so. Excessive speed is mostly marked as a secondary or tertiary 
cause rather than the primary cause of a crash. Drink driving is not very high 
on the list of causes for the microscopic analysis as opposed to the base-level 
data where it comes second in 2006. Possible reasons for this were 
mentioned in the discussion section. In UK data for 2007 (DfT, 2008) for 
crashes attended by the police (and where a contributory factor was noted) 
“failure to look properly” was the leading factor (present in 20% of all factors) 
noted followed by the “failure to judge the other person’s path or speed” 
(11%). The third most common contributory factor was 
“careless/reckless/hurried driving” (9%). Against this backdrop of contributory 
factors, “driving without due care and attention” appears to be a catch-all 
phrase which may be potentially broken down into a few other categories.    
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Figure 55: Crash causation. 
5.2.5 Objects hit in crashes 
Pedestrians were a particularly high risk group (figure 56) as they were most 
often the first object impacted by a vehicle (in some cases it appears that the 
pedestrian might have jumped at the vehicle rather than being hit by it). Such 
cases were suspected suicide attempts as confirmed by the police 
investigators (Dubai Police, 2008b). However they were not only present as a 
first point of impact but even as a second and third object hit (figures 58 and 
59) as would be the case when a vehicle leaves the road and encroaches on 
pedestrian areas or hits multiple people attempting to cross a road. Further 
analysis of the drivers that hit pedestrians showed that 60% of those drivers 
had less than 4 years driving experience but 57% of drivers with less than 4 
years experience were found in the main sample (all objects hit) so drivers 
with less experience did not seem more likely to hit a pedestrian than any 
other object.  
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Figure 56: First object hit in crash. Vehicle 1 is the impacting vehicle. 2006 and ¼ 2007 
in-depth cases (n=295). 
Pedestrians were most frequently hit by cars followed by “other” vehicle types. 
This category included such vehicles as cyclists, buses, light goods vehicles, 
etc. Cars most frequently hit other cars. 
Further analysis of pedestrian collisions (166 in total – figure 57) shows most 
were hit by cars and 4x4s (over 50%) followed by light and heavy goods 
vehicles and buses. 
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Figure 57: Pedestrian crashes by the most frequent impacting vehicle (n=166). 
Cars and other motorised vehicles made up the bulk of other objects hit. 
Heavy goods vehicles (HGV) and 4x4s make up a similar and sizeable portion 
of first objects hit followed closely by cycles. There was no registration found 
for cycles but the new vehicle sales of 4x4s and HGVs or trucks were 
dissimilar at around 20% for 4x4s and 6% for HGVs out of total vehicle sales 
in 2006. Other unusual items hit appeared further down on the list such as 
sand, shrubs and trees. 
UK casualty crashes in 2007 (DfT, 2008) involved a pedestrian and one 
vehicle in only 15% of the cases reported which was in sharp contrast to the 
extent of the problem in the Dubai in-depth data. The majority of injury 
crashes in the UK involved two or more vehicles other than a pedestrian 
(69.8%). 
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Steel barriers (figure 58) were the most common second object that was hit. 
This was to be expected after losing control of a vehicle or impacting another 
mobile object. No recent studies were found that publish this kind of analysis 
though this data should be available in in-depth databases where they exist 
around the world. In the UK (DfT, 2008) single vehicle crashes were analysed 
according to the first objects hit. The majority of objects hit are listed as “other 
permanent objects” (11% of all single vehicle crashes) while trees make up 
the single largest known category at 5.9%. 
 
Figure 58: Second object hit in crash. 
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Figure 59: Third object hit in crash. 
The total number of crashes with a first object hit recorded was 295. Cases 
with a report of a second and third object were significantly less at 60 and 15 
respectively. Nevertheless the subset of 15 cases where a vehicle hit 3 
objects consecutively necessitates further investigation. It is likely that such 
crashes involve high speeds and/or high energy that is dissipated through a 
number of impacts with different objects. Categories smaller than 5% were 
merged to form the “other” category. 
5.3 Preventative measures validation 
10 in-depth sample cases were selected and reviewed with 7 experts in the 
field to assess their level of agreement with the preventative measures 
suggested. Overall the cases had 54 factors assigned to them and each factor 
was rated by the expert as explained in chapter 4 (Methodology) as 1 of 5 
agreement levels. This gave a total of 378 scores (7 experts x 54 factors). The 
overall scores were added up and disagreements were measured as a 
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response of 1 or 2 on the scale (translating to “Disagree” or “Strongly 
disagree”). Some disagreement was found as illustrated in the table below, 
but it was not greater than 15% (i.e. 56 out of 378). 
Table 29: Frequency of scores for assessment of preventative factors by experts. 
Score Frequency Percentage 
1 (Strongly disagree) 9 2.4%
2 (Disagree) 47 12.4%
3 (Neutral) 68 18%
4 (Agree) 160 42.3%
5 (Strongly agree) 94 24.9%
Total 378 100%
Reasons for the disagreement with some factors shown by UK experts were 
numerous. If more time was available to explain the cases and factors to the 
experts then it is likely that there would have been less disagreement. The 
main reasons for disagreement were listed below: 
- The experts did not have as much information on the crashes available 
to them or as much time to dwell on each crash and think it through as 
the researcher (on average they each had 12 minutes to understand 
each crash as opposed to at least 37 minutes by the researcher). 
- Experts did not have access to the extra information from Dubai 
investigators or the opportunity to discuss any of the crashes that had 
been attended by the team in Dubai. 
- The preventative measures were devised by the researcher and were 
well understood, while sometimes their meaning and examples had to 
be explained to the experts who had various levels of experience and 
exposure to the different preventative factors and little experience of 
the UAE road system. 
5.3.1 Preventative measures: vehicles 
These were the vehicle factors selected that could mitigate injury/crash 
occurrence had they been present according to the best judgement of the 
circumstances (figure 60) in the in-depth sample. The factors were not 
mutually exclusive (i.e. the total factors selected may exceed the number of 
cases as some cases have more than one factor selected). The order of 
factors is not significant. These factors were selected from the extensive 
literature review as being some of the most effective in the field as proven in 
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previous research, while still being relevant and largely unused in Dubai at the 
time of study. Effectiveness was normally measured as the calculated 
percentage reduction in injuries or injury crashes before/after application of a 
measure. 
Vehicle design might have come a long way in the past few decades but the 
space for improvement is still available as long as people are being injured by 
or in cars. The description of vehicle design is purposely left vague because 
the remit of this area is so large that it would be difficult for a study of this size 
to cover all the possibilities. 
Vehicle factors that may mitigate outcome
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Figure 60: Frequency of crashes in which named vehicle factors would have positively 
affected outcome. 
The vehicle factor that was most frequent for most cases was “better 
crashworthiness”. This means that a lot of crashes might have been 
survivable or the injury might have been less severe had the structure of the 
vehicle been more robust, as one example of what might constitute better 
crashworthiness. This did not mean that all the vehicles in Dubai had poor 
crashworthiness, but it might indicate that many of the vehicles involved in 
serious crashes were older or did not conform to the latest crashworthiness 
standards. Seat belt use was suggested as a mitigating factor in a number of 
cases but this was a difficult choice to make as it was only possible to select it 
when it was obvious that a seat belt was not used. This was due to the non-
reporting of seat belt use for most cases. Loss of control was present in a 
 170
number of cases despite the generally dry roads and good weather conditions 
that prevail in Dubai. Loss of control might be the result of excessive speeds 
or unusual road conditions (as was the case in one crash with sand on the 
road). Also tyre quality and condition might contribute to loss-of-control 
crashes, as more than one case involved what is known as “sand tyres” 
(smooth balloon tyres with longitudinal tread lines) fitted on 4x4s. 
5.3.2 Preventative measures: human factors 
Here the human factors that may improve the outcome in the in-depth sample 
of crashes were presented (figure 61). The knowledge deficiencies were not 
limited to drivers but were also widespread among other vulnerable road 
users namely pedestrians and cyclists. 
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Figure 61: Frequency of crashes in which named human factor may have positively 
affected outcome. 
Whilst it is easy to regulate drivers or operators of machinery there is little 
control that can be exerted over walking and cycling except in a very tightly 
controlled environment. Hence it was not practical to suggest measures 
targeted at pedestrian behaviour. Reading some of the witness statements 
proved that some pedestrians learn from experience while others were caught 
up in a crash before they had time to learn. Pedestrian and cyclist visibility 
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might also play an important role in preserving the safety of this class of road 
user. Drivers in witness statements have reported not seeing pedestrians in a 
number of cases and these problems can be exacerbated in adverse weather 
and visibility. Other factors (offending driver punishment, cyclist protection, 
child seating) came up less often but were nevertheless important for 
consideration because their existence in this size of sample indicates a wider 
presence in the whole population.  
5.4  Preventative measures: road factors 
The road environment is a major contributor - or detractor - to safety in 
crashes. The general factor that was most frequent in this category (figure 62) 
in the microscopic analysis was pedestrian protection. In the absolute majority 
of cases for which this factor was selected the first object hit was a 
pedestrian.  
Examples of measures included under this category include grade-separated 
crossing facilities, traffic segregation and fences (to prevent pedestrians from 
crossing at dangerous locations). The high frequency of this factor may further 
correlate to the human factors of education and offender punishment for both 
the driver and pedestrian.  
Driving in excess of the posted speed limit or using an inappropriate speed 
was the second most common road factor selected (figure 62). This not only 
covered cases where the speed was established from witnesses or through 
hard evidence (calculations from skid marks or speed camera citations) but 
also situations where the speed limit in the area might have contributed to the 
outcome. This is likely in situations where a driver was not found to have 
exceeded the limit but where a lower limit would be suitable due to the nature 
of the road or area (e.g. known for heavy pedestrian traffic). In some cases 
speed enforcement was active on the road in question (through fixed speed 
cameras) so this might point to the limited range of effectiveness of such 
devices or the indifference of drivers to being caught or fined. 
 172
Road factors that may mitigate outcome
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160
Central barriers, guardrails & crash cushions
Pedestrian protection measures
Improved visibility/lighting around location
Drink driving enforcement
Speed limit/automatic enforcement
Speed-reducing devices (humps,etc.)
ITS (more road information)
Frangible post could improve outcome
R
oa
d 
fa
ct
or
Frequency of crashes
 
Figure 62: Frequency of crashes in which named road factors may have positively 
affected injury or crash outcome. 
The third most common road factor (figure 62) covers a broad range of 
interventions including central barriers, guardrails on the side of the road and 
crash cushions and impact absorbers. This factor applied to cases that could 
have been prevented or reduced in severity had a suitable barrier been 
present either to prevent the vehicle from leaving the carriageway (possibly 
hitting a fixed object) or from crossing the median (and interacting with traffic 
travelling in the opposite direction). 
Other factors that were related to crashes but with less frequency were speed 
reducing devices in the road (humps) and improved lighting or visibility in the 
area. The low ranking of drink-driving enforcement is testament that the 
problem of drink-driving is not too widespread in serious and fatal crashes in 
this sample though the true extent of the problem needs to be established 
with further investigation. Though drink-driving enforcement might not initially 
appear to fall under the “road factor” category it was placed there because it is 
an activity that generally takes place on the road. It is distinct from the factor 
of offending driver punishment that is listed under human factors. Only one 
case was found with more than 3 separate road factors recorded; the majority 
of cases had 3 or less. 
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5.5 Vehicle class size and risk profile 
For cases where vehicle data was available the vehicles were classed into 
simplified categories according to their size and body type broadly similar to 
those used in new vehicle sales (Auto Strategies International, 2007). This 
allowed the classification of the first vehicle involved (V1) into the different 
size classes for comparison to each other and for subsequent comparison 
with the vehicle sales data.  
Vehicles were divided into the categories of cars, sport utilities (4x4s), trucks, 
pickups, and buses (as described in the Methodology section). If UAE market 
data was representative then cars and sport utility vehicles appear under-
represented in the sample whereas trucks and other heavy vehicles are over-
represented. 
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Figure 63: Comparison of UAE 2006 new vehicle sales & in-depth Vehicle 1 (impacting 
vehicle) data (Auto Strategies International, 2007). 
5.6 Summary  
The data presented relied on the analysis of data supplied first at the 
macroscopic level then at the microscopic level. Crash prevention factors 
were assigned to crashes based on the knowledge of crash circumstances 
and effective countermeasures as found in the literature (for the in-depth 
sample). These preventative factors were validated with crash experts to 
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verify their relevance to the crashes assigned. Vehicle class sizes involved in 
the in-depth sample were compared to new vehicle sales data for the same 
year to present similarities and differences between two. The following tables 
(table 30 and 31) present the key findings from the analysis performed (the 
order is adopted from the analysis and is of no significance). These were 
found to be the main road safety problems in Dubai. 
Table 30: Key problem areas and supporting analysis (base-level data) 
No. Problems found from analysis Supporting analysis Analysis in 
Chapter 6 
sub-section 
1 High proportion of fatal crashes 13.5% fatal compared to 1.4% in UK 6.2 
2 Most fatal crashes involve a single 
vehicle and pedestrian 
60% of fatals involve a single vehicle, 
of which most hit pedestrians (59%)  
6.8 
3 More crashes used to occur on 
Thursday 
15.94% occur on Thursdays, average 
is 14.28% 
6.3 
4 Crashes peak in the afternoon and 
evening 
See figure 12, page 89 6.3 
5 High number of single-vehicle
crashes 
48.7% involve a single vehicle 6.4 
6 Most crashes occur on roads with a 
60km/hr speed limit 
40.6% occur on 60km/hr roads, more 
than any other 
6.5, 6.7 
7 Urban areas account for many 
crashes 
Most 60km/hr roads above are in 
urban areas 
6.5 
8 Pedestrian crashes are the most 
common type 
28.56% of crashes are pedestrian-
type, more than any other 
6.8 
9 Inconsiderate driving is the most 
common crash cause 
Accounts for 26.7% of crash causes, 
more than any other 
6.6, 6.15 
10 Speeding is the 2nd most common 
crash cause 
Accounts for 12.63% of all crashes 6.7 
11 Dual carriageway roads account for 
most crashes 
54.9% of crash roads are dual 
carriageways 
6.9 
12 More crashes occur during the day 
than at night 
57.8% of crashes occur during the 
day 
- 
13 Males in the active population (19-
50yrs old) are the most common 
casualties 
82% of casualties are male; see 
figure 30 page 109 
6.12 
14 Drink-driving is a leading crash 
cause (especially in later years) 
In 2006, alcohol was the 2nd leading 
crash cause, at 11.5% of total 
6.6 
 
Table 31: Key findings and supporting analysis (in-depth data) 
No. Key finding from analysis Supporting analysis 
1 December had the most crashes in 2006 About 10% of crashes occur in Dec. 
2 Crashes peak at certain rush hours 6am, 5pm and 8pm 
3 Wednesdays are a relatively safe day  Least number of crashes take place 
on Wednesday 
4 Crashes concentrated on high-speed roads Top 3 locations are all highways with 
high speed limits 
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No. Key finding from analysis Supporting analysis 
5 Areas of high pedestrian density account for 
many crashes 
Al Muhaisna 2nd is the fourth most 
frequent location 
6 Overspeeding is a problem 41.6% and 46.3% of V1 & V2 drivers 
were speeding 
7 Inner-city roads and highways are the most 
frequent crash locations 
Most crashes (26%) occur on roads 
with a speed limit of 80 or 120kph 
8 Loss of control and fixed object impacts are a 
key problem 
Loss of directional control is the 2nd
most common mechanism followed 
by fixed object impacts 
9 Inattentive driving and pedestrians in the road 
are key causes 
The vast majority of cases (>90%) 
have inattentive driving as a main 
cause while half cite pedestrians in or 
near the carriageway 
10 Pedestrians are a high risk road user group They were the most common 1st
object hit (53%) and a common 2nd
object hit 
11 Steel barriers were often hit as a consequence 
of a crash 
The most commonly encountered 2nd
object hit was a barrier (21%) 
12 Crashworthiness of vehicles was important for 
mitigating outcome 
Almost all cases had crashworthiness 
as a vehicle factor in the crash 
13 Driver education & training was a key mitigating 
factor in most crashes  
Present in almost all cases 
14 Pedestrian issues were common in many 
crashes (visibility/education/awareness) 
Present in almost half the sample 
15 Pedestrian issues were also common in road 
measures (crossings etc) 
Present in almost half the sample 
16 Small cars and sport utilities were the most 
commonly involved vehicles 
Together they made up 30% of the 
sample 
17 Trucks pose a particular problem with injury 
crashes 
Over-represented in relation to 
vehicle sales and (6%:20%) 
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The link between crash causation and countermeasures is illustrated in the following matrix, where the base-level causation is 
matched against the countermeasures listed under road/vehicle/human factors (the key to the countermeasures is at the bottom of 
the table). The most popular countermeasures were related to driver education and punishment. Some causes are related to 
numerous countermeasures at the same time.  
Table 32: Crash causation (as reported by the police for base-level cases) with potential countermeasures 
Cause                                                            Countermeasure 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
Lack of consideration for other road users    ? ? ?            
Violating speed limit    ? ?         ? ?   
Entering carriageway without checking for traffic    ? ?             
Following too close to vehicle in front    ? ?             
Lack of lane discipline    ? ?             
Jumping a red light    ? ?             
Carelessness and lack of attention    ? ?             
Sudden change of direction ?   ? ?             
Dangerous driving ?   ? ?             
Effect of taking alcohol    ? ?        ?     
Tyre blow out ?   ?              
Reversing without due care    ?              
Going against traffic    ?              
Wandering animal          ?  ?     ?
Incorrect overtaking    ?              
Wrong turn    ? ?             
Failing to give way    ? ?             
Doors not securely closed    ?              
No knowledge of driving and no licence     ?    ?         
Effects of natural or environment factors            ?      
 177
Cause                                                            Countermeasure 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
Shedding of load    ? ?             
Excess loading    ? ?             
Entering a no-entry zone    ? ?             
Tiredness and sleep  ?  ?              
Trailer separation    ?              
Presence of obstacles in road                 ?
Speed humps                  
Unroadworthy vehicle    ? ?             
Faulty road                  
Effect of taking drugs    ? ?             
Total 3 1 - 24 18 1 - - 1 1 - 2 1 1 1 - 2
 
Key to countermeasures: 
1. Loss of control/ESC  
2. More crashworthy vehicle design  
3. Seat belt use  
4. Driver education & training  
5. Offending driver punishment  
6. Pedestrian/cyclist edu. & awareness  
7. Pedestrian/cyclist visibility  
8. Cyclist protection/helmet 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
9. Driving age limit 
10. Central barriers, guardrails & crash cushions 
11. Pedestrian protection measures 
12. Improved visibility/lighting around location 
13. Drink driving enforcement 
14. Speed limit/automatic enforcement 
15. Speed-reducing devices (humps, etc.) 
16. Frangible post could improve outcome 
17. ITS (more road information)
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The matrix table has more spaces than tick marks. This was because the 
various measures could not be related to more causes with confidence as 
there was limited information available for the majority of cases. The non-
selection of a countermeasure does not mean it is not likely to be effective in 
Dubai at all, but rather that with the current knowledge on most cases it is 
difficult to assign it to particular cases within the base sample of the 
macroscopic study with confidence. 
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Chapter 6 Application of results to countermeasures 
6.1 Introduction 
Road safety can be improved by a number of measures depending on the 
symptoms and causes identified in the analysis. Based on the main causes 
and problem areas outlined in the results, solutions were recommended and 
evaluated for suitability based on specific issues faced in Dubai and on their 
success in other contexts (as reviewed in the literature). The most effective 
measures were chosen first if they were deemed applicable in the Dubai 
environment. Using known effectiveness levels it was possible to quantify 
savings in injury and crash reductions as well as economic terms. The extent 
to which these effectiveness levels may apply in Dubai were discussed in the 
next chapter.  
6.2 Countermeasures to reduce the high proportion of fatal 
crashes 
In the results a large percentage of crash cases were found to be fatal 
(13.5% for 2005, 10.6% overall) whereas in the UK only 1.4% (2005) of 
crashes were fatal. In analysing personal injury numbers rather than crash 
numbers fatal and serious injuries were sustained by 11.1% of all casualties 
and 15.9% of all crashes were classified as serious or fatal. This is similar to 
the UK rate for 2005 (DfT, 2006b) however the definitions of fatal and serious 
crashes were not identical (RTA, 2006a) so the comparison might not be 
representative. Dubai crashes were classified as fatal if the medical report 
showed a fatality within 4 months of the crash (RTA, 2006a). Fatal crashes in 
Dubai might be exaggerated by the availability of cheap fuel and long 
expanses of fairly straight and feature-less highways that connect the emirate 
with other emirates. A high level of income also meant that vehicles capable 
of achieving high speeds were common place and within reach for a large 
section of the population. Further analysis results were shown in table 33.  
A two-pronged approach is needed for treatment of the ailment of traffic 
crashes: the prevention of crashes and the prevention of injuries. Crash 
prevention (active safety) is the ideal as it will save costs and limit physical 
damage and associated downtime for repair as well as virtually eliminating 
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the human cost of injury. If crash prevention is not attainable then at least a 
decrease in injuries and injury severity (passive safety) should be aimed for. 
Safety measures relevant to the most common type of fatal crash – that 
involve pedestrians – include:  
- Signalised pedestrian crossings (which drivers are more likely to stop at 
rather than zebra crossings) 
- Speed humps or rumble strips at crossing sites (give the driver a speeding 
sensation as they approach even if speed does not increase, to encourage 
slowing down) 
- Improved driver visibility at pedestrian locations (to ensure pedestrians 
approaching crossings are not hidden from view by roadside furniture) 
- More pedestrian-friendly vehicle design and crashworthiness (to reduce 
injury severity and improve crash outcomes). 
Studies conducted in Victoria, Australia concentrating on pedestrians 
(Corben & Diamantopoulou, 1996; Corben et al, 1996; Corben & Duarte, 
2006) have made similar recommendations to improve pedestrian safety.  
Table 33: Characteristics of most fatal cases, 1995-2006. 
Involve a single vehicle (~60%), of which the majority hit pedestrians (59%) 
Occur in daylight conditions (52.7%) or night time with sufficient lighting (40.3%) 
Occur on Thursdays and Fridays (33%) 
Have the cause listed as lack of consideration to others or over-speeding (>50%) 
Have the crash type listed as pedestrian (37.4%), rollover (13.6%), or stationary object 
impact (11.8%) 
Occur on 60km/h roads (25%) or 120km/h (24.8%), then 80km/h (22%) 
Take place on dual carriageways with 2, 3 or 4 lanes (~67%) 
Involve a steel barrier (31%), unknown object (18.8%), kerb (17%) and no barrier (16.5%) 
Road markings exist at the majority of sites (70%) 
Fair weather is prevalent (>97%), as are dry roads (>95%) 
Males are over-represented (88% of fatally injured) 
Some nationalities are predominant: Indian (31.9%), UAE (19.4%), and Pakistani (17.4%) 
Fatalities are mostly young (23-30yrs: 27%, 31-40yrs: 27%, 41-50yrs: 14%, under 18: 11%) 
Note: order of the above factors is by the order of incidence of the fields in the database and 
is not significant.  
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Safety measures that can reduce the incidence of the second most common 
type of fatal crashes, the rollover, and injuries sustained therein, are:  
- Variants of Electronic Stability Control (ESC), as rollover is often preceded 
by loss of control, so if this is prevented the crash itself may be prevented or 
its severity reduced. 
- Compulsory seat belt enforcement (however increased seat belt use in 
other countries has been shown to increase slight injuries while decreasing 
serious and fatal injuries). Seat belts help keep the occupants inside the 
vehicle in a rollover thus decreasing their risk of injury by being thrown out.  
The third most common type of fatal crashes, hitting a stationary object, 
might be reduced by measures such as: 
- Crash cushions at the stationary object location especially if a location is 
found to have been the site of more than one injury-causing crash. 
- Roadside barriers to prevent the vehicle leaving the road in the first place. 
Barriers and crash cushions act to catch a vehicle and direct it to a controlled 
stop rather than throwing it back into the carriageway (Elvik & Vaa, 2004). 
- Improved vehicle crashworthiness (side impact protection, front vehicle 
structures designed for narrow object impacts, roof strength). 
6.2.1 Seat belt enforcement order in January 1999 
At this point, mention should be made of the compulsory seat belt law for 
front seat occupants that was introduced with a high-profile awareness 
campaign nation-wide in 1998 and the impact it had on the number and 
severity of casualties. By comparing the 12-month period before and after 
introduction of the law the distribution of injury severity does not change 
significantly while the total number of injured people has decreased by about 
270 (10%) the most significant reductions being in slight injuries. This follows 
the trend of the previous years (as seen in figure 26, page 130) thus casting 
doubt on whether this was a direct result of seat belt legislation or some 
external confounding factors during that time. In the late 1990s there was a 
general feeling of unease in the area due to tension in Iraq, war in the 
Balkans and bombings in neighbouring Saudi Arabia. These feelings of 
unease may be translated into less economic activity (thus reducing traffic 
exposure) and the movement of some activity further abroad to perceived 
safer havens. 
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The trend reverses after the year 2000 despite no change in relevant 
legislation but the population growth rate remains quite high compared to 
Western countries (1985-1995: 6.2%; Ministry of Economy, 2007). The only 
known surveys of seatbelt use (table 27, page 152) show a declining trend 
but that cannot be tied to the increase in injury crashes without further work. 
6.3 Countermeasures to reduce timely variation 
Another major issue found was the injury crash peak at certain times. 
Exposure control can be an effective means of reducing daily variation and 
hopefully reducing the overall figures though monthly and daily variation is 
not necessarily a bad thing that needs to be changed or that might have any 
effect on overall injury crashes if it is changed.  
Measures of exposure control include: 
- Road pricing and toll roads (road users will try to avoid paying for using a 
road by using alternative roads or transport means). 
- Public transport provision (will reduce the number of MVs on the road if 
more people chose to ride buses rather than drive) 
- Compacting towns to reduce the built up area per person (this reduces the 
need for travel by commuters thus shortening their journeys). 
Road pricing (tolls) on certain key routes have been introduced on one major 
route in July 2007 and expanded to another one in September 2008. Road 
tolls are distinct from congestion charging in that the latter applies in dense 
urban areas (Ison, 2005) but tolls can be in non-urban areas as well as they 
partially are in Dubai. The effect of road tolls on the safety of these routes 
can be assessed after implementation though the areas under consideration 
do not rank in the top 6 crash locations so the impact is not expected to be 
high unless there is a knock-on effect due to traffic volume shifting to other 
areas. 
6.4 Countermeasures to reduce single vehicle crashes and 
injuries 
Almost half the injury crashes in the macroscopic study involved only one 
vehicle. Measures designed to reduce the high proportion of single vehicle 
crashes depend on the type of crash that single vehicles are involved in. 
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Upon first inspection Electronic Stability Control (ESC, also known by other 
names like ESP, ESC+T, DSC, VDC, Stabilitrak) looks like a measure that 
could be used to target these crashes but upon closer inspection it turns out 
that the majority of single-vehicle fatal crashes were pedestrian cases (where 
the pedestrian is assumed most likely to have been injured rather than the 
driver) and not loss-of-control crashes. ESC would do little to prevent a 
pedestrian crash unless it occurred because the vehicle went out of control 
first and subsequently hit a pedestrian, a situation ESC is designed to 
mitigate. 
Single vehicle crashes involving pedestrians are multi-party crashes. They 
could be separated from true single-party crashes (involving a vehicle only 
and no other road user) but the description has been preserved to avoid 
confusion because this is how they were described in the original crash data 
supplied by the authorities in Dubai. Pedestrian crashes are dealt with in a 
separate section to follow while this section deals with single-party crashes.  
The most common types of crash for single-party crashes were rollovers and 
stationary-object impacts (together accounting for 94% of this subset of 
cases).  
Countermeasures that are most suitable for reducing single-party crashes 
and injuries are shared with the suggestions to reduce fatal crashes: 
- Compulsory seat belt enforcement  
- Vehicle stability control devices (ESC, etc) 
- Improved rollover protection (passive safety, vehicle structural strength, 
side curtain airbags) 
- Crash cushions at fixed roadside objects that are likely to be hit 
- Roadside barriers to prevent the vehicle leaving the road in the first place. 
Countermeasures such as ESC (Electronic Stability Control) are not 
recommended for retrofit but rather for inclusion of vehicles sold in the 
market. In the UK it was estimated (Weekes et al, 2009) that ESC fitment will 
have penetrated all the vehicle fleet in 2021 if the European Community 
regulation to make it standard on all new cars sold by 2014 was followed. In 
the UAE no such regulation exists so it is unlikely that the penetration of ESC 
in the fleet will be as high as the UK unless similar regulations are 
implemented. 
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6.5 Countermeasures for top crash locations 
The top six crash locations account for a significant share of all injury crashes 
(around 1/6). The main crash type at these locations varies by the nature of 
location (e.g. high-speed road vs. urban city street). Measures that might be 
applied to the top crash locations mainly involve: 
- Black spot treatment (analysing the location of frequent crashes to identify 
the key causation factors and devise a treatment to remove those factors). 
6.6 Countermeasures to control inconsiderate and drink-
driving 
Driving without consideration to other road users was the most common 
crash cause found in all injury crashes. Inconsiderate driving is a difficult 
crash cause to prescribe measures for as it could encompass behavioural 
problems (lack of courtesy), educational problems (the importance of giving 
right of way was not emphasised) or psychological problems (road rage or 
anger management). Each has a different remedy however a longer practical 
driving test has been suggested as a method of vetting drivers with more 
care as the longer the test is, the greater the likelihood of the driver making a 
mistake (Fazakerley & Downing, 1980) that is dangerous. 
Driving while under the influence of alcohol was found to be a leading cause 
of crashes (the 2nd most common in 2006 only). Crashes involving alcohol 
intoxication peak around 4 am so that is a clear area where enhanced 
patrolling (perhaps monitoring drivers leaving popular alcohol vendors) can 
be effective. Another known measure for tackling driving while intoxicated is 
blood alcohol concentration legislation and enforcement (for instance using 
breath-testing especially when the time of crashes is so well defined as in 
figure 34, page 139) to root out the greatest number of offenders. Alcohol 
involvement did not appear pervasive in previous years as it appears not to 
have been recorded as rigorously but in 2006 alone it was the second 
leading cause of injury crashes. This suggests that measures (such as 
enforcement) to tackle the problem should be applied quickly before further 
escalation. A concerted campaign of Random Breath Testing (RBT) such as 
used in New South Wales, Australia (Homel, 1990) shows the positive results 
that can be achieved by such a method. Random Breath Testing was not 
known to be in use in the UAE. The protocol for testing drivers involved in 
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crashes is based on suspicion or the existence of evidence (e.g. alcoholic 
beverages) in MVs upon which a medical test is administered at a police 
station or hospital. 
6.7 Countermeasures related to speed limit analysis 
The majority of crashes happened on roads with a speed limit of 60km/hr. 
Further analysis of crashes that occur on 60km/hr roads reveals that the 
majority of them were pedestrian collisions (34.5%), more than in the overall 
sample where pedestrian crashes made up only 28.6%. Almost half the 
crashes at that speed only involve one vehicle leading to the assumption of a 
pedestrian or stationary object being hit. Fortunately only a small part of 
those crashes (10.5%) result in serious or fatal injury.  
Reducing speeds on the streets with the most pedestrian crashes (say from 
60km/hr to 50 or 40km/hr) combined with monitoring speeds and automatic 
enforcement with speed cameras are the primary measures that are 
recommended especially noting the absence of speed cameras on low-speed 
roads (most are on roads with 80, 100, and 120km/h limits). Reducing 
speeds in the lower speed range (25-50 km/hr) was supported by early 
research on pedestrian crash survivability and impact speeds (Ashton & 
Mackay, 1979; Ashton, 1982). This was heavily used by the UK Department 
for Transport’s campaign on the importance of adhering to a 30mph speed 
limit (DfT, 2004). Speed camera effectiveness has been shown in other parts 
of the world (Elvik & Vaa, 2004; Holland & Conner, 1996; Newstead & 
Cameron, 2003). 
6.8 Countermeasures for pedestrian safety 
Pedestrian crashes were the most evident crash type reported (28%). Most 
of the countermeasures for reducing pedestrian crashes were similar to some 
of those suggested in the section on fatal crashes. No barrier or central 
reservation exists in the majority of cases (32%). This supports the 
prevalence of single-carriageway roads. No road markings or signs were 
present in some cases (33%) and it was not known if this was a contributing 
factor as it may affect vehicle positioning and the line-of-sight or even 
improper parking (for instance when yellow lines are not painted on the 
roadside extremities on curves). If a significant number of pedestrian 
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collisions occur because an MV has lost control and mounted the pavement 
then barriers that prevent motor traffic from entering pedestrian areas are a 
consideration. Conversely if most crashes occur when a pedestrian enters 
the road outside proper crossing zones then barriers that control people will 
be needed (like fences for example). 
Other factors related to the human side might be of significance in pedestrian 
crashes like poor road sense on the pedestrian’s side with bad judgement of 
vehicle approach speed and the time gap available. Pedestrian impairment 
(from alcohol intoxication for example) was not recorded (in macroscopic 
analysis) or encountered (in microscopic analysis) in the data but testing for 
alcohol levels was ordered by the authorities if alcohol intoxication was 
suspected. From the driver’s side, non-compliance or ignorance of pedestrian 
priority and vulnerability might play a role as could the lack of enforcement for 
this punishable offence (according to UAE traffic law). Stronger police 
enforcement of rules at pedestrian crossings and improvement of driver 
training and education to reinforce pedestrian priority rules and clarifying any 
rules that exist, should help in reducing the number of pedestrian collisions. 
The provision of pedestrian facilities must be considered at the high-risk 
areas to provide a safe way to cross the road. These countermeasures may 
be high or low cost. Examples of high cost measures are pedestrian bridges 
and under-passes. Signalised pedestrian crossings are an example of lower 
cost measures. Approaches to pedestrian crossings can be designed to 
encourage drivers to reduce speed by employing rumble strips or speed 
bumps. 
Vehicle design might affect the outcome of crashes as a “soft” front end 
made of an energy-absorbing material will produce a softer impact than a 
hard or inflexible front end with a steel bull-bar fitted. Encouraging the sale of 
vehicles with “pedestrian-friendly” front ends is another area to consider as a 
large number of new cars are registered every year and regulation of this 
aspect can influence the vehicle fleet in the long run. The European Union 
has issued directives in this regard (2003/102/EC) that begin to apply to light 
vehicles approved for the EU market in 2010 (European Communities, 
2009a;b). No such legislation existed in the UAE but if all European vehicles 
comply in a few years then this will have positive implications for the UAE 
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passenger car fleet (which had a significant European component of 15.5% 
of sales in 2006; Auto Strategies International, 2007). 
Driver vision from inside the vehicle is another area in which improved 
vehicle design and regulation might contribute to a reduction in crashes. 
Regulations in this regard have not changed for decades (EEC Directive 
77/649/EEC) although there were some test protocols being developed to 
establish a consumer test in this area (PNCAP - Primary Safety New Car 
Assessment Program, visibility section). Those had not come into effect at 
the time of writing (DfT, 2007a). This will be of use in assessing cars if the 
drivers involved in pedestrian crashes claimed not to see the pedestrian. 
6.9 Road layout countermeasures 
Dual carriageways accounted for most of the injury crash sites (55%). Road 
layout was often chosen by road planning and municipal authorities based on 
the service class and projected use of the road. Changing the balance of 
road types is not an option as a measure for improving safety due to the 
large costs involved but it must be considered for new road projects. Ways to 
improve safety on the particular road type under consideration can only be 
found when further analysis of crashes on these roads is performed; then 
weaknesses can be highlighted and addressed. 
6.10 Central reservations and barriers as countermeasures 
Recording of central reservations only appeared after 1997 implying it was 
introduced on the crash form in 1998. Adjusting for this most injury crashes 
from that date were at a site where no barrier or central reservation exists 
(30%). Of those sites the top two are a service road to a main highway 
(where a barrier would not normally be installed) and the old Souq (market) 
area that is very heavy with pedestrian traffic. The installation of barriers at 
these locations might be beneficial (unless the victims were pedestrians on 
the road then pedestrian crossings or overhead bridges would be a better 
solution). Overhead bridges have the attraction of allowing free pedestrian 
movement while not affecting vehicular traffic. This would be relevant in an 
area of heavy pedestrian traffic such as the old Souq. However it might not 
be practical on a service road as a number of pedestrians use the 
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carriageway to get to their cars that are parked on either side of the one-way 
service road (figure 64). A barrier would prevent access to the parked cars. 
Figure 64: Schematic illustration of road layout on Sheikh Zayed Service Road, where 
pedestrian crashes would not be helped by barriers (not to scale). 
The majority of pedestrian data supplied (base-level) did not include the 
location where pedestrians were hit (carriageway or pavement). A minority of 
cases in microanalysis showed pedestrians being struck off the road but the 
majority were struck on roads. The evaluation of current barriers of different 
design and construction was not possible as the type of barrier was not 
supplied in macroanalysis.  
6.11 Countermeasures for lighting and environmental 
conditions 
In the small number of cases (often less than 5%) in which lighting or 
weather or road surface conditions were not optimal, it should be noted that 
these few cases might be avoidable through specific treatment (like installing 
or clearing gutters to deal with standing water or improved street lighting in 
poorly lit areas). Road markings and/or signs exist in the majority of cases 
but no road markings or signs were recorded in a significant number of cases 
(~28%); most of those cases were from the early period of the study (1995-
1997) so it was very likely that those conditions were not recorded on the 
form at that time. The number of cases with no road markings or signs 
significantly declines after those years. 
Weather conditions were fair in most cases (>97%) but the few days of 
annual rain or fog make the headlines in the local media as large crash 
numbers are recorded. There are two groups of solutions to this very periodic 
peak. If meteorological data identifying the inclement-weather days was 
available and injury crashes during the few inclement days were found to be 
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higher than regular days then the employment of Variable Message Signs 
(VMS) to warn drivers of the conditions and remind them of the need for 
cautious driving might improve safety. Limiting exposure during these times 
(for instance by employers encouraging staff to work from home) can also be 
beneficial. In Austria, pedestrian injuries were less serious in severe weather 
conditions (Kim et al, 2008) so it may be the case that road users could also 
be more cautious in Dubai in unusual weather. 
6.12 Countermeasures for gender and nationality variations 
Females were under-represented as casualties (18%) compared to their 
share in the population (26.6% in Dubai, 32.4% in the UAE, source: Ministry 
of Economy, 2005) but this does not take into account exposure and driving 
habits. Traditionally the local population will prefer to drive women around 
rather than have them drive themselves so this might be a factor as well. 
Some conservative families prefer their daughters not to drive unless they 
have to (as might happen when getting a job or having to take children to 
school). Female vehicle drivers and occupants are of particular concern in 
crashes as they tend to have more severe injuries compared to male drivers 
and occupants (Evans, 2001; Welsh & Lenard, 2001). In the neighbouring 
state of Qatar (Bener & Crundall, 2008) male drivers were found to have a 
higher crash rate than their female counterparts so it might be an underlying 
issue in the UAE as well. 
Nationals of India and the UAE feature most frequently as casualties closely 
followed by Pakistanis (see figure 44, page 150). South Asians (mainly 
nationals of India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh) make up 50% of the 
UAE population (CIA, 2009). Emaratis tend to be injured most in crashes on 
two main highways, Sheikh Zayed Road and Dubai Al-Ain Road (combined 
16% of total locations) and they have more severe crashes than the average 
population (14.7% fatal, 6% serious)..Analysis of the nationality of casualties 
by road user type shows that Indian casualties were mostly passengers in 
vehicles while Pakistani and Emarati casualties were most commonly injured 
as vehicle drivers. The time of crashes does not deviate from the average 
very much for the first two nationalities but for Indians a distinct peak of 
crashes is found around 8am. Culture and educational background are two 
suspected factors as pointed out by an earlier survey of drivers in the Gulf 
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(Al-Madani & Al-Janahi, 2002). Ethnic origin was also found to have an effect 
on reported seat-belt use in the USA (Boyd et al, 2008). Drink-driving among 
adolescents in California (Walker et al, 2003) was found to be more common 
among Latinos in one study based on telephone interviews. Not enough is 
known about exposure to single out any one nationality as being more or less 
risky in driving than others. 
Reducing the incidence of the top three nationalities in injury crashes might 
be made through improved driver testing, by increasing the length of the test 
or introducing an advanced test for drivers that are involved in a crash due to 
suspected poor driving. However it might not be politically correct to apply 
this measure to a particular nationality so extending it to all the driving 
population would be the ideal. In the year 2000 the length of the practical part 
of the test in Dubai did not exceed 10 minutes at most for each candidate 
and the “written” part consisted of a verbal test of traffic sign comprehension. 
Increasing the test length might put extra pressure on the driver examination 
system and hence might not be an attractive countermeasure to authorities 
as it implies higher costs due to more staff time needed to conduct the tests. 
This may be offset by higher test fees but these might prove unpopular with 
the members of the public who are applying for a driving licence. 
6.13 Countermeasures for young casualties 
Those under eighteen years of age form a significant proportion of injured 
individuals (~11%) and most of those are injured on single-carriageways with 
a single lane in each direction generally indicating a low-speed road. The 
predominant crash type for this age group was pedestrian (32.7%) but it is 
not known if the responsibility lies with the pedestrian (if under the legal age) 
or the guardian or the driver of the vehicle involved. Any recommendation for 
dealing with this issue must take this into account. In the UK child fatalities 
and serious injuries that are pedestrians make up a higher proportion (61%; 
DfT, 2008) but that may be due to the higher incidence of walking in the UK. 
Universal measures that might be worth considering are school education for 
young pedestrians; signalised pedestrian crossings where they are not used 
and pedestrian barriers (fences) to prevent crossing at problem locations 
whilst providing alternatives. The latter measure has been applied on the 
road with the most injury crashes (Sheikh Zayed Road) as a 31-km long 
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fence along the busiest stretch. This has been effective in reducing run-over 
mortalities along this road from 23 in 2005 to 15 in 2006, according to Dubai 
road authorities (Ahmed, 2007a). A significant portion of the population of the 
UAE is young, especially with UAE nationals, where 51.1% are under the age 
of 20 (Ministry of Economy, 2005). Exposure might be higher for the young 
age groups as 18-30 year olds account for the greatest number of casualties. 
Programs of education for school-going children have been shown to 
improve their road crossing behaviour in the cities of Miami (Hotz et al, 
2004a;b) and Melbourne (Congiu, 2008). 
Measures for young casualties that were car occupants depend on the cause 
and type of injury. Without more detail it was difficult to suggest 
countermeasures but child seating and restraint are primary considerations in 
this area. Studies by multiple organisations in the EU have investigated this 
special sub-section of car occupants to develop a crash database for further 
work (Kirk et al, 2006). 
6.14 Countermeasures to improve seat belt usage 
Seat belt use rates from Dubai and neighbouring areas indicated a serious 
problem with the lack of use by vehicle occupants (Barss et al, 2008). Seat 
belts have been mostly used in HMCs after legislation and enforcement so 
this is a primary area for work in Dubai and the UAE since the legislation (for 
front seat occupants) exists but enforcement is not strict. Legislation in the 
UAE only applies to front seat occupants (Dubai Court, 2006) but is still 
considered inadequate (Barss et al, 2008). Non-enforcement based 
strategies have been used in other countries to encourage seat belt use 
based on education, encouragement and reward of road users (Zaal, 1994). 
Other measures that have been proven successful in other countries like 
Sweden (Krafft et al, 2006) were “smart” seat belt reminders with a loud 
audible signal and visual signal though the control group for that study (cars 
without seat belt reminders) were in almost all cases older than the study 
group so it does not control for driver age and choice (it could be that drivers 
of newer cars are more seat-belt conscious than older ones). Such devices 
are coming on to the market partly due to pressure from consumer tests like 
EuroNCAP as a way of improving the score in such tests but they are not 
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thought to be currently fitted to the majority of cars on the road in the UAE or 
Dubai. 
6.15 Countermeasures for driver education and behaviour 
It is not realistic to apply countermeasures that might limit the driving task to 
people who have completed higher education or hold certain degrees as it is 
almost certain that holders of these degrees will have more productive things 
to do in their time than drive. Conversely a majority of drivers on the road 
undertake the driving task as part of their job if not the core of their job (like 
taxi drivers, bus drivers and couriers). In addition education was not 
considered by some experts to be an effective treatment for road traffic 
injuries (Mohan & Tiwari, 1998; Mohan, 2003). However these views related 
to less motorised countries not highly motorised ones. The educational 
background of drivers was found to affect traffic sign comprehension in the 
UAE and some neighbouring countries in the GCC (Gulf Cooperative 
Council). Any discussion of driver educational measures must be focused on 
driver behavioural issues that lead to unsafe driving and their causes. A 
driving test is already in use in Dubai and the UAE and as such cannot be 
suggested as a stand-alone measure though improving the driving test is a 
candidate for consideration. 
While the method of driving can be taught consideration for other road users 
is best enforced as drivers display exemplary performance when in the 
vicinity of a police patrol (Axup, 1990, cited in Zaal, 1994). As consideration 
for other road users is a behaviour issue, it can be influenced by enforcement 
as other behavioural issues have responded to enforcement (seat-belt use, 
drink-driving, speeding; Fildes & Lee, 1993; Zaal, 1994). Revising the driving 
theory test (which currently consists of a test of sign comprehension only) to 
include situations that may teach the importance of consideration for fellow 
road users might assist in producing more considerate drivers. Care should 
be taken to ensure this cause is only recorded in the form when it is the 
actual main cause of a crash and not a misnomer for something else. 
Speeding has been linked in the past (Mackay, 1985) with sports car driving 
and newer cars. The proportion of new cars in the UAE overall (as a 
percentage of total registrations in 2006) was 12.1% (Ministry of Economy, 
2009) whereas in the UK the percentage of new cars in the same year was 
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6.5% (DfT, 2007c). This might be a factor in explaining non-conforming driver 
behaviour with regards to speed. 
6.16 Projections if the existing situation continues 
There is one factor which may be used as a fatality predictor during the years 
of this data collection and that is the measure of fatality risk (almost 
unchanged at ~20 deaths per 100,000 people throughout, see figure 7 page 
36). Using official population projections for the coming twelve years 
(Statistics Centre of Dubai, 2007) it was possible to make projections of the 
fatality figures based on the constant fatality risk of previous years. If the 
existing trend continues then road deaths are expected to rise to 684 – more 
than double their number in 2006. This prediction is a very basic one using 
only one variable and assuming all other variables to remain the same. 
Confounding factors such as changes in road length, vehicle travel and road 
user exposure and vehicle fleet composition might all affect the actual 
outcome. However all these variables are likely to have changed over the 
past twelve years (1995-2006) but the fatality risk has not, so it might remain 
the same for a few years to come. 
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Figure 65: Dubai projected population and fatalities for next 12 years. Source of 
population data: Statistics Center of Dubai, 2007.  
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6.17 The key: matching countermeasures and problems 
After the main problems were identified in the previous chapter and the key 
countermeasures for those problem areas were reviewed here it was 
possible to tie up the main problem areas with the main countermeasures in 
that area that are of proven effectiveness as found in the literature review. 
The main problem areas were first selected from the results. Suitable 
countermeasures were then considered, one by one, based on their 
estimated or proven effectiveness in the international field. Those 
countermeasures with the highest level of effectiveness (largest expected 
improvement in safety) were then shortlisted and matched up with the 
specific problems they were designed to treat. 
Following this step an estimate of the improvement in road safety was made 
retrospectively assuming the measure was applied to all related crashes. For 
instance if ESC has an estimated effectiveness in reducing single-vehicle 
crashes by 16.7% then the number of vehicle crashes involving a single 
vehicle where ESC might have been effective (ex. rollovers and loss of 
control crashes) were selected out of the total cases. The 16.7% expected 
reduction is applied to this number only to derive an expected improvement 
in this sub-set of crashes. To make this estimate valid it is assumed that the 
next 12 years will have at least as many crashes as the past 12 years. From 
the predictions made in the previous section this is a valid assumption. If the 
past trend continues and crashes in the next period are more then this 
means the gains from using this countermeasure will increase proportionally 
making the savings presented an underestimate. 
Some crashes may have multiple causes reported. More than one 
countermeasure may apply to such a crash. Interaction between different 
countermeasures is possible (e.g. night-time enforcement through increased 
patrols and automatic enforcement by speed cameras). Calculation of the 
effect of this interaction is made more difficult due to the number of possible 
scenarios. Out of the total nine measures suggested, any number of 
measures may interact with each other. For example, if a driver not wearing a 
seat belt crashes at high speed after losing control and impacts a fixed object 
outside the road, the crash may be affected by a number of countermeasures 
(seat belt legislation, ESC, automatic enforcement, crash cushions). The 
effectiveness of a countermeasure might change depending on the rest of 
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the countermeasures involved and the extent of their deployment. The study 
of these interactions deserves consideration for further refinement of the 
predictions. 
6.18 Calculating potential cost savings 
Next a cost estimate of the safety improvements was made. This was based 
on the premise that every crash or injury has financial cost implications. 
Some countries like the UK have detailed costing information available for 
road crashes so these were used due to the lack of such data in Dubai and 
the UAE. The figures that were used came from the latest available 
publication of the Department for Transport (DfT, 2007b) and can be easily 
updated when more relevant data becomes available. Some of the main 
values used were the average cost of a crash where at least one person was 
injured (£64,440) and the average cost to the economy of treating one 
casualty from a car crash (£44,920). The first figure was used when 
estimates of effectiveness of a countermeasure were given as a percentage 
reduction in all injury crashes (this was the case for the majority of 
countermeasures). In one case a countermeasure had its effectiveness 
measured as a reduction in casualties not crashes. Only in that case (seat 
belt legislation) was it necessary to use the second cost figure (£44,920). 
This allowed the calculation of a final estimated figure for the grand total of 
savings possible by using the most effective available countermeasures. 
Using the original predictions of crash fatalities for the next 12 years and the 
cumulative estimate of crashes over that period (5,665) it was possible to 
demonstrate the effectiveness of the first measure suggested in table 29. If 
the current situation continues unabated the cumulative number of fatalities 
will likely be around 5,700. If the 1,555 estimated reduction in fatalities is 
deducted this will reduce the total cumulative estimate to around 4,100, 
which is over a quarter reduction in fatalities (28%) – a significant 
achievement by any standard. 
The effectiveness of a countermeasure was estimated over the whole injury 
crash data set and not only the problem that prompted suggestion of that 
measure. For example, a significant presence of rollovers in the sub-set of 
fatal crashes led to the valid assumption that a lot of rollovers were preceded 
by loss of control, so measures to reduce loss-of-control were suggested. 
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Then their effectiveness was measured as a percentage reduction in all 
rollover injury crashes, not just fatal ones. Measures for which quantified 
savings estimates exist have been selected. Estimates of the reduction in all 
injury crashes were found for most countermeasures (except as stated in the 
tables on the next pages). A breakdown of the estimated reductions for each 
crash severity (for example fatal, serious, slight, etc) was not available for 
every countermeasure and were hence not included. 
Table 34: Breakdown of key problem areas, relevant countermeasures and the number 
of applicable cases 
No. 
Problem (number of 
crashes in base-level 
sample) 
Sub-
division 
Countermeasure and 
known effectiveness 
(best estimate of 
difference in injury 
occurrence/injury 
crashes) 
Number of 
applicable cases 
1 High proportion of fatal crashes 
Motor 
vehicle 
occupants 
Seat belt use legislation 
(-12%2 injured MV 
occupants) 
12961 (assuming a 
minimum of one 
casualty per crash) 
2 Pedestrian crashes are the most common type - 
Upgrade to signalised 
(separate phase) 
pedestrian crossing 
facilities (-30%2 crashes)
5181 
3 High number of single-vehicle crashes 
Stationary 
object 
impact 
Crash cushion at the site 
of stationary object 
(-69%2 crashes) 
1719 single vehicle 
stationary-object 
impacts 
4 
Urban areas account 
for a lot of crashes 
(7376 crashes on 
roads with 60kph limit) 
Speed 
limits 
(lower 
end) 
Reducing existing speed 
limits from 70?60 and 
60?50 km/hr 
(-9%2 crashes) 
7376 cases on roads 
with 60kph limit 
5 
Speeding is 2nd most 
common crash cause 
(2293) 
Vehicle 
monitoring
Automatic speed 
enforcement 
(-17%2 crashes) 
2293 
6 High proportion of fatal crashes (1926) Rollovers 
Electronic stability 
control (-16.7%1 
crashes) 
1970 
7 
Highways account for a 
lot of crashes (2150 
crashes on roads with 
120kph limit) 
Speed 
limits 
(higher 
end) 
Reducing existing speed 
limits from 130?120 or 
110, 120?110 km/hr 
(-14%2 crashes) 
2150 on roads with 
120kph limit 
8 
Crash peaks in the 
afternoon and evenings 
(7681 occur from 12-
2pm, 4-10pm) 
Vehicle 
control 
Road tolls to reduce 
exposure 
(-5%2 crashes) 
3680 from 12-2pm,4-
10pm at top 6 
locations 
9 
Drink-driving (esp. in 
later years – 404 cases 
from 2004-2006) 
Driver 
monitoring
Enforcement during 
night-time 
(-7%2 crashes) 
404 from 2004-2006 
1 Source: Lie et al, 2005   
2 Source: Elvik & Vaa, 2004   
3 Source: DfT, 2007b 
Most of the figures for countermeasure effectiveness were taken from the 
meta-analysis carried out on the results of a number of studies by Elvik & 
Vaa (2004). The sources of these studies varied in location. Some were 
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conducted in Scandinavia (effect of toll roads and ESC) while the majority 
come from around the world (North America, Australasia, Western Europe 
and Scandinavia). Effectiveness measures were carefully selected to exclude 
those related to environments that differed significantly from Dubai. One 
example was the exclusion of studded tyres as a safety countermeasure 
because the effectiveness of this measure comes from studies in countries 
with very cold winters and heavy snowfall. Dubai in contrast normally has 
very little rainfall, let alone snowfall (Dubai Meteorological Department, 
2006). All the studies made calculations of effectiveness based on 
observation before and after the application of a measure while controlling for 
other factors (Elvik & Vaa, 2004, Lie et al, 2005; Thomas et al, 2006b). In all 
cases these studies were the most recent and comprehensive source of 
information available. Differences were bound to exist between Dubai and 
the study areas in many aspects like weather, road user behaviour, vehicle 
fleet, etc. Until the individual countermeasures are studied in the same depth 
in Dubai (as in the international studies quoted) it will not be possible to find 
more accurate effectiveness estimates. 
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Table 35 Suggested countermeasures; their effectiveness; and preliminary estimated cost savings 
No. Countermeasure Best estimate of 
difference in injury 
occurrence/ injury 
crashes 
Estimated 12-year crash/casualty reduction 
(retrospective, rounded to last digit) 
Avg value of est. saving in crash 
prevention costs (based on UK, 
2005)3  
1 Seat belt use legislation -12%2 (injured MV 
occupants) 
1,555 (assuming all non-pedestrians are MV occupants) £44,920 x 1,555 = £69,850,600  
2 Signalised (separate phase) 
pedestrian crossing facilities 
(upgrade) 
-30%2 (crashes) 1554 £64,440 x 1554 = £100,139,760 
3 Crash cushion at the site of 
stationary object 
-69%2 (crashes) 1186 (taking all single-vehicle stationary-object injury 
crashes) 
£76,425,840 
4 Reducing existing speed limits 
(from 70?60 and 60?50 km/hr) 
-9%2 (crashes) 663 (on roads with a recorded 60 km/hr speed limit) £42,723,720 
5 Automatic speed enforcement -17%2 (crashes) 389 (note: the increased use of speed cameras in the last 
period has already shifted speeding to 6th leading cause in 
2006) 
£25,067,160 
6 Electronic stability control -16.7%1 (crashes) 329 £21,200,760 
7 Reducing existing speed limits 
(from 130?120 or 110, 120?110 
km/hr) 
-14%2 (crashes) 301 (on roads with a recorded 120 km/hr speed limit) £19,396,440 
8 Road tolls to reduce exposure -5%2 (crashes) 184 (effect measured on top 6 locations only, as nature of 
other locations unknown) 
£11,856,960 
9 Enforcement during night-time -7%2 (crashes) 28 (noting only 2005-6 had significant records; if previous 
years had same rate of drinking as 2006, reduction would 
be 169) 
£1,804,320 
   4,634 crashes, 1,555 casualties £368,465,560  
≈AED2,690,000,000 Dirhams, the 
local UAE currency (mkt ex. rate 
mid-April 2007) 
1 Source: Lie et al, 2005 
2 Source: Elvik & Vaa, 2004  
3 Source: DfT, 2007b 
Order is by category (casualty savings then crash reductions) and decreasing magnitude of projected savings. 
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6.19 Summary – macroscopic analysis of base data 
Following the identification of the key problems of road safety from the 
analysis of the base-level police crash data provided the countermeasures 
that were suitable for application to solve these problems were matched 
from the literature. The major innovative part of this work is the use of 
international knowledge of these countermeasures and the measured 
improvement from using them and matching that to current problems in 
Dubai. Where reliable countermeasure effectiveness data existed this was 
then used to measure the impact of the proposed countermeasures on the 
situation in Dubai making the simple assumption that there will be at least as 
many crashes in the coming 12-year period as in the preceding one. 
Table 36: Main problems from macroanalysis and suggested 
countermeasures. 
 Problem Extent of problem Countermeasures 
1 Fatal crash propensity 13.5% in 2006 10.6% 
overall. 
Pedestrians: 37% of 
total 
Pedestrians: signalised 
crossings; speed humps; 
improved visibility; 
crashworthiness 
2 Rollovers & hitting a 
stationary object (among 
fatals group) 
Rollovers: 13.6% 
Stationary object: 
11.8% 
ESC; seat belt enforcement 
Crash cushions; roadside barriers
3 Crash peaks at certain hours Most crashes occur 
from noon – 9pm 
Exposure control: road pricing; 
taxation; pubic transport; 
compacting towns 
4 Single vehicle crashes 48.7% of total ESC; seat belt enforcement; 
crash cushions; roadside barriers
5 Frequent crash locations 1/6 of all crashes occur 
in 6 areas 
Black spot treatment 
6 Inconsiderate & drink driving Incon.: 26.7% of all 
causes, drink: 11.5% in 
2006 
Enforcement & breath testing; 
legislation;  
7 Crashes in 60km/hr zones Pedestrian crashes 
most common in these 
zones (34.5%) 
Revised (lower) speed limits 
8 Pedestrian safety 28.6% of all crashes 
with pedestrians 
Separate crossings; speed 
humps; improved visibility; 
education 
9 Road layout 55% of all crashes are 
on dual c’ways 
Requires further study (not 
enough data) 
10 Central reservations; lighting; 
environment 
Not enough data Requires further study (not 
enough data) 
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 Problem Extent of problem Countermeasures 
11 Males are the most common 
casualties 
82% of casualties are 
male 
Requires further study (not 
enough data) 
12 Young casualties Make up 11% of all 
casualties 
Requires further study (not 
enough data) 
13 Seat belt use Not enough data Requires further study (not 
enough data) 
14 Driver education & behaviour Inconsiderate driving 
26.7% of all causes 
Requires further study 
If the next 12 years were similar to the preceding period then the annual 
road fatality figure was expected to double (to 684) by 2017. In total nine 
countermeasures were selected and their estimated benefits were 
calculated. The reductions were estimated as 8,242 crashes and 1,555 
casualties over the 12-year period. The magnitude of reductions in costs 
was found to be in the order of £300 million. Though the estimates are only 
accurate as far as the costs of crashes in the UK match the costs in the UAE 
updated financial figures can be incorporated once they are found and this 
does not detract from the main calculations of crash and injury reductions. 
6.20 Relating preventative measures to interventions in the 
microscopic analysis 
6.20.1 Introduction 
In a similar way to the approach used for macroscopic data, one of the main 
outcomes for the in-depth data analysis (the list of preventative measures) 
was used to match key problem areas to interventions found under the 
broad countermeasures area suggested. These interventions have all been 
reviewed in the appropriate section and the existing knowledge of these 
interventions (namely their level of effectiveness from previous research) 
was used to calculate the potential benefit on the in-depth sample. 
The difference between the two data sets lies in the level of information 
available on crashes in each. In the first sample only fourteen fields of data 
were available for every case file. This put severe limitations on the extent to 
which the crash circumstances can be deciphered and understood 
completely. The second sample contained over 140 fields of information on 
every crash in addition to the non-encoded information such as scene 
photographs and drawings. The more detailed knowledge allowed the 
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matching of interventions to specific problems with more accuracy, down to 
the individual cases. Because this sample did not cover all crashes in 2006 
a weighting of cases was performed to match the sample to the whole 2006 
injury crash population as that data is known from the base level data.  
6.20.2 Selection criteria 
The preventative measures that were chosen most frequently were short-
listed for further review. The next step was for one or more interventions of 
known effectiveness and expected relevance to the area to be matched to 
the top preventative measures assigned to cases in the in-depth sample 
(table 37). Only those interventions in bold were selected for further 
consideration because of local knowledge. The study was concentrated on 
measures that may be realistically implemented to keep it as close to reality 
as possible and applicable in the real world. 
Table 37: Top preventative measures and related interventions  
 
Countermeasures area Related intervention that may 
have improved outcome 
Prevalence in sample. 
(Multiple measures may 
apply to the same 
crash) 
1 Seat belt use Seat belt use legislation 89/300 (29.7%) 
2 Central barriers, guardrails 
and crash cushions 
Guardrail along    roadside. 
Vehicle crashworthiness. 
46/300 (15.3%)
285/300 (95%) 
3 Pedestrian safety Pedestrian protection 
measures. 
Pedestrian visibility. 
Pedestrian education. 
153/300 (51%) 
 
155/300 (51.7%) 
168/300 (56%) 
4 Speed related measures Auto. speed enforcement 72/300 (24%) 
5 Loss of control Electronic stability control 72/300 (24%) 
6 Offending driver punishment Fines and detention 38/300 (12.7%) 
Seat belt legislation for front seat occupants was already in place in Dubai 
and the UAE (Dubai Courts, 2006). Vehicle crashworthiness is a very broad 
term and influencing this in the short or medium term was seen as an 
unrealistic proposition. Pedestrian visibility was an area where little work has 
been done (especially related to the local conditions in the UAE) and 
influencing it or the behaviour of a huge number of foreign labourers was 
improbable. Pedestrian education (though desirable) was not selected due 
to similar expectations along with the non-provision of pedestrian facilities in 
many cases, which is a measure of higher priority. Pedestrians may be 
taught to cross at appropriate locations once such locations (or crossings) 
were put in place.  
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The remaining measures (in bold) were chosen for the next step due to the 
greater clarity of the relationship between them and specific cases as well 
as their established benefit from the various studies in the literature review. 
For the next step every intervention was looked at in more detail and cases 
were reviewed individually to ensure they match the case conditions as 
closely as possible to have a positive impact on the outcome. Though a lot 
of these measures might have been used at some stage in Dubai their use 
was not evident in the cases selected. This problem may be solved by road 
safety audits and black spot treatments. 
6.21 Matching interventions and problems to estimate 
reductions 
The next step was to calculate an average reduction in the number of 
crashes for every intervention and make an estimate of cost savings using 
available UK data in British Pounds for 2005 (DfT, 2007b). This was 
converted to the UAE currency (Dirham symbol AED) using exchange rates 
current at the time (July 2008). One intervention (fines and detention) was 
excluded from the next table due to the calculated effectiveness being 
applicable to the whole crash population (including non-injury crashes). All 
other interventions had effectiveness estimates based on injury crashes only 
hence the calculation of their benefits was more straightforward. To 
calculate the benefit of fines and detention it was necessary to make an 
estimate of the proportion of injury crashes to the whole crash population 
(table 35). 
For example, cases selected for grade-separated crossing facilities 
(intervention №3 in table 41) were only those that could have benefited from 
a crossing facility at the site. Cases were excluded if there were any 
indicators of unusual behaviour like drunkenness, attempted suicide or 
jumping over a pedestrian fence. For speed cameras (intervention №5) it 
must be stated that effectiveness was mixed between urban and rural areas 
and areas where the studies were made may differ significantly from Dubai. 
6.21.1 Weighting cases according to severity 
To make the sample data applicable to the whole population of reported 
injury crashes in Dubai in 2006 each subset of crashes was divided into the 
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different severities assigned by the police. Each severity was then multiplied 
by the factor found from the overall population (table 39). The results and 
breakdown were displayed in table 40. This allowed estimation of the 
benefits possible from just these six interventions over the whole population 
of 2006 injury crashes (table 41). 
6.21.2 Annual cost savings 
It was not surprising that grade-separated crossing facilities for pedestrians 
resulted in the single largest calculated benefit as the largest proportion of 
objects hit was pedestrians. Surprisingly stability control accounted for the 
next-highest reduction in costs (but only a small number of crashes) due to 
the established effectiveness of the measure especially in fatal and serious 
crashes (Thomas, 2006b; Thomas & Frampton, 2007). Speed cameras 
accounted for the third-highest reduction in costs and this measure was 
already on the police agenda to see an increase in use in both quality and 
quantity (Al-Theeb, 2008b). 
Guardrails along the roadside and in the median between opposing 
carriageways were also found to offer a substantial saving. This shows that 
despite the many new roads that were designed according to international 
standards there were still many incidents where a railing could have helped. 
Driver punishment through fines and detention also can result in some 
benefit despite the tens of thousands of fines recorded every month (Al-
Theeb, 2008a). Increased fines and enforcement had a significant positive 
impact on road-related trauma in other countries with rapidly increasing 
motorisation (Poli de Figueiredo et al, 2001; Ribeiro & Góes, 2005).  
The total cost savings possible by these few measures were substantial. 
The cost of the interventions was not available but when it becomes 
available further work on cost benefit analysis may be carried out. Whatever 
the cost of interventions it will be a small component of the budget of the 
roads authority. The cost of ongoing road projects in 2007 was 8bn Dirhams  
excluding the work on Dubai Metro (AED16bn; Gulf News, 2007). 
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Table 38: Estimated crash and cost reductions for in-depth sample 
Preventative measure Specific intervention  Best estimate 
of 
effectiveness
No. of 
matched 
cases  
Estimated crash reduction 
& cost* 
Estimated annual cost saving 
 
Guardrails along roadside -47%1 8 3.52 x £64,440 £226,823 (AED 1.6m) 
 
Central barriers, 
guardrails & crash 
cushions Median guardrail on multi-lane 
divided highways 
-30%1 10 3 x £64,440 £193,320 (AED 1.4m) 
Pedestrian measures Grade-separated crossing 
facilities 
-82%1 96 78.72 x £64,440 £5,072,717 (AED 35.5m) 
 
Vehicle control/active 
safety measures 
Electronic stability control 
(ESP/ESC/DSC/etc). 
-19%2 39 7.41 x £64,440 £477,500 (AED 3.3m) 
Speed cameras Automatic speed enforcement -17%1 68 11.56 x £64,440 £744,926 (AED 5.2m) 
Offending driver 
punishment 
Fines and detention -10%3 all crashes 36 (special case – see next 
tables) 
 
    Total (July 2008 exch. rates) £6,715,286/ AED47,007,002 
*Average value of prevention of crash – UK 2005 (DfT, 2007b). 
1Percentage change in number of injury crashes, according to Elvik & Vaa, 2004. 
2Percentage change in number of fatal and serious injury crashes (ESC vs. non-ESC cars); combined effect of ESC and passive safety improvements, according to 
Thomas, 2006b. This figure was used rather than the first estimate (for 1995-2006 crashes) as it was a more recent study. 
3Percentage change in number of total crashes; Elvik & Vaa, 2004. 
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Table 39: Weighting factors for in-depth sample to whole 2006 crash population by severity 
Severity Weighting factor 
Fatal 1.56 
Serious 6.74 
Medium 26.1 
Slight 92.9 
 
Table 40: Weighting of cases related to selected interventions 
 
Severity divisions before weighting Severity after weighting (rounded to 
nearest digit) 
Intervention 
Total 
before 
weighting 
Fatal Serious Medium Slight Fatal Serious Medium Slight 
Total after 
weighting 
1.Guardrails along roadside 8 2 2  0 1 3 13 0 93 109
2.Median guardrail on multi-lane 
divided highways 10 6  0  0 2 9 0 0 186 195
3.Grade-separated crossing facility 96 56 8 5   87 54 131 0 272
4.ESP/stability control 39 19 2 1 1 30 13 26 93 162
5.Speed cameras 68 35 5 5 3 55 34 131 279 499
6. Driver fines and detention 36 18 4 0 1 28 27 0 93 148
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Table 41: Total calculated reductions in crashes and costs 2006 
Intervention Total before 
weighting 
Total after 
weighting 
Effectiveness (% 
change in prob. of 
injury) 
Crashes reduced 
(to nearest digit) 
Savings per 
crash◊ 
Total annual 
savings 
1. Guardrails along roadside 8 109 -47% 51 £64,440 £3,286,440
2. Median guardrail on multi-lane 
divided highways 10 195 -30% 59 £64,440 £3,801,960
3. Grade-separated crossing facility 96 272 -82% 223 £64,440 £14,370,120
4. ESP/stability control¥ 39 30 -19% (fatals only) 6 £1,644,790 £9,868,740
5. Speed cameras 68 499 -17% 85 £64,440 £5,477,400
6. Driver fines & detention 36 148*
-10% all crashes 
(inc. non-injury) 1988 £1,710 £3,399,480
    2412 Total £40,204,140
     
Exch. rate  
July ‘08 ~AED281,400,000 
◊Average value of prevention of crash – UK 2005 (DfT, 2007b). 
*This intervention’s effectiveness was available only as a percentage of all crashes. That figure was calculated for the next table as follows: 
148 cases after weighting (injury crashes only). To weight these cases to the whole crash population (inc. non-injury) the proportion of injury:non-injury crashes was 
needed. Proportion of injury crashes to all crashes in 2006 is 1:134.32 (RTA, 2007). 10% of all crashes = 10% (148 x 134.32)  = 0.1 x 19,879 = 1,988 cases. 
¥ This value decreases after weighting because the initial cases included fatal and non-fatal injury cases whereas the measure only applies to fatal and serious 
cases (and serious cases were not graded as such in this data set). The number of cases were ESP may have been effective included both fatal and non-fatal 
cases. However the effectiveness estimate only applied to fatal cases hence non-fatal cases were removed, resulting in a decrease in cases after weighting rather 
than an increase.  
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6.22  Summary – microscopic analysis and interventions 
The findings from the in-depth data coincide with those from the base data in 
many cases as it was based on a subset of the whole population but there 
were many concerns with injury crashes that were now highlighted by the in-
depth nature of the information and data collected and analysed in 
microscopic depth. Some variations may be due to the shorter time range 
covered which might make it more difficult to see trends which were easily 
visible over 12 years. Others highlight differences in ground conditions (new 
roads, increasing traffic) that are characteristic of the situation in Dubai. The 
concentration of this study on serious and fatal crashes made it a very 
strong base from which to begin tackling the most costly crashes (in terms of 
human and financial cost).  
The top preventative measures that applied to the most crashes in the 
sample were selected for further analysis. These included guardrails, 
pedestrian measures, speed enforcement and fines and detention. Items 
that were excluded were already in use in Dubai to some extent or difficult to 
implement on the ground. Examples of excluded measures were seat belt 
legislation; vehicle crashworthiness and pedestrian visibility.  
Table 42: Summary of interventions and estimated reductions. 
The more detailed crash causation and mechanism reporting improves on 
the base-level data which allowed the application of the novel preventative 
measures technique to the crashes in the database. The interventions that 
Intervention Crashes reduced 
(after weighting) 
Total annual savings 
1. Guardrails along roadside 51 £3,286,440
2. Median guardrail on multi-lane divided 
highways 59 £3,801,960
3. Grade-separated crossing facility 223 £14,370,120
4. ESP/stability control 6 £9,868,740
5. Speed cameras 85 £5,477,400
6. Driver fines & detention 1988 £3,399,480
Total 2412 £40,204,140
 
Exch. rate  July 
‘08 ~AED281,400,000 
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were selected as the basis for improvements in safety were all matched to 
individual cases in the database to ensure relevance. Widening the process 
to include the whole population of casualty crashes in 2006 was possible by 
weighting the cases according to severity to calculate the possible gains for 
the whole of Dubai in one year. The severity ratios used for weighting the 
different crash severities were found from the results to be 1:1 for fatal 
crashes, 1:4 for serious crashes, 1:17 for medium crashes and 1:60 slight. 
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Chapter 7 Discussion of potential to apply counter-
injury measures in Dubai 
7.1 Introduction 
Road safety challenges were investigated in Dubai to establish its current 
standing among best-performing nations and to learn which counter-injury 
measures could be best applied from best-practice around the world. The 
results and implications were discussed in the following sections starting 
with the overall scenario, then proceeding to more detail. 
Economic growth and development are the goals of many policies and 
governments around the world. They are being achieved with startling effect 
in Dubai. This growth has brought with it multiple costs and new problems 
including the exacerbation of some existing problems, of which road safety is 
one. This is the area with which this research is concerned. The road 
infrastructure has come under immense pressure in recent years and 
construction in some places has not been able to keep pace with demand, 
as has been witnessed by the decision to bring forward the construction of a 
multi-billion-Dirham light rail transit system (Dubai Metro) that was initially 
planned for 2010 and beyond. 
Two main stakeholders in the field, academic institutions and road 
authorities, have to a large extent focused on a few specific issues permitted 
by their time and budgets. By their very nature, the authorities are not 
research-intensive or research-driven and a lot of their time is consumed by 
the rapid growth of the city and the multiple projects and maintenance that 
entails. Academic institutions exist in a culture that is not that familiar with 
external funding and subsequently lack support to conduct any large-scale 
studies to evaluate the problem but recently things are beginning to change 
for the better. This work is envisaged to be a key motivating factor for driving 
the research culture and improving the situation through scientific study and 
evaluation when presented to key decision-makers in an appropriate 
context. 
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7.2 Improvements through knowledge transfer 
In this study road safety in the emirate of Dubai in the UAE was the main 
focus. To understand the situation in Dubai within the global context it was 
necessary to review the global situation and a brief history of crash and 
injury-prevention research. Injury prevention in transport has been 
researched since the early part of the 20th century (De Haven, 1942; Stapp, 
1957) and the work of early pioneers has shown that mortality and morbidity 
through road and air transport was not inevitable; rather it was avoidable. 
Little was known about the human body’s tolerance to injury but those early 
studies showed that this tolerance was higher than most people expected 
(De Haven, 2000). By showing that the forces experienced in a crash were 
survivable in some situations this gave renewed hope to road safety 
proponents that more crashes should be survivable (Nader, 1965).  
The global burden of road traffic crashes and injuries was studied by other 
researchers and estimates for the developing scale of the problem in the 
next twenty years were alarming. The position of traffic injuries as a cause of 
mortality (Murray & Lopez, 1997d) was expected to rise to 6th worldwide in 
2020 (from 9th in 1990). Their position as a cause of loss of life years put 
them even higher in the list of diseases only third behind heart disease and 
depression. This established the current and expected size of the problem 
worldwide and the reason it demands attention from all the stakeholders in 
the equation.  
The existing literature on Dubai and the region was sparse and outdated in 
most cases but enough was available to allow a basic comparison with other 
nations around the world. It was especially interesting to compare Dubai with 
the best-performing countries to highlight the best possible end-position 
achievable through technologies and advancements applied in those 
countries. The different geographical areas were often grouped together 
(Jacobs & Aeron-Thomas, 2000) based on their level of motor vehicle use 
better known as motorisation (motor vehicles per unit of population). Dubai 
belonged to the HMC (Highly Motorised Country) group because the level of 
motorisation there was around 525 vehicles/1000 people. This level was 
similar to the levels of motorisation of the UK in recent years (552-563; DfT, 
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2006b). Standard measures of road safety performance known as fatality 
rate and fatality risk showed the best-performing countries like the UK to 
have a fatality rate of around 1 (per 10,000 motor vehicles) and a fatality risk 
of around 5 (per 100,000 population) respectively. Comparing the data from 
Dubai for 2005 showed the fatality rate (3.75) and risk (20.5) to be three to 
four times that of the UK (Ashur, 2003; RTA, 2006b; Ministry of Economy, 
2005). 
The only way of assessing the standards and dimensions of traffic crashes 
and injuries on the roads in Dubai was through data collected by the police 
and road authorities. This data was available going back a number of years 
but it was not easily accessible. The ease of data collection improved with 
time until eventually access was granted to in-depth data on site at Dubai 
Police Traffic Headquarters. 
Once the data was collected and analysed from the official sources it was 
possible to define the main problem areas and concerns. Some of the 
problems were similar to those found and dealt with in other HMCs but the 
proportions were different. Key examples of this were pedestrian crashes 
and young casualties. In the UK pedestrian and child injuries (<15 years) 
were a top priority (DfT, 2008) making up 12.2% and 9.6% of overall 
casualties respectively. In Dubai pedestrians made up 28.6% of casualties 
and those under 18 years of age formed 11% of casualties, with the biggest 
difference over the UK being in pedestrian safety. In the UK these areas 
were made a priority under the Road Safety Strategy for 2010 being covered 
in two of the ten themes (DfT, 2000). In Dubai the discontent with the 
situation is present but similar targets were not found to exist in practise. 
Research projects focusing on young casualties have been funded by the 
EU to address this problem (Kirk et al, 2006). In Dubai pedestrians were the 
most common first object hit from the in-depth database (53%) thus being a 
high priority problem but grade-separated crossings remain few and far 
between. These crossings have been verified as beneficial to safety in 
numerous studies (Elvik & Vaa, 2004; Reading et al, 1995) and form the 
basis of one of the key interventions suggested for Dubai that has a huge 
potential annual saving (£14 million, table 41). Further savings might be 
possible if more resources were dedicated to the study of this problem as 
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has been done in Victoria, Australia (Corben & Diamantopoulou, 1996; 
Corben & Duarte, 2006). 
The lack of roadside barriers or guardrails was estimated to relate directly to 
around 109 crashes in the year 2006 in Dubai (this excludes median 
guardrails between carriageways). The savings estimated from the effect of 
this intervention on these crashes amounted to £3.2 million based on the 
effectiveness found in other studies (Elvik & Vaa, 2004). Most of the 
guardrail studies were conducted in Western countries which might have 
different road environments. However the effectiveness of the measure was 
not likely to change when applied to Dubai due to the selection process of 
crashes. Individual crashes were only selected where no evidence of a 
barrier was found and the vehicle ran off the road. Similar attention to detail 
was followed for all interventions when matching them to crashes so the 
overall reliability of the results is high. 
Another example of a highly effective technological measure was the 
development of variants of Stability Control. Numerous studies (Farmer, 
2004; Kreiss et al, 2005; Lie et al, 2005; Thomas, 2006b; Bahouth, 2005; 
Aga & Okada, 2003) have measured the effectiveness of this measure. It 
was shown to reduce crashes or injuries especially in certain conditions 
(single vehicle crashes; harsh winter conditions). While some of these 
conditions are precluded in Dubai (harsh winter) there are still a significant 
number of loss of control crashes (39 in 2006 in-depth sample). The vehicles 
involved in these crashes did not have any form of electronic stability aid 
fitted to ensure their selection was valid. 
With the available resources and data a significant volume of crash 
reduction estimates was possible (2,412). The refinement of the method 
from the base-level data and the resulting increase in the cost savings 
estimate (from £30 million to £40 million annually) show how much more can 
be done with more data and better problem-intervention matching.   
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7.3 Injury severity in base-level data 
7.3.1 Slight and medium severity crashes 
The shift in recorded crash severities over the time period under study is 
worrying as the absolute number and proportion of serious injuries increases 
while slight injuries are on the decline. This could be an actual decrease in 
slight injury levels or a problem elsewhere in the system of recording or 
reporting crashes. Less-serious injuries may have gone unreported to the 
police and simply treated at hospitals as injuries due to other causes. It is 
not known if hospitals report motor vehicle-related injuries to the police if the 
police do not request the data from a known crash case. It would be 
tempting to relate the decrease in slight injury numbers to seat belt use, as 
the number of slight injury crashes post-implementation (1999) has been 
constantly below the pre-implementation phase except that it is rising and 
the last year (2006) almost reached pre-1999 levels. This is not helped by a 
recent study in the city of Al-Ain that showed very low seat belt use by the 
population (Barss et al, 2008). The proportion of slight injuries to all injury 
levels has decreased after 1999. This also goes against what the experience 
in other countries shows, that an increase in seat belt use is normally 
accompanied by a reduction in fatal injuries but an increase in slight injuries 
(Abdalla, 2005; Koushki et al, 2003). One possible explanation for the 
decline in the year 2000 was the enforcement of seatbelt legislation (front 
seat occupants only) in January 1999 (El-Sadig, 2004). The post-2000 
increase was also found in another study (Abdalla, 2005) when describing 
the fatality rate in the year 2000, reversing the decline seen in previous 
years. This study also showed that fatalities accounted for 4.8% of all 
casualties and serious injuries accounted for 2.5% of the total based on 
1999 data. Using hospital data it would be possible to verify to what extent 
police data reflects the actual situation on the roads and allow the injury 
coding to a more advanced level using conventional international standards 
like the AIS (Abbreviated Injury Scale; AAAM, 1990). A study conducted in 
the city of Al-Ain (El-Sadig et al, 2004) – which is around 150km east of 
Dubai – also showed that slight injuries made up the majority (77%) of the 
sample of hospital admissions from road crashes over 7 months in 2002. 
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7.3.2 Fatal crashes and their characteristics 
The majority of fatal crashes involve a single vehicle (49%). Analysis shows 
that most of those vehicles result in a pedestrian fatality (59%) so the 
approach must involve all dimensions, the road user, vehicle and 
surroundings. The road users in this case are both the driver and pedestrian 
and with the current data available it was not possible to deduce whether the 
fault lies with the driver or pedestrian and each requires a different approach 
to remedy the problem once it is found. However for the estimate of crash 
cost savings the cost of an average injury crash was used to cover both 
eventualities regardless of who is to blame. Driver error could include 
misjudgement of pedestrian actions or misjudging the braking distance 
needed or using inappropriate speed for the conditions or ignorance/violation 
of the rules regarding pedestrian priority. These are taught when new drivers 
undergo training but are not clearly outlined as an offence in any literature 
typically available to the driver (in Dubai). Possible pedestrian errors include 
unfamiliarity with motor vehicles and the inability to judge the speed of 
approach safely. Other possible causes might be impaired judgement due to 
external factors such as stress or very hot weather or frustration at waiting 
for a long time to cross and the unavailability of crossing facilities with no 
gaps in traffic. In Australia a review of pedestrian crossing conditions 
(Corben & Diamantopoulou, 1996) found low compliance by pedestrians at 
signal-controlled crossings when waiting times were excessive. Differences 
were found in the past in the ability to comprehend signs between drivers of 
different educational backgrounds and income levels in the UAE and 
neighbouring countries (Al-Madani & Al-Janahi, 2002). It is possible that a 
relationship exists between a driver’s circumstances and crash type that 
needs further research to establish. Behavioural differences (seat belt use 
and drink-driving) between road users of different ethnic origins have been 
observed in a number of studies (Boyd et al, 2008; Walker et al, 2003). The 
effect of ethnicity on the type and severity of a crash needs further 
investigation (along with a population breakdown by ethnic origin) before any 
solid links are established. 
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The vehicle might be a contributor to a crash if there is a mechanical failure 
(which raises the question of vehicle roadworthiness tests and how 
comprehensive they are) or the vehicle design might not be pedestrian 
friendly (with EuroNCAP star-ratings for pedestrian fronts and with further 
data on the vehicle fleet it would be possible to estimate the proportion of 
vehicles with a good star rating that can be considered “pedestrian-friendly”). 
Visibility within the vehicle might have contributed to the driver not seeing 
the pedestrian in time (e.g. A-pillar obstruction) which is a consideration for 
human factors work. A test method for assessing visibility out of cars was 
established in the 1970s (EEC Directive 77/649/EEC) but has yet to be 
updated. Further work with drivers involved in pedestrian crashes will allow 
the determination of contributory and causation factors to see if visibility was 
a problem faced by drivers and hence needs addressing by the proposed 
methods. The example of police forces in the UK with the latest revision of 
STATS19 (the form filled by the police when reporting crashes) to include 
contributory factors can be taken into account and this was included in the 
section of proposed work for the next stage. 
The countermeasures suggested in the previous chapter encompass the 
road user, vehicle and road environment and by tackling all three factors it is 
more than likely that a reduction in fatal crashes (and the most common of 
those involving pedestrians) can be achieved. The second most common 
type of fatal crash involves the vehicle occupant and the countermeasures 
that might reduce the injury outcomes in this case have not been exhausted 
yet namely through seat belt use. Most HMCs have seen a reduction in 
serious and fatal injuries after seat belt use increased so this is very likely to 
happen in Dubai as well. A counterpoint to this is the high incidence of 
young fatalities. If some of those are vehicle occupants then mandatory seat 
belt use might not benefit them as they might be better served by child 
restraints. A law enforcing the use of child restraints does not exist in Dubai 
nor is there any compulsion upon drivers or parents to correctly seat their 
children in vehicles. This is another area for consideration in the future or 
alongside seat belt legislation and implementation. 
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7.4 Variations in crash times 
7.4.1 Daily and hourly variations (macro-level) 
The crash peak on one day of the week (Thursday) may be attributed to the 
difference in driving pattern due to the Thursday-Friday weekend (most 
government departments are closed on Thursday and the private sector 
normally opens for half a day). After the change of weekend to Friday-
Saturday for the public sector the analysis showed a marked decrease in 
crashes during Wednesdays, Thursdays and most notably Saturdays, which 
would suggest that removing a large element of traffic (public sector 
workers) reduced injury crashes on that day (basing the calculation on the 
overall number of cases divided by the number of days then comparing the 
rate per day). This suggests that the countermeasure suggested (exposure 
control) is effective and was inadvertently applied here as the main reason 
for the weekend switch was thought to be an effort to reduce the lag-days for 
business transactions between the UAE and the West. For example if a 
business deal was initiated on a Thursday (when most institutions in the 
UAE were closed) it would remain inactive during the weekend (Friday) and 
when Saturday arrives most companies in the West would be closed until 
Sunday so effectively four days will have passed before anything can be 
done with the deal. This is wasteful in a business environment where hours 
and minutes count as much as days and weeks. The only other study found 
to reference crash times (1999-2001) was focused on an urban area in the 
neighbouring emirate of Abu Dhabi (Ashur et al, 2005). It reported 6% of 
crashes occurred at 11am, 12-2pm and 5pm. A similar calculation was 
attempted with the available data but it was not possible to accurately 
replicate the analysis as the conventions used for estimation were not 
published. Does 11am mean a crash occurring only at that time, or within 5 
minutes of the hour? Without such knowledge it was not possible to replicate 
the measure for the Dubai data in addition to the significant differences in 
geography and composition between the two areas. A study of Al-Ain city 
data for 1990 (Bener et al, 1992) gave a general time range for casualty 
crashes between 8am and 2pm which did not correspond to the findings in 
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Dubai. Al-Ain city is significantly different to Dubai in size and planning as 
well as composition and the level of traffic. 
In the UK, Friday afternoons have the highest number of crashes during the 
week (Ljubic et al, 2002). This corresponds to Friday being the last day of 
the working week before the official weekend begins on Saturday so being in 
a similar situation to Thursday in Dubai (and most of the Middle-East) before 
the Friday-Saturday weekend was implemented. This shows that exposure 
can have a significant impact on crash rates but it is related to many external 
factors that make it difficult to control individually without imposing draconian 
measures on society; however the acceptance of some measures by society 
is possible if the return (less congested, safer roads and faster journeys) is 
realised soon thereafter. The change in weekend shows a decrease in injury 
crashes on Saturdays and Wednesdays. This decrease may be related to 
the decreased volume of traffic due to the removal of school and 
government traffic on Saturdays. Fridays instead seem to take the load with 
an increase in crash occurrence compared to the previous months and years 
possibly due to people using the day more for leisure outings and non-
essential trips to unfamiliar areas. Longer data series are required to see 
whether the effect is short-lived or not. Another factor affecting weekend 
traffic is the commuting pattern for motorists. A large amount of economic 
activity in the UAE (measured by the number of establishments) takes place 
in the two largest emirates of Dubai and Abu Dhabi (64%; Ministry of 
Economy, 2006). Some of the workforce resides in areas with more 
moderate living costs (such as the northern emirates) and as Dubai lies 
between the capital Abu Dhabi and the northern emirates it acts as a 
corridor for through-traffic. Official estimates (Dubai Statistics Centre, 2009) 
put the number of people active during the day in Dubai at the end of 2008 
at 2.45 million, 49% more than the estimated resident population (1.65m). 
This is accounted for by residents of other emirates in addition to an element 
of tourists and sailors.  
High-speed by-passes have been built recently to accommodate this traffic 
in the form of Emirates Road, Al-Khail road and the Outer Bypass Road. 
Licensing information for those involved in fatal crashes shows that most 
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vehicles (of the accused party) were registered in Dubai (72.5%) while Abu 
Dhabi and Sharjah vehicles come next with 9.7% each (RTA, 2006). These 
figures do not represent the origin of vehicles as residents of other emirates 
whose primary workplace is in Dubai may register their cars in Dubai but 
reside elsewhere.  
 
 
Figure 66: Political map of the UAE. 
A study in neighbouring Abu Dhabi (Ashur et al, 2005) from 1999-2001 
(n=15,306 crashes) showed that crashes peaked on Saturdays and Sundays 
(19% & 17% respectively) followed by Wednesdays (16%). This could be 
due to the fact that in those years Dubai was thought of as a leisure 
destination for a lot of the population of Abu Dhabi who consequently head 
to Dubai on weekends reducing traffic in Abu Dhabi (Thursday and Friday 
had the lowest percentage of crashes out of all days in Abu Dhabi – 11% 
and 9% respectively). 
In looking at crash times along with days of the week, the afternoon and 
evening periods account for more crashes, which might correspond to more 
exposure during that time compared to the morning period. When looking 
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exclusively at the morning period, the weekend (Friday and Saturday) has 
the most crashes out of all the other days. This indicates a possible link to 
the type of activities and nature of trips undertaken in weekends (involving 
return trips very late at night or early in the morning that are associated with 
tiredness and fatigue). 
7.4.2 Hourly and monthly variations (macro-level) 
The difference in crash rates with time can be a pointer to an underlying 
problem that is time-sensitive like the level of traffic at a certain time of day 
or week. If for example traffic levels at peak hours result in more crashes 
then alternative routes to reduce traffic during those peak hours can be a 
solution. If, however, traffic levels in morning and evening rush hours were 
similar yet more crashes happen in the evening rush hour then it might be 
the case that the crash cause is more due to driver fatigue and exhaustion 
rather than the increase in traffic levels as drivers in the morning are 
expected to be more alert. In the UK and other countries drivers were found 
to be more prone to a sleep-related crash between the times of 02.00-06.00 
and 14.00-16.00 (Horne & Reyner, 1999). No such work was found on the 
UAE. Exposure data and traffic counters placed at strategic sites can assist 
in further study of the timely variations and comparing them to crash 
occurrence, type and severity. Variations throughout the year might be due 
to changes in the commute of workers in the different sectors of the 
economy. For instance construction and haulage traffic is expected to 
remain high all year round as construction in the past few years has been a 
constant activity in high gear. Academic traffic on the other hand is tied to 
the school or university calendar and is expected to be reduced to a 
minimum during the long summer vacation (around July – August) and the 
effect of this is seen in traffic. One possible counter-argument to this is that 
leisure activities outside school terms increase thus balancing out the 
decrease in academic traffic. It is common in the UAE population to take a 
summer break outside the country often to cooler climates so the whole 
population of vehicles on the road might decrease in these times. Ultimately 
the distribution of crashes during the year or day might be useful when 
countermeasures to tackle a certain problem highlighted by timely variations 
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can be applied. However generally it was thought that variations (especially 
monthly) are too vague to point to any particular problem that can be solved 
by measures like exposure control as the primary reason they are monitored 
is for overall reductions and year-on-year monthly comparisons. Earlier work 
in Al-Ain (Bener et al, 1992) showed similarly high levels of crashes during 
winter months followed by spring with the least number of crashes in 
summer (1990 data). That study also showed higher crashes in the Muslim 
fasting month of Ramadan that coincided with April that year but the month 
falls at a different time every year so it is difficult to compare this result over 
a number of years. The summer period is particularly hot in the region and 
high temperatures and humidity drive a large part of the population to take 
leave during this time so driving activity decreases. This is aside from the 
reduced traffic due to the closure of universities and schools. In winter 
months tourist traffic increases due to the more moderate climate and this – 
tied along with large promotions (like the Dubai Shopping Festival) – leads to 
more demand for travel on the roads. Other studies of peak times show 
increased involvement of certain road user groups like child pedestrians in 
early mornings in Austria (Mayr et al, 2003) which correspond to the time of 
going to school. The comparison of casualty crash numbers per month with 
the time of occurrence shows similar findings to the daily comparison (i.e. 
peaks during the afternoon and evening for all months of the year). The 
cooler winter months and hotter summer months do not appear to affect the 
time of day when injury crashes peak. However the size of the peak for 
every month seems dependent on whether it is summer or another season 
(summer months 6 to 9 have lower peaks than the rest of the year). This is 
in line with the lower traffic expected due to school and work holidays and a 
reduction in activity due to the summer heat. 
7.4.3 Variation in month, hour and day of occurrence (micro-level) 
The month of December stands out as having the most crashes in the year. 
This may be due to meteorological factors like a few days with impaired 
visibility (due to fog or sandstorms) or low traction (due to rainfall; Dubai 
Meteorological Office, 2006). Crash rates in some Nordic countries actually 
improve in wintry conditions (Fridstrøm et al, 1995) but this may be due to 
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more careful driving in such conditions. Exposure of traffic during that time is 
not known, so it was not possible to attribute the variation to these factors 
with any certainty when the volume of traffic or number of trips might be 
responsible. In 2006 tourist traffic (measured by the number of hotel guests) 
peaked in Dubai during the months of March, July and December 
(Department of Tourism and Commerce Marketing, 2009) exceeding 
500,000 tourists per month. Most schools also remain shut during the 
summer. The fact that July (along with November) had the lowest incidence 
of crashes was surprising as July was a peak month for tourist numbers. 
Tourists have been found to have a higher crash risk in previous studies 
(Wilks, 1999; Yannis et al, 2007). Because the in-depth sample is mainly 
composed of fatal and serious crashes (figure 23 p.121) these may be more 
random events compared to the overall distribution of injury crashes seen in 
the larger population of the base-level sample where fluctuation from month 
to month was less. In the UK for 2007 (DfT, 2008) July and August account 
for the highest number of serious and fatal crashes. This might be related to 
the more moderate summer temperatures in the UK that encourage more 
road usage. 
The peaks seen in hourly variation correspond to periods of rush hour traffic 
well known to the residents and commuters throughout Dubai. These were 
different from the peaks found in the base-level data possibly due to the 
hectic pace of construction in 2006 which was unmatched by the period 
before. The large volume of vehicles on the road during these hours 
corresponds to a greater possibility of interaction between them. It also 
increases the chances of a vehicle hitting other vehicles if it loses control. 
While UK data (DfT, 2008; Ljubic et al, 2002) showed peaks at 8am and 4-
6pm this may be due to the different timings of public and private sector 
corporations. In the UAE public departments varied in the pattern of working 
hours but many finished earlier in the day than the UK (around 3pm) and 
started earlier (7.30am). Commuters to work from far away places will have 
to leave their homes very early especially as labour camps that house the 
hundreds of thousands of construction workers are often located far from 
their work sites. Two shifts in a day were common in many organisations 
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with a long afternoon break (2 or 3 hours) so the evening shift ends at 
around the second evening peak (8pm).  
Wednesdays witnessed a lower number of crashes than any other weekday. 
The weekend for employees of government departments and many 
corporations in the financial sector is Friday and Saturday so linking this 
reduction to traffic generated by these two sectors is not viable. However 
some companies still operate a Thursday-Friday weekend for most 
employees and these might have an effect on the number of serious crashes 
that occur on the day preceding the weekend. It may be that drivers try their 
best to return home safely at the end of a long week or that some leave early 
to avoid the rush hour thus spreading traffic load over a longer time. Times 
of lighter traffic were seen to have a lower frequency of crashes in 
microscopic analysis. Thursday and Friday traffic may be different in 
composition to traffic during the working week as it is not work-related. In the 
UK Fridays and weekends (Saturday and Sunday) accounted for the largest 
number of drink-drive crashes (2006: 63%; DfT, 2008) with most of them 
taking place between the hours of 9pm and 3am. This reflects the drinking 
culture in the UK that is less evident in Dubai especially for fatal and serious 
crashes. The UK working week is fairly different in that practically all 
organisations have the same weekend. In that situation, Friday accounts for 
the largest number of serious crashes and Sunday for the smallest number 
(Mansfield et al, 2008) but the study sample was larger (2000-2005). 
7.5 Enforcement 
7.5.1 Base-level data 
Police enforcement of rules and regulations is always a balancing act 
between behaviour-affecting affirmative action and time-wasting 
administrative action. Before any law enforcement is discussed it is 
important to emphasize that enforcement is only as good as the laws behind 
it. It is pointless to have a law banning the wearing of red socks as it would: 
a. be unenforceable; and b. have no effect on road safety or crash outcome. 
Effective laws are needed for enforcement to be effective. Excessive 
administrative work related to enforcement (like filling in time-consuming 
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forms for every act of enforcement) is a strong discouragement to active and 
constant enforcement. The balance between practicality and effectiveness is 
often down to the police officer’s judgement. It would be unsafe to stop on a 
blind corner – putting the patrol car and other drivers at risk – for the sake of 
citing a minor offence to a pedestrian that may be stopped later down the 
road, or that has very little to do with safety in the first place. Effective 
enforcement also depends on the officer’s training and equipment level as 
they need to have excellent knowledge of any relevant legislation and be 
well trained to police it effectively. Dubai Police is generally seen as a well-
funded organisation with state-of-the-art equipment and policing methods 
however it is possible – as with many rapidly-developing departments and 
areas – to overlook some of the training and legislative needs to support this 
growth in requirements especially where traffic enforcement is concerned. 
The effect of enforcement in Stockton, California (Voas & Hause, 1987) was 
encouraging however the differences between the perception and powers of 
the police in Dubai and the USA are very different. It is likely that the effects 
of enforcement will not be directly translated across continents but some 
positive effect is still possible. A prime example is with the drink-driving 
problem when crashes are found to peak around 4am. This correlates with 
the closing time for entertainment venues where alcohol is served. 
Concentrating enforcement around that time or around known alcohol-
serving venues could have a direct effect on drink-driving levels or crashes. 
The experience of Australia (Zaal, 1994) with Random Breath Testing (RBT) 
combined with publicity positively influenced driver behaviour with respect to 
drink-driving over a period of time. 
7.5.2 Automatic speed enforcement 
Automatic speed enforcement might be effective in the short term but once 
camera locations are known their effectiveness might decrease significantly 
as was experienced in Kuwait (Koushki & Hasan, 2000) which shares a 
similar cultural, geographical and economic background to the UAE. The 
same suggestions made to tackle the problem in Kuwait (Koushki & Hasan, 
2000) - “live” enforcement with police patrols - might be effective in Dubai 
also but the issue of human resource availability will limit the extent to which 
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this can be applied. This is based on the assumption of similar behaviour in 
reaction to the suggested countermeasure. The reactions may differ due to 
previous work in the Gulf Cooperative Council (Al-Madani, 2000; Al-Madani 
& Al-Janahi, 2002) that showed drivers differ in self-reported behaviour 
(such as seat belt use and comprehension of traffic signs) between the 
countries. A study on speed camera locations and driver speeds similar to 
that described in Kuwait, if performed in the UAE would help quantify the 
effect of this measure and the extent to which the situation differs from 
neighbouring countries. The deployment of visible speed camera vans was 
successful in reducing fatalities in Australia (Newstead & Cameron, 2003) 
when positioned according to the guidelines of a local road safety manual 
(Queensland Transport, 2000). In Queensland the deployment of these 
cameras was estimated to result in an annual reduction of 32% thus 
avoiding 110 fatalities (Newstead & Cameron, 2003). Encouraging results 
were also found in other countries (Pilkington & Kinra, 2005). 
7.5.3 Seat belt enforcement 
Seat belt use data was not supplied for these crashes but roadside surveys 
were conducted by the authorities during the same time period covered by 
the data. This allowed a snapshot of seat belt use to be taken in the overall 
driving population of which this data was a subset of. These indicate the 
most recent usage rates since the enforcement of the seat belt law in 
January 1999 are around 65% for drivers and 25% for front seat passengers 
(table 27). Self-reported usage in the UAE before January 1999 falls 
considerably below these levels. Bener et al (1994) in a survey of 800 
drivers admitted to the emergency departments of two major hospitals in Al-
Ain as a result of a crash found that 10.5% reported “constant” usage and 
5.8% reported usage as “frequent”. This was before the enforcement of 
seatbelt legislation. A repeat of these surveys will provide valuable 
information on this area which currently lacks definition however recent work 
in the UAE shows the legislation to have become ineffective after a few 
years (Barss et al, 2008).  
Another medical study conducted in Al-Ain on 1995 data (Sankaran-Kutty et 
al, 1998) showed a very low level of seat belt use for casualties (6%, n=247). 
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The latest published work (Barss et al, 2008) at the time of writing also in the 
city of Al-Ain showed an alarming rate of seat belt use over a sample of 500 
vehicles. Drivers had a 29% usage rate, while front seat passengers had a 
14% rate and only 2% of rear seat adults wore seat belts. Even more 
worrying was the rate for children, 23% sat in front, of whom 4% were 
restrained and only 1% in the rear were restrained. 
If the general population of drivers has a low seat belt utilisation rate then it 
is safe to assume those drivers involved in crashes will have a similar usage 
rate, if not lower, because the experience of other countries has shown non-
seat belt wearing drivers to be over-represented in crashes (Hunter et al, 
1990). Seat belts are thought to be most effective in scenarios of frontal 
impact or running-off-the-road crashes (Evans, 1990). Their effectiveness in 
reducing fatalities (by 23%) and injuries (by 26%) is supported by the 
experience of the UK with mandatory wearing laws (Mackay, 1985) and is 
difficult to explain by other factors like exposure or risk compensation (also 
known as “risk homeostasis”, “closed loop compensatory feedback” or 
“behavioural adaptation”; Adams, 1994). In the UK usage rose from around 
40% for drivers before the law to around 90% after. It was assumed that this 
was the main factor in reducing injuries and fatalities in the following year 
(Mackay, 1985) despite other events happening in that year (1983) that 
might have influenced these figures like the campaign against drunken 
driving which included more breath tests than any previous year (Adams, 
1994). If the latest usage rate measured in Dubai drivers (65%) is still 
current and is assumed to rise to 90% with enforcement of the existing law 
then a decrease in death and injury of 20% is predicted (based on the UK 
experience). In numbers this would mean a reduction in the number of 
people fatally injured from a stationary object impact or rollover by 102 but 
this is only a rough estimate assuming all other factors (crash rate, 
exposure, etc) over the next 12 years remain the same. Reasons why this 
might not be the result if the seat belt law was strictly enforced include the 
difference in driving population (that of Dubai is relatively small compared to 
the UK at the time – 16 million) and might not respond behaviourally in the 
same way due to cultural differences. These cultural differences were 
highlighted by previous work on driver behaviour that compared Emarati 
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drivers in the UAE to their peers in Britain, the Netherlands, Finland and 
Australia (Bener et al, 2004). Bener found large differences in behaviour 
between UAE drivers and those in the Western nations with the Arabian 
drivers prone to riskier behaviour. In related studies different factors were 
found to affect drivers’ seat belt use such as the level of comprehension of 
traffic signs (UAE; Al-Madani & Al-Janahi, 2002) and ethnic origin (USA; 
Boyd et al, 2008). There is also no representative monitoring of restraint use 
over a long time period like there is in the UK (Broughton, 1990; 2003). In a 
literature review from studies in Australia and around the world enforcement 
along with primary seat belt legislation, education and publicity were all 
recommended for improving seat belt utilisation rates (Zaal, 1994). 
Secondary seat belt legislation (where a driver can only be cited for a seat 
belt offence if first stopped for another reason) was commonly found in the 
USA but the effectiveness of primary legislation was higher (Rivara et al, 
1999). If long-term use was only affected by enforcement then the cost and 
feasibility of constant increased enforcement needs to be taken into account. 
However the experience in many Western nations suggests seat belt use 
rates remain high with minimal enforcement as the emphasis for compliance 
lies with the individual vehicle occupant (Zaal, 1994). 
7.6 Crashes by number of involved parties (macro) 
7.6.1 Single vehicle crashes 
The prevalence of single-vehicle crashes deserves further attention for the 
main reason that they are more common than two-vehicle crashes (49% vs. 
42%). Hence their reduction (and the reduction of associated injury 
outcomes) will mean a reduction in a major sub-set of crashes. Most of the 
single-vehicle crashes are either pedestrian crashes (57%) or rollovers 
(21%) and stationary-object impacts (19%) where it is assumed the vehicle 
leaves the road. In the UK a smaller proportion of crashes (30%) involve one 
vehicle (with or without a pedestrian) and more (59%) involve two vehicles 
(DfT, 2008).  
Pedestrian crashes occur wherever there is interaction between pedestrian 
and vehicular traffic so separating these traffic streams is the ideal way to 
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prevent them. This has severe practical implications for both types of traffic 
as it is not realistic to always exclude one type of traffic where the other 
exists due to prohibitive costs (for instance building pedestrian bridges or 
underpasses at frequent intervals over urban streets). The more practical 
alternative is allowing the interaction of different traffic streams while 
controlling it to prevent the worst outcome: an injury. Voluntary methods of 
control (zebra crossings, pedestrian priority rules) already exist at a lot of 
locations but their effectiveness does not appear to be high at all as would 
be witnessed if an observer stands at a zebra crossing in Dubai for long 
enough. This can be evaluated scientifically through field surveys. Enforced 
control of traffic as with a pedestrian-controlled or activated signal to stop 
motor vehicles (MVs) and the recording of offending MVs that do not stop on 
camera is a more effective way of permitting mixed-traffic streams while 
reducing the danger to the more vulnerable road users. Enforcement has 
proven successful in other fields (like speed control) so it is likely that, by 
analogy, its effectiveness can be extended to pedestrian signal control. The 
experience of other countries, especially where urban settings mean 
pedestrians almost always have priority, might be applicable to some extent 
in some areas of Dubai. However the level of attention paid to pedestrians 
by drivers in Dubai and the UAE shows a large disparity when compared to 
the behaviour of drivers in Western countries (Bener et al, 2004). This lack 
of pedestrian awareness by drivers was also found in neighbouring Qatar 
(Bener et al, 2005) by the self-reported incidents of not noticing a pedestrian 
crossing when turning into a side street from the main road. Speed 
enforcement was shown to be successful in tackling speeding in many 
studies (Zaal, 1994). The effect of fines and penalty points on speeding 
enforcement was mixed and depended on existing enforcement levels. If 
enforcement (and hence the risk of detection) of an errant driver was low 
then it was not likely that even severe fines would affect road user behaviour 
(Ross & Voas, 1990). In Sweden in the 1980s speeding fines were 
increased twice but with no effect on driving behaviour (Aberg et al, 1989; 
Andersson, 1989; cited in Zaal, 1994). The financial penalty may be 
insignificant compared to income or social status and might not be a 
deterrent so changes in enforcement to increase the perceived risk of 
227 
detection must be considered. Feedback to drivers given in the form of signs 
showing the percentage of speeding drivers in the preceding time period 
have been effective in reducing average speeds while in use (Rooijers & de 
Bruin, 1990; Maroney & Dewar, 1987; cited in Fildes & Lee, 1993). 
Instantaneous feedback to drivers showing their speeds to other drivers 
have been suggested as a means to embarrass individuals into compliance 
(Fildes & Lee, 1993). Such devices have been used in Dubai in the past in a 
very limited context. Penalty points have been used in the past to deter 
drivers from committing offences and were found to be most effective on 
drivers with consistent violations (Dingle, 1985, cited in Zaal, 1994). Haque 
(1987, cited in Zaal, 1994) also showed a beneficial effect to the system of 
penalty points in Victoria, Australia. One possible drawback to the scheme is 
the impression given to drivers that a certain number of offences is 
acceptable before punishment was due (Williams et al, 1992, cited in Zaal, 
1994). The authorities in the UAE introduced a penalty points system in 
legislation for 2008 (Abu Dhabi Police, 2008) which shows that the 
recommendations made here were already being implemented in some 
areas. 
Rollovers were the second-most common crash type (evident in 10.9% of 
cases) and this could be due to a number of factors. The vehicle fleet under 
discussion contains a large number of 4x4 vehicles that mostly have a 
higher centre of gravity than saloon cars and thus are more prone to rollover 
rather than spin when there is loss of control at speed. New vehicle sales 
data in 2006 (Auto Strategies International, 2007) for the UAE showed that 
over 21% of sales were attributed to 4x4 vehicles. Four-wheel drive vehicles 
have already been identified as a priority for research in a previous study in 
the UAE (Bener et al, 2006). Electronic systems that prevent the vehicle 
from leaving the road or prevent the driver from losing control in the first 
place have shown their effectiveness in Scandinavian countries (Lie et al, 
2005) as well as Japan (Aga & Okada, 2003), Australasia (Scully & 
Newstead, 2007), the UK (Thomas & Frampton, 2007) and USA (Bahouth, 
2005; Farmer, 2004). The effect of these technologies is likely to be positive 
on the road users in Dubai as the first studies of ESC effect (especially on 
4x4 vehicles) show great potential in single-vehicle crashes (Dang, 2004). 
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However the argument remains that making a car safer leads to the driver 
taking more risks hence cancelling out the benefits. This debate existed 
since seat belts first came on to the scene (Adams, 1982; 1994) and will 
likely be heard in the future in respect of more advances in vehicle 
technology (lane-departure warning, night vision, blind spot monitoring, etc).  
High speed roads form a significant section of the road network and carry a 
large amount of traffic every day so combining high speed roads with driver 
error is likely to result in an unforgiving road environment. It is fortunate that 
most rollovers (94.5%) are single-vehicle crashes which means there is no 
obvious involvement of other vehicles but this might change with time given 
the increasing traffic flow. Through making the road environment more 
forgiving (by the suggested countermeasures like steel barriers) the 
outcomes of these crashes might be less severe. To prevent them in the first 
place further investigation of their causes is required. It is likely that driver 
error and misjudgement is the leading cause though other contributory 
factors might be present, like excess speed, over-confidence in the ability of 
the vehicle and sudden unexpected movement from other traffic. More 
modern technologies are slowly beginning to offer some assistance in this 
respect, such as being able to alert a driver when they start leaving the lane 
unintentionally (without using the indicator). These technologies are still new 
to market and in the future as their use becomes more widespread it is 
hoped they can be evaluated with regard to their effect on this type of crash. 
Hitting a stationary object almost certainly involves losing control of the 
vehicle as it is very rare for a driver to intentionally want to damage their 
vehicle and public property and risk their lives in the process. This type of 
crash is similar to a rollover in that a lot of energy is dissipated in such a 
crash. With a rollover there is a greater distance over which this energy is 
dissipated whereas a stationary object impact can be over a very short 
distance (thus testing the structure of the vehicle to the maximum) as 
stationary roadside objects are often only a few metres from the main 
carriageway (like lamp posts, sign posts and bridge supports). This problem 
was reported widely in the literature (Elvik & Vaa, 2004) and treatments at 
one area were presented in depth from the experience in Victoria, Australia 
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(Corben et al, 1997). Countermeasures such as crash barriers, guardrails, 
crash cushions and frangible poles that increase the deceleration distance 
(and thus allow for more energy absorption over a longer time) are a clear 
candidate for reducing injuries in these crashes. The Australian 
recommendations (Corben et al, 1997) highlighted the effectiveness of 
changes to horizontal road geometry alignment (44% reduction in casualty 
crashes) and shoulder sealing (32% reduction). Road design guidelines also 
came under criticism (Delaney et al, 2002) for failing to reduce the severity 
or frequency of crashes into fixed roadside objects. This reinforces the 
importance of local investigation and treatment of blackspots using known 
crash causes as performed in Victoria (Corben et al, 1997). Other 
countermeasures that reduce the possibility of loss-of-control of the vehicle 
(already described above) are also important to prevent these crashes 
happening in the first place. 
7.7 Crash locations (macroscopic analysis) 
7.7.1 Introduction  
Initially it was intended to use the precise crash location on a GIS 
(Geographical Information System) platform along with a digital roads base-
map of Dubai to analyse the location of crashes and their concentration in 
different areas. However this was not possible due to a number of difficulties 
so analysis using street names was performed and some meaningful data 
was extracted from this. 
7.7.2 Main roads involved 
Differences in crash rates between the main roads must not be given too 
much significance as traffic on Sheikh Zayed Road far exceeds that on 
Dubai Al-Ain Road as it is a main through-route for traffic between the capital 
Abu Dhabi and the Northern Emirates. Emirates Ring Road only came into 
existence in late 2000 so it is much newer than the other two roads. The 
2007 data release (Dubai Police, 2008a) from official publications shows that 
in 2007 the top crash blackspot was the same (Sheikh Zayed Rd) but the 
lower ranking roads are shuffled around due to new roads being built and 
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existing roads being expanded in the past few years. It is logical for the 
roads with the heaviest traffic flow to have the most opportunities for a crash 
occurring. However the adjustment of road users to different roads and 
speeds and the performance of vehicles in different crash configurations 
also has a large effect on the chances of a crash happening and the injury 
outcomes associated with it. In building a modern road infrastructure to cope 
with current demand, Dubai has a rapidly-growing network of mostly new or 
well-maintained roads that is used by hundreds of thousands of vehicles 
every day. However, at any one time, the number of road users is likely to be 
from a large number of different backgrounds and cultures. In Germany for 
instance the number of non-Germans on the road who are unfamiliar with 
the road system is unlikely to be high as Germans make the absolute 
majority of the residents of Germany. In the UAE this is not so especially in 
Dubai. The mix of different nationalities might be a contributor to users of the 
road system adhering to different values and conceptions which does not 
help the road safety situation. Sometimes different emirates have different 
enforcement levels of the same rules (such as the level of window glass 
tinting allowed) which might cause some confusion for motorists travelling 
between the emirates. The top crash locations are all well-known and well-
used thoroughfares and in an effort to reduce impacts and delays with heavy 
vehicles the police have banned trucks and heavy vehicles from most of the 
main highways during rush hours. If vehicle type was available in the data 
the effect of this on the involvement of heavy vehicles in injury crashes on 
arterial roads could be further assessed. Black spot treatment of these 
locations combined with detailed crash data is likely to yield dividends in 
reducing crash scenarios that recur frequently. Cross-tabulation of the top 
crash locations with crash types reveals an association between the type of 
crash and location. The most frequent crash types listed for high-speed 
roads (rollovers and head-to-tail crashes) might be influenced by measures 
discussed in the enforcement section (speed enforcement and police 
patrols). Speed is often contributory to a rollover and increasing the distance 
between vehicles can improve safety margins (e.g. with chevrons to indicate 
safe following distances). Further countermeasures related to specific crash 
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types are discussed further in the following sections (on crash types, causes, 
objects hit and preventative measures). 
7.8 Crash locations (microscopic analysis) 
The top 6 locations of crashes are mostly multi-lane dual-carriageways 
where vehicles can achieve high speeds and hence gain a lot of momentum 
that is dissipated in various ways often resulting in injury or death. These 
roads also acted as corridors for traffic in and out of the city of Dubai 
connecting it on the south west to Abu Dhabi, on the east to Al-Ain and in 
the north east to Sharjah and the Northern Emirates and hence carry a lot of 
inter-emirate traffic. New roads parallel to the above roads were planned for 
the future so a shift in load (and crashes) might occur. The top ranking road 
(Emirates Rd) was fairly new compared to the next one down (Sheikh Zayed 
Rd) but it has quickly taken position as the top crash location. This may be 
due to the relieving effect it had on traffic from Sheikh Zayed Rd as it runs 
almost parallel to it. Emirates Rd also has the distinction of being built across 
plain desert so the surrounding areas were not as interesting to drivers as 
Sheikh Zayed Rd (which is lined by towers and sky scrapers). It was 
expected this will likely change in the future as the areas between the two 
major routes get populated and they eventually become more alike than 
different. The remaining top locations (three with the exception of Al 
Muhaisna 2nd) were all high speed roads with a speed limit of 100 or 120kph 
so there was a clear link between serious crashes and high speed roads. Al 
Muhaisna 2nd was the exception being a residential area where low-income 
workers were housed. The roads there had generally low speed limits (40 or 
60kph) but the mix of road users in that area was unique in that it consisted 
of a large pedestrian and cyclist population as motorised vehicles were out 
of the reach of most residents there. In the UK smaller roads with higher 
speed limits account for more serious crashes (Mansfield et al, 2008). The 
low-speed roads in Dubai were seen to be more modern and less risky for 
drivers due to more recent construction with wider shoulders and lanes. 
Severe and fatal crashes in the UK (Mansfield et al, 2008) were more 
common to non-trunk A-roads and roads with a 60mph (~100kph) speed 
limit. Smaller roads in the UK may be less forgiving than their counterparts in 
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Dubai due to the different environment with grass verges or ditches lining a 
lot of country roads. In Dubai the warm climate dictates that the verges were 
often made up of sand or an asphalt shoulder is put in place. The main crash 
type associated with the six top locations was pedestrian crashes, most 
occurring on roads with a speed limit of 120 kph (i.e. motorways) whereas in 
the UK pedestrians are banned from motorways. 
7.9 Speed limits (macroscopic analysis) 
Speed reductions can result in a small decrease in injury crashes but with an 
associated cost to businesses, the economy and the environment. 
Businesses suffer due to longer delivery times for goods and longer 
commuting times for workers which all translate into higher operating costs. 
The environment is affected by the increased emissions, fuel bills and fuel 
consumption which are thought to contribute to climate change. The 
consequential effect of increased costs to business will be passed on to the 
economy by raising costs and contributing to inflation. Working out a 
favourable balance between these factors is not possible without detailed 
economic and environmental analysis but if it is found that speed reduction 
on certain roads is feasible then it can become a key element in improving 
road safety as it has been shown to work in that way especially in 
Scandinavian countries. However road user behaviour in Scandinavia and in 
Dubai is very different (Bener et al, 2004) so a direct comparison might not 
be entirely valid. However the majority of the population is assumed to be 
law-abiding when it comes to speed limits until further work is conducted to 
prove or disprove this. The increased cost of policing these new speeds 
must be taken into consideration as well as enforcement seems to be one of 
the few ways that road users in this region can be persuaded to adhere to 
speed limits. 
7.10 Speed limits and speeding (microscopic analysis) 
The figures for speeding for the first and second vehicles involved may not 
reflect the actual incidence of speeding due to a number of missing values 
where speeding might have taken place but was not recorded due to the 
lack of evidence. In most cases V1 was the accused vehicle and V2 
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sometimes shared some of the blame but it was unusual to find that the 
incidence of speeding in V2 was more common than in V1. This pointed to 
an endemic speeding problem in the drivers of vehicles involved in serious 
crashes (over 41% and 46% of the first and second vehicles involved were 
speeding respectively). This made it more likely that speeding was a 
contributory factor to these types of crashes as was seen in the official injury 
crash causation publication for 2006 (RTA, 2007). There speeding appears 
fourth on the list of causative factors (8.2%) and third in the case of fatal 
cases only (14.3%). In a representative study (Mansfield et al, 2008) from 
the UK excessive speeding was the third most common contributory factor 
recorded at the scene. Speeding in Western studies was shown to be tied in 
with societal values (Makinen & Oei, 1992, cited in Zaal, 1994) while being 
widespread and condoned within society (Croft, 1993, cited in Zaal, 1994). 
Speed limits were known in the majority of cases except in a few where the 
location was unconventional (in six cases only). Crashes that occur on such 
locations (on private land, in the desert or on construction sites) were not 
strictly the responsibility of the traffic police and were classed as 
occupational safety problems. They were included in the analysis because 
they were investigated by traffic police and involved motor vehicles. The 
cause was down to driver error in almost all cases. The two most prevalent 
speed limits, 80 and 120km/h, reflected the locations they were set in. 
Roads with an 80km/h limit were more likely to be within the city limits and 
near areas of commercial activity with traffic-light controlled junctions and 
numerous entry and exit routes for traffic. If a large number of pedestrian 
crashes occurred in the 80km/h zones (as they did) then lower speed limits 
might be one way to reducing the casualties there. If, however, the 120km/h 
regions account for most of the pedestrian crashes then different methods of 
excluding or protecting pedestrian traffic must be devised because mixing 
unregulated pedestrian traffic with vehicles travelling at such high speeds 
had disastrous consequences. Roads with speed limits of 120kph were the 
next most common category after 80kph roads with a minor difference 
between them. 
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There was a significant difference between roads where most injuries occur 
and the designated speed limit in the UK and the findings of microscopic 
analysis. In the UK in 2007 roads with the worst incidence of injury crashes 
(62.8%) were 30mph roads (DfT, 2008). All injury crashes occurring on 
50mph limit roads (closest to 80kph) made up 2.9% of the total while roads 
with a 70mph speed limit (closest to 120kph) accounted for only 7.8% of 
total crashes. The most frequent speed limit at UK injury sites in 2007 was 
30mph (62.8%) which might highlight the different types of roads involved in 
crashes. These differences may be attributable to the difference in road 
construction and age mentioned earlier as well as differences in the climate 
conditions and general population of drivers and vehicles involved and their 
travel patterns. 
7.11 Crash causation (macro-level) 
Federal (UAE-wide) records from 1990-1998 (El-Sadig et al, 2002) show that 
the leading cause for fatal crashes was careless driving (43% average). This 
was not listed as a cause on Dubai crash forms due to non-unification of 
crash report forms at that time unless it is equated to “inconsiderate driving”. 
Crash causes were seen to vary significantly between the latest year 
available (2006) and previous years. The most frequent crash cause 
(inconsiderate driving: 26.7%) has not changed but the order of other causes 
has changed significantly with the ominous rise of drink-driving as a 
significant contributor to injury crashes in 2006. This rapidly-changing 
scenario reflects the dynamic pace of development and the ever-changing 
population and 24-hour economy with many construction projects working 
around the clock to finish on time and before competitors and deadlines. 
Delays in construction can lead to large fines and lengthy and costly 
disputes between clients and construction companies (Zaneldin, 2006). The 
recording of crash cause is assumed to be reasonably reliable but the 
degree to which this recording is repeatable and accurate is not known. As 
with any human activity some degree of error is to be expected especially 
when the recording is hardly ever done under the same circumstances. The 
number of fields available for crash types appears to be sufficient to cover 
most crashes but the definitions of certain causes were not fully understood. 
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This may be improved by discussions with crash investigators that use the 
form frequently.  
The prime crash causation (inconsiderate driving) is a problem with 
behavioural and psychological dimensions, as well as educational ones. It 
would be too simplistic to assume a different driving test or curriculum of 
driver education at schools will help solve this problem taking into 
consideration the experience of other countries with these measures. 
However this area deserves more detailed study to come up with realistic 
and effective countermeasures. It might also be the case that this is used as 
a cause when it is closest to the actual crash cause but the actual cause is 
not recorded due to time constraints or the need for extra information when 
those involved in the crash are not easily accessible. Speeding is a common 
cause and associated with more severe crashes in other countries especially 
for pedestrians (Gårder, 2004; Kim et al, 2008; Pitt et al, 1990) so tackling 
this even as a contributory factor would be desirable. 
Causations that are expected to be frequently encountered in a hot desert 
environment are not that common namely blown-out tyres and animal 
collisions (especially camels). The rarity of tyre defects could be attributed to 
the relatively modern vehicle fleet and to annual inspections by the 
authorities that are compulsory at the time of vehicle registration renewal. 
Animal collisions are not as high up the list of causes due to the extensive 
fencing around almost all major motorways and many routes that cut through 
uninhabited land where animal farming might take place. The problem is 
much more evident in countries with larger unpopulated areas as is seen in 
the neighbouring Kingdom of Saudi Arabia which witnesses around 600 
camel-vehicle collisions annually (Al-Ghamdi & AlGadhi, 2004).  
Treatment of causes is mainly based on their frequency and share of the 
total crash causation though some consideration must be given to costs (if 
countermeasures for certain causes are too expensive) and to less-common 
causes if their treatment is not that difficult or expensive. It might be more 
appropriate to expedite it before the more costly and complex 
countermeasures are put into place. This applies to all suggested 
countermeasures in a similar vein. 
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7.12 Crash types (macro-level) 
Crashes are classed according to only 10 types and the most common of 
those, pedestrian collisions (28.6%), might not receive the most attention 
due to non-car users being affected.  
Table 43: The 10 crash types from macro-level analysis 
No. Crash Type 
1 Pedestrian collision 
2 Head to tail collision 
3 Side to side collision 
4 Rollover 
5 Stationary object impact 
6 Hit while turning 
7 Head to side impact 
8 Head on collision 
9 Falling off moving vehicle 
10 Impact with animal 
In 2006 pedestrian crashes accounted for 33.3% of injury crashes (RTA, 
2007) while in 2007 they made up 35.6% of all injury cases (Dubai Police, 
2008a). Dubai is notable for the absence of pedestrianised zones in busy 
market areas except at seasonal times of the year like the annual Dubai 
Shopping Festival. This was generally held in the winter months (January – 
March) when a popular shopping boulevard – Al Rigga Street – is closed to 
traffic. Aside from speed which was discussed in the previous section, other 
factors that can improve the pedestrian situation are more controlled 
crossing facilities and wider pavements with good visibility as found from 
previous work in the literature review (Corben & Diamantopoulou, 1996; 
Corben & Duarte, 2006; Elvik & Vaa, 2004; Reading et al, 1995). Further 
analysis of these crashes reveals that most occur at lunch-time or in the 
evening (6 – 9pm) when it is generally dark. The time of year also plays a 
role with more pedestrian cases happening during winter months than in 
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summer as could be explained by the very high temperatures in summer that 
drive people indoors. 
For the top 4 locations of pedestrian crashes the top spot is a main 3- and 4-
lane highway (with a speed limit of 120km/hr) but the other three are all 
smaller inner-city roads with the main speed limit of 60km/hr. For the 
highway a solution effectively preventing pedestrians from being present 
there or alternatively providing them with safe crossing facilities must be 
considered. In the UK and other countries pedestrians are banned from 
highways (except in emergencies) but no similar ban was found in past UAE 
legislation so this must be suggested on review. In a similar way to Dubai 
rural roads in Virginia and Maine in the USA carried a higher risk for 
pedestrians than urban ones (Garber & Lienau, 1996; Gårder, 2004, 
respectively). For inner-city roads most of the crashes take place on single-
carriageways with one lane in each direction so reducing the speed limits on 
these roads or providing controlled crossing facilities must be considered. 
Vision and visibility might factor in the equation if drivers cannot see 
pedestrians when coming along a tight curve or if obscured by objects close 
to the carriageway. This has been shown to be relevant in a recent study 
from On-The-Spot crash data (Lenard & Hill, 2004). Visibility for the 
pedestrians is also an important issue as highlighted in previous work 
especially for children (Mayr et al, 2003). 
If a comparison was to be made between the design of cities in the UK and 
USA in terms of car-friendliness then Dubai would be closer to the latter than 
the former in that cars are almost always catered for in any residential, 
industrial or leisure development. Pedestrians often come as a second 
thought, or not at all except in planning the paths to and from the car parking 
locations. This might be used to explain the presence of pedestrian crashes 
at the top of the list though there are increasing moves to introduce 
countermeasures for pedestrian safety in existing trouble spots and to 
ensure all new developments cater for pedestrian and vulnerable traffic as 
well as the motorised variety. The effect of these countermeasures on crash 
safety can be reviewed after implementation and the effect should be clear 
to see in terms of pedestrian-related crash numbers. The other common 
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type of crash, head to tail, is easy to attribute to not leaving enough distance 
between vehicles as related to speed as most head-to-tail collisions can be 
averted if a. the driver saw the obstruction or vehicle in front and b. the driver 
managed to stop in time. The lack of driver attention might be affected by in-
vehicle distractions (mobile phones, navigation and entertainment devices) 
and further work (possibly interviews with drivers involved in such crashes) 
can establish if this is a significant factor in these crashes. Side-to-side 
crashes need further categorisation as those that happen between vehicles 
travelling in the same direction are different in cause and treatment to those 
that happen between vehicles travelling in opposite directions. Lane 
discipline might be a factor affecting same-direction side-swipe crashes 
while lane separation might affect side-swipes between traffic going in 
opposite directions. 
The crash type does not indicate the area of damage to the vehicle, though 
this can be assumed for some types (a “side-to-side” crash would be 
assumed to have damaged the sides of the vehicles involved) but the 
direction of force or the involvement or amount of crush of certain vehicle 
structures, specifically stiff structures, was not known from the given data. 
This information is useful in calculating estimates of the crash speed and 
deceleration which are of use in reconstruction. Large-scale studies like 
CCIS (the Cooperative Crash Injury Study, Mackay et al, 1985, as cited in 
Welsh et al, 2006) have looked at vehicle damage and injury outcome trying 
to correlate the two and a lot of vehicles already exist in the database. A 
similar study to CCIS based in Dubai would offer the chance to compare 
findings as well as investigate vehicles that are not found in the UK market 
but are available in the UAE. To be of most use this would have to be done 
in association with collecting more extensive injury information preferably 
according to an international convention like the AIS (AAAM, 1990). 
7.13 Crash mechanisms and causes (micro-level) 
Knowledge of the crash mechanism is key to understanding the crash 
cause, and hence the relevance of any countermeasures proposed. Though 
it is more directly related to primary safety it does not mean that it should be 
ignored because if the crash happens anyway the outcome might be 
239 
reduced in severity if the crash mechanism can be controlled by external 
factors (like Stability Control, or a crash barrier). Loss of traction is rarely 
recorded as a mechanism possibly due to the dry nature of roads for most of 
the year due to low rainfall. The loss of directional control could be as a 
result of evasive action taken to avert impact with an object (whether 
movable or fixed) so the different mechanisms may be related. For every 
crash mechanism there might be a number of underlying reasons (like poor 
vehicle control by the driver, poor vehicle roadworthiness, worn tyres or 
adverse road conditions). Such factors are difficult to extract from the 
available data without probing further into the case by doing more scene 
information and interviews with the involved parties. The crash mechanisms 
listed were unique to this study and developed with knowledge of the types 
of crashes in the base-level data so they were not found in other studies in 
the field to allow for comparisons to be made. An impact with a movable 
object may have two different dimensions depending on whether the object 
hit was another motor vehicle or another type of road user (pedestrian or 
cyclist). In the case of impacts with other vehicles the underlying cause 
might be an unexpected movement or manoeuvre by the other party or the 
classical case of not leaving enough space between vehicles to allow time 
for reaction in case of an emergency. In the case of impacts with other types 
of road users the situation may be related to the unexpected presence or 
behaviour of certain road users (pedestrians or cyclists). A case in point is 
the attempt to cross multiple lanes of a wide motorway during peak traffic 
times. While the law in the UK bans pedestrians and cyclists from 
motorways altogether, the only item in UAE legislation found to relate to 
pedestrians was a fine for crossing from locations “other than designated” 
but only where these crossings exist (Dubai Courts, 2006). This leaves the 
matter open to interpretation by judiciary and enforcement authorities as 
pedestrian crossings did not exist on most motorways.  
Crash causes mostly laid the blame on human rather than machine error 
which highlighted the presence of a problem with driver behaviour and 
education. This was too complex to allow recommendation of one universal 
solution to fit all cases as such a solution did not exist from the literature. 
Rather a number of interventions targeting specific problems were suitable 
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once the problems were understood in more detail. Many crash causes 
involve vulnerable road users and this again drew attention to a problem with 
the actions or behaviour of this section of road user which might have 
contributed to the crash if it was not already a main cause. Motorised vehicle 
driver testing and licensing is achievable on a large scale while pedestrians 
and cyclists are much more difficult to regulate in any form without extensive 
legislation and enforcement. The cost of such measures is often too 
prohibitive to allow for universal application. Comparison with crash 
causation and contributory factors from the UK was difficult due to the 
difference in terms and classifications but some trends were distinguishable. 
The largest single contributory factor in the UK in 2007 (DfT, 2008) was 
failure to look properly while in the in-depth sample it was driving without due 
care, a factor more closely resembling the UK STATS19 factor “careless, 
reckless, in a hurry” which was the third most common in that year. However 
in the OTS data (Mansfield et al, 2008) inattention was the most commonly 
mentioned scene factor that may have more closely approximated the in-
depth factor “driving without due care”. The OTS study was meant to be 
representative of the overall UK crash population in terms of severity (Hill & 
Cuerden, 2005). Excessive speed was found to be similarly high in causative 
and contributory factors ranking third in the microanalysis and second in 
OTS (Mansfield et al, 2008). Pedestrian-related causes were high on the list 
of the in-depth sample (second) and may be related to the STATS19 factor 
of “pedestrian failed to look properly” which ranks eighth in the UK in 2007 
(DfT, 2008) which indicated the different magnitude of the pedestrian 
problem between the UK and Dubai as found in the in-depth sample. 
Comparison with the whole population of injury crashes in 2006 (RTA, 2007) 
showed the first cause to be the same (inconsiderate driving) while the 
second most common cause was far less evident in microanalysis (drink-
driving). This meant that drink-driving – while highly evident in the overall 
crash sample – was less evident in the in-depth sample. Due to the higher 
severity of the in-depth sample this implied that most drink-driving crashes 
were of low severity otherwise they would have been included in the in-depth 
sample. 
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7.14 Objects hit in crashes (micro-level) 
The situation appeared very different between the in-depth sample and any 
UK data found. Data on objects hit in the OTS study (Mansfield et al, 2008) 
showed most impacts were with another car followed by stationary object 
impacts. For UK crashes in 2007 (DfT, 2008) single vehicle crashes that hit 
nothing were the most common followed by impacts with “other permanent 
objects” then tree impacts. This difference arose due to the classification of 
single-vehicle crashes separately from pedestrian crashes with one vehicle.  
In Victoria, Australia fixed object impacts made up a significant portion (23%) 
of all crashes in 1994 (Natalizio, 1995, cited in Corben et al, 1996) whereas 
in microanalysis the impact type occurs in only 12.6% of crashes. Single-
vehicle crashes in the UK (DfT, 2008) in 2007, where an object was hit 
outside the carriageway, made up 9.5% of all injury crashes in that year. 
Due to the nature of the supplied data, single-vehicle crashes included both 
crashes of a vehicle alone (e.g. rollover) and crashes of a vehicle with a non-
vehicle road user (pedestrian or cyclist). As a total, crashes involving 
pedestrians and one vehicle numbered almost half the total crashes 
classified as “single vehicle” crashes.  The first object hit by all the main 
motor vehicle groups was also a pedestrian. This highlights compatibility 
issues between vehicles and vulnerable road users, which should be of a 
higher priority than vehicle-to-vehicle crashes as they are more frequent and 
severe. Pedestrian-hit crashes appear over-represented in microanalysis 
compared to Dubai 2006 figures (RTA, 2007) that show pedestrian crashes 
made up 33% of the total while fixed object impacts made up 11% of the 
total, as compared to 53% (first object hit) and 12% respectively, in 
microanalysis. This pointed to the generally higher severity of pedestrian 
crashes because they were more evident in the sample which was shown to 
contain crashes of higher severity compared to the whole population. The 
classification used in the UK of hitting nothing may have accounted for some 
crashes in the in-depth sample where more detail was found like hitting 
“sand” or the kerb. These generally came under the category of “other” in the 
relevant pie chart. No information was found on the second or third objects 
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hit in crashes in the UK or from official Dubai publications which meant 
further comparison was not possible. 
7.15 Road layout and furniture (macro-level) 
It is worth mentioning that non-motorway routes (especially B-roads) can be 
very unforgiving in terms of driver error often with no shoulder or runoff 
space if a vehicle leaves the carriageway. Most minor roads in Dubai are 
lined by pavement or a shoulder, or in the worst case by sand. There are a 
few exceptions in outlying areas where roads run through rocky landscapes. 
The most common crash type on 3-lane dual carriageways is jointly shared 
by pedestrian and head-to-tail collisions. Pedestrian collisions are the most 
common on single carriageways with one lane in each direction. Dual 
carriageways with 4 lanes appear less dangerous (smaller number of injury 
crashes occur on them) but this might be misleading due to the recent 
introduction of such roads (they only came into existence in 1998). Selecting 
only cases from 1998 onwards shows they are relatively safer than 3-lane 
highways but this may be explained by less exposure (traffic volume) due to 
the reluctance of drivers to use them as they lead to an increase in distances 
travelled. Some types of roadside treatment (e.g. guard rail ends and new 
street lighting) were found to increase injury crash frequencies (Corben et al, 
1997). This might be due to the introduction of a new roadside hazard (e.g. 
lamp post) where none was present before. The majority of dual-
carriageway motorways in Dubai have a steel central reservation but further 
work is required to assess the effectiveness of the barrier in reducing crash 
severity and injury occurrence. Local data on road width and configuration 
for injury crashes is not published. The information on what divider exists 
between carriageways is of limited use as the majority of cases are recorded 
as “unknown” so it was likely this field has only been introduced in the last 
few years or that the entries are not suitable in a large number of cases 
hence alternate entries must be suggested. In places where no barrier or 
separation is recorded as being present it was logical to assume that the 
road is a single-carriageway. A kerb exists in a large number of cases but no 
account is made of the type or height of kerb as there are a number of them 
in use on different roads and the deflection of a vehicle might differ 
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significantly according to what type of kerb it hits (some kerbs are designed 
to arrest the vehicle tyre and prevent it mounting the kerb). Where a barrier 
was recorded steel was the most common material followed by concrete. As 
indicated by the literature review concrete is a less favourable 
countermeasure than steel barriers but to validate this in Dubai further 
description is needed as no differentiation is made in recording the different 
types of barrier materials. Certain standards exist in Europe (ex. EN-1317) 
that test barriers in a standardised test but it is not known if any of these 
standards are currently adopted or specified for new roads in Dubai. From 
the description of the field on the crash report form it appears that barriers at 
the side of the road are not recorded. These could be an important part of 
the environment surrounding a crash site and allowing for this to be recorded 
in future will add valuable information on barriers that do not divide traffic in 
opposite directions. 
Roadside conditions and objects hit are important factors in serious crashes 
and improvement of these conditions has been successful in reducing 
crashes cost-effectively in Victoria, Australia (Corben et al, 1997). That state 
counts fixed roadside hazards as possibly the single largest component of all 
road trauma (Delaney et al, 2002). 
7.16 Environmental and local conditions (macro-level) 
The recording of light and weather conditions is essential for being able to 
estimate the effect of variables that are outside human control. Whereas in 
the UK night-time driving is seen as more dangerous than day-time driving, 
in Dubai this cannot be concluded from the current availability of data as 
exposure might be different between night and day. Night-time driving might 
put more stress on a driver as road features are more difficult to distinguish 
than in daytime, and the darkness outside might lead to sleepiness behind 
the wheel. If exposure is not taken into account then night and day are 
almost equal in crash occurrence. The climate in Dubai is well known for 
year-round sunshine and rare days of cloud or haze. Sandstorms and fog 
happen on occasion but not very often. Sunshine can sometimes present a 
hazard if it is low on the horizon and causes the driver to squint or the driver 
does not employ sunshades (visors) or sun glasses to improve visibility in 
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these conditions which make it otherwise difficult to make out the contrast 
between road hazards, especially smaller ones. It is not known whether road 
users compensate in such situations by lowering their speeds or being more 
careful. Data from North Carolina (Kim et al, 2008) shows inclement weather 
to have a positive effect on pedestrian injuries reducing the probability of 
fatal injury by 35% which is a demonstration of this effect. Darkness however 
results in an increased probability of death or serious injury for pedestrians 
(Kim et al, 2008). Poor lighting conditions (due to overcast skies and cloud 
cover) are more common in Europe than in Dubai as shown by UK data for 
2007 where 25.9% of casualty crashes happened in unlit conditions. In North 
Carolina over 3 years (Kim et al, 2008) 42% of pedestrian crashes occurred 
during darkness with or without streetlights which was not far from the 37.6% 
figure seen in Dubai for all crashes. Data for pedestrian crashes in a study of 
Maine state in the US (Gårder, 2004) showed that 39% of crashes happen in 
non-daylight conditions, again not very different to the findings in Dubai. This 
indicated that night-time crashes might not be a serious problem when 
compared to studies in the USA. 
Other extreme or unusual weather conditions can affect driving by affecting 
vision or vehicle handling (namely tyre grip, braking and cornering) and if 
drivers are not taught to adjust their driving style accordingly these times can 
become more dangerous than they need be. To improve the road surface 
friction in these conditions will not be cost-effective as they only occur during 
a short time of the year. Driving instruction almost never takes place in these 
conditions as driving tuition vehicles are banned from operating outside 
certain hours (which purposely excludes night driving). Other conditions are 
very rare to be faced by any significant number of learner drivers. This is in 
sharp contrast to Germany where the learner driver must complete a 
requisite number of hours of motorway and night driving in order to get the 
licence. 
7.17 Casualty and driver profiles (macro-level) 
The vast majority of drivers in injury crashes were male and it was not 
known whether this is reflected in the licensed population or actual drivers 
on the road at any one time so the conclusion that male drivers are more 
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dangerous cannot be made without further study. Previous studies of 
hospital admissions from road crashes in 1995 in a city not far from Dubai 
(Al-Ain, 150km east of Dubai) showed males to be the majority of casualties 
at 86% (Sankaran-Kutty et al, 1998). An earlier study (Bener et al, 1992) at 
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the same city but at a different hospital in 1990 showed males to form 87% 
of admissions from road crashes so the 82% male figure from this data is in 
keeping with this trend. The latest census data shows the percentage of 
males in the population to stand at 75.5% (DMSC, 2007c) so the division of 
the sexes in injury figures follows the division in the general population 
though exposure data is unavailable for a more accurate comparison. The 
best representation of the population is by a population pyramid (figure 67). 
Within each gender, the dominance of male driver casualties and female 
passengers might be a result of the social structure of the population in 
Dubai, where it is common for families to have drivers for female members of 
the family (even if they possess a driving licence). In this way females would 
be less likely to drive and more likely to be driven. If travel data were 
available to measure the exposure to driving between genders then it would 
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be possible to compare crash involvement more accurately but with the data 
in hand it is not possible to advance the discussion on this issue further. 
Other studies in the region on crash involvement (Abdalla, 2002; Bener et al, 
2004) have shown a difference in crash risk between genders with males 
always having a higher crash risk than females. Surprisingly, when driver 
behaviour and errors were surveyed in questionnaires (Bener & Crundall, 
2008) females reported more errors and lapses or at least as many (Bener 
et al, 2008) as males did. The age range of casualties is worrying due to the 
large number of children present as this section of casualties requires 
special countermeasures that take into account the very vulnerable type of 
road user and their occasional inability to judge road situations safely. The 
majority of countermeasures suggested however target the adult road user 
and it is hoped a child will always be under the supervision of a responsible 
adult. The casualty age profile generally fits with the population age profile 
as most of the population is economically active and driving is an integral 
part of many jobs. Public transport is hardly used by middle-income 
individuals in general. 
It is no surprise to anyone familiar with Dubai that the nationality of 
casualties was divided so clearly. This is not very different to the findings of 
Bener et al (1992) who grouped Asian nationalities together and found they 
collectively made up the largest group of cases (37.8%). The latest census 
data from 2005 (Ministry of Economy, 2005) for the whole UAE shows 
Emaratis to make up 20.1% of the total or slightly higher than their 
proportion in the sample. This goes back to the demographic make-up of the 
population and the economically active nature of these nationalities. The 
type of road user injured (driver, passenger or pedestrian) varies with 
nationality. Emaratis and Pakistanis are most often injured as drivers while 
Indians are more commonly injured as pedestrians. This might reflect the 
economic status of certain nationalities as lower-income groups will have 
limited travel options compared to higher-income groups. Pedestrians might 
not always be pedestrians by choice rather by necessity. To counteract or 
change this balance means changing the structure of the whole population 
or targeting those specific nationalities. Every driver in Dubai must have a 
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UAE-issued licence or exchange his licence for a local one if working there. 
Nationals of certain countries (36 in total) are allowed to exchange their 
home licence without undergoing a driving test (but an eye test is required), 
while all other nationals must undergo a driving test locally (Dubai 
Government Information and Services Portal, 2010). This may be a way to 
influence the mix of nationalities as previous studies on drink-driving and 
licensing between drivers of different ethnic origins in the USA (Colorado 
and California respectively; Harper et al, 2000; Walker et al, 2003) 
suggested targeted programs of education for groups that were over-
involved in crashes. These studies’ suggested measures might need to be 
sensitively targeted towards Hispanics due to their relatively higher 
incidence of drink-driving and other safety breaches. Asian Americans were 
found to have a lower propensity to drink and drive or ride with drunk-drivers, 
which might relate to societal differences between the two groups.  
Driver attitudes and their level of education and comprehension of signs 
have been flagged by a number of studies from the region. One such study 
was based on a driver survey (n=2,820) conducted between three GCC 
countries: Bahrain, Qatar and the UAE (Al-Madani, 2000). The findings of 
that study bring up some encouraging signs that UAE drivers had slightly 
better comprehensive abilities possibly due to the existence of a written 
driving test in that country which is not the case in Bahrain and Qatar at the 
time of study. The survey also had a self-reported rate of seatbelt usage of 
38.6%. This might be skewed by the nature of person that would have been 
targeted by the survey in the first place (literate, educated) and hence those 
that were more likely to respond though the methodology is justified in the 
study. A later study (Al-Madani & Al-Janahi, 2002) expanded to five 
countries (UAE, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar and Oman) also showed that drivers 
in these countries had substantial problems with the comprehension of road 
signs with UAE drivers doing marginally better than the rest. 
Driver behaviour in the region has been the subject of a few studies. Bener 
& Crundall (2008) conducted a questionnaire-based study on 1110 drivers in 
the neighbouring state of Qatar looking at self-reported driver behaviour, 
skills inventory and seatbelt use. Qatar shares many features with the UAE 
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as it undergoes rapid growth and development. Women reported a higher 
number of certain violations and lapses than men (examples include jumping 
a red light and ignoring the speed limit). However men had higher crash 
rates than women. Mobile phone use was also studied in Qatar (Bener et al, 
2005) among drivers involved in crashes (n=822). Self-reported mobile 
phone usage was reported by 73% of respondents despite a third of them 
favouring a law against mobile phone use while driving. Mobile phone use 
has been linked to crash causation and driver distraction in a number of 
studies (Redelmeier & Tibshirani, 1997; Violanti, 1998; Violanti & Marshall, 
1996; as cited in Bener et al, 2005). This phenomenon needs to be studied 
in more depth in Dubai and the UAE to establish the extent to which it affects 
crash involvement.   
7.18 Data recording (macro-level) 
The data supplied did not contain all the fields available in the crash form 
due to data sensitivity and other formalities. Some of the fields could be of 
great use for further analysis like those describing the type of injured person, 
seat belt use, vehicle tyre condition and the involvement of a bicycle or pedal 
cycle. Some of the fields could be updated to make them easier to use or 
gather more useful information. The first example is the road barrier field 
where the investigator can either choose concrete or steel as the type. There 
are many types of steel barriers (wire, continuous s-shape) so changing the 
options might help gather more useful data on this area. A second example 
is the field describing “crash site proximity to local feature”; this is not very 
useful in the current state as the majority of cases have “other” listed as the 
feature (which was not supplied with the data). If this “other” category was 
supplied then it might show other features that are common to crash sites. If 
other features are frequently entered manually the crash form or options can 
be updated by including the most commonly selected “other” feature to save 
time and encourage correct coding of the form, and improving the 
usefulness of data collected. 
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7.19 Good aspects of road safety (macro-level) 
Lighting conditions are good in the majority of cases as are weather and 
road surface conditions. This is definitely due to the geographical location as 
well as the constant upgrade, construction and maintenance of roads that 
has been taking place in Dubai over the past 10 years. Spending on roads in 
2006 was reported at AED 3.5 billion or around £500m (Ahmed, 2006) which 
is a lot considering the population of Dubai in 2006 was equivalent to that of 
two medium-sized British counties combined. The spending of one medium-
sized county in Britain (Leicestershire, 2006/7) on road transport was £21 
million (Leicestershire County Council, 2009). This illustrated the huge gap 
in spending between the two. 
7.20 Preventative measures (micro-level) 
7.20.1 Validation 
The validation carried out was necessary to verify the factors were assigned 
to cases with reasonable confidence. The ideal situation would be validation 
by experts in Dubai who were familiar with the Dubai cases and scenarios, if 
they were also trained in understanding the preventative measures and 
contributory factors suggested. As this was not possible UK experts were 
used. Agreement with the factors may have been more extensive had the 
experts had more knowledge of the crashes and first-hand experience of the 
transport system in the UAE. In some limited cases different measures or 
interventions were suggested by the experts. These may be useful for future 
revisions of the protocol.  
The assessment and suggestion of mitigating factors and countermeasures 
was often attempted or desired in many other studies (Corben et al, 1996; 
Corben et al, 1997; Corben & Duarte, 2006; Delaney et al, 2002; Gårder, 
2004; Keall & Newstead, 2007; Mansfield et al, 2008; Welsh & Lenard, 
2001) to point the way forward for improved conditions for road users. 
7.20.2 Vehicle Factors 
Crashworthiness was by far the most commonly suggested preventative 
factor for crashes in the vehicle category. Seat belts might be viewed as part 
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of vehicle crashworthiness but their fitment has been standard in most 
locations in a vehicle for many years so seat belt use was separated from 
crashworthiness. Improvements in vehicle crashworthiness have improved 
injury outcomes for car occupants in the past (Richter et al, 2005) and future 
improvements were expected to improve safety for other road users as well 
with the revision of consumer testing standards (EuroNCAP, 2008). Seat belt 
use was selected due to the low observed use in many areas in and around 
Dubai (Abdalla, 2005; Barrs et al, 2008; Bener et al, 1994; El-Sadig et al, 
2004; Koushki et al, 2003; RTA, 2006c). It was significantly higher in the UK 
for many years (Broughton, 1990; 2003). Other studies have shown a 
distinct link between non-use and injury in a crash. In one study in New 
Zealand (Blows et al, 2005) unbelted drivers had ten times the risk of being 
involved in an injury crash compared to belted drivers. Seat belts have been 
tried and tested in reducing fatalities and injuries over many years in many 
localities (Adams, 1994; Elvik & Vaa, 2004; Evans, 1991; Lund & Zador, 
1984). Their recommendation as a measure is not surprising given the 
worrying usage rates shown in regional studies (Abdalla, 2005; Barrs et al, 
2008; Bener et al, 1994; El-Sadig et al, 2004; RTA, 2006c; Sankaran-Kutty 
et al, 1998). Airbags were not suggested as a measure due to the lack of 
any data on the extent of their presence in the vehicle fleet in the UAE. 
Records of airbag deployment or involvement were not supplied in crash 
data either. 
In the Euro NCAP test up to 2007 very few cars achieved a good pedestrian 
safety rating (Euro NCAP, 2008). This is especially relevant in areas where 
pedestrians make up a majority of casualties. Efforts to improve the 
performance of vehicles in pedestrian impacts were outlined by European 
directive 2003/102/EC which applies to vehicles for sale in Europe in two 
stages beginning in 2005 (European Communities, 2009a; 2009b). Japan 
also introduced regulations for testing bonnet surfaces for head impacts but 
without a knee impact test as in Europe (Kerkeling et al, 2005). Vehicles sold 
in the UAE do not currently need to meet such standards but as European 
and Japanese vehicles begin to meet these regulations the UAE vehicle fleet 
is expected to benefit. 
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Electronic stability control was suggested as a valid intervention mostly for 
single vehicle loss of control crashes found in the sample. The effectiveness 
of ESC was established through numerous studies in different geographical 
areas, but some studies (Thomas & Frampton, 2007) showed less 
effectiveness in dry conditions (the majority of situations in Dubai) than in 
wet and snowy conditions so slightly decreased effectiveness was expected. 
Still most of the vehicles involved in loss of control crashes were not 
equipped with ESC so fitment may have altered the outcome. ESC only has 
a relatively small number of studies published on its effectiveness since it 
was introduced to the market in the late 1990s but all agree on some benefit 
particularly in low friction conditions or for single vehicle crashes (Farmer, 
2004; Kreiss et al, 2005; Lie et al, 2005; Scully & Newstead, 2007; Thomas 
& Frampton, 2007). This is particularly relevant considering there is a known 
proportion of single vehicle loss-of-control crashes in Dubai (6.6% in the in-
depth sample). 
7.20.3 Human Factors 
Human factors may be considered the most important – and most 
controversial – of all due to their divisiveness amongst road users and road 
safety stakeholders. Nader (1965) illustrated this with the coming of age of 
safety in the US car market and many stakeholders continued to blame the 
human element for any safety shortcomings, refusing to improve design to 
accommodate human error. Driver education and training were foremost in 
the factors that may improve the outcome in a crash or prevent it altogether 
as most crashes are due to human fault despite some criticism of some 
parts of education as ineffective or even counterproductive (Christie, 2001; 
Mohan, 2003). The education, training and awareness of the three most 
commonly involved road user classes – drivers, pedestrians and cyclists – 
were recurring themes in most cases in microanalysis. This highlighted the 
size of the problem in this area especially with such a diverse population of 
various nationalities with the largest section being made up of young and 
middle-aged males. Until control is completely removed from the road user 
and handed over to a fault-free “system” the driver or person in command 
will have to be a focus for interventions. The existing system of driver 
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training and qualification was found to be very different to those in place in 
the best-performing countries around the world in road safety terms. The 
overhaul and improvement of this process may seem daunting with the large 
number of applicants and personnel involved, however it only gets harder 
the more it is postponed due to the unrelenting population growth seen in the 
area (Statistics Center of Dubai, 2007). Driving licences were seen as an 
essential part of doing business in Dubai and they were a requirement or 
strongly desired in most job advertisements. A thorough driver education 
and licensing scheme is distinct from post-qualification advanced driver 
training in emergency manoeuvres. The latter was not found to be effective 
(Christie, 2001) in improving safety in other studies. 
It is also true that countries that had a thorough regime of driver testing (e.g. 
UK and Germany) and qualification have some of the most disciplined 
drivers and lowest fatality rates (DfT, 2008). Distinction must be made 
between driver education at the qualifying stage and training that takes place 
later in an effort to “boost” certain driving skills that are hardly ever put to use 
in everyday driving. The former was the natural counterpart to that cause 
most often quoted by the police: driving without due consideration to others. 
The latter type of training is hardly ever put to use in the real-world. Also the 
increased confidence might lead drivers to take more risks, as one study of 
holders of a racing licence showed that they had worse driving records than 
non-racing drivers despite their increased training (Williams & O’Neill, 1974, 
in Dorn & Brown, 2003). 
Pedestrian education was especially relevant to road users who were from 
other countries in which the mix and speeds of traffic were very different. 
This was highlighted by one case where the casualty had only arrived in 
Dubai a week before and had crossed the road when his more experienced 
relative refrained from crossing. Pedestrian visibility may be a dual effect of 
either the pedestrian or road environment or both. Dark clothing at night 
would not aid visibility nor will an unlit street or pavement or overhanging 
trees and other road features that may conceal pedestrians and cyclists. The 
road factors may be differentiated from the human factors if exact location 
data was available. If a particular spot on a road was the scene of multiple 
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pedestrian crashes then it might be a road design issue whereas if the 
crashes happen at different locations it might be a human factor though both 
cannot be ruled out. Such factors are difficult to establish from a scene plan 
drawing or photographs. On-site inspection is needed. When a driver 
commits an offence (e.g. runs a red light) that causes a crash, this crash 
could have been avoided had the driver known that the risk of being caught 
and punished was high. This might have prevented the offence (and hence 
the crash) from happening, thus providing a better overall outcome. In this 
way offending driver punishment acts as both a deterrent to some drivers 
and as a punishment after the event. This generally meant more effective 
legislation, licence restrictions, financial penalties, education, publicity and 
enforcement was needed as these measures have been shown to improve 
safety in various ways in different countries (Delhaye, 2006; Lawpoolsri et al, 
2007; Lund et al, 1986; Nichols & Ross, 1990; Poli de Figueiredo et al, 2001; 
Zaal, 1994). 
7.20.4 Road Factors 
Factors related to the road and surrounding environment were mainly 
focused on pedestrian measures. This made sense considering pedestrians 
were most often the first object hit in crashes. While the human factors of 
education, awareness and visibility played a part, the environment’s role was 
also considered. The majority of sites could have benefitted from the 
separation of pedestrian and motor traffic (by crossings or bridges or 
tunnels) and in some cases measures controlling pedestrians may have 
been more appropriate (like fencing). This was especially relevant on long 
stretches of motorway where pedestrian traffic was not expected. Cyclist 
traffic was not considered in the majority of new road developments and 
improvements and cycling was not even an option for consideration by the 
majority of commuters. Future integration of cycling within the transport 
system must be considered to institutionalise the usage of this 
environmentally-friendly transport mode and protect the users without 
compromising motorised traffic. 
Speed limit enforcement by automatic means, namely speed cameras, has 
proved effective in a number of studies (Elvik & Vaa, 2004; Newstead & 
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Cameron, 2003; Pilkington & Kinra, 2005) while there remain some 
problems with the halo- and time-limited-effect (Champness et al, 2005; 
Holland & Conner, 1996; Koushki & Hasan, 2000). These effects show that 
the deterrent effect of speed cameras is limited to the vicinity and time of 
deployment. The measure has been in use in Dubai for a number of years 
and concentrated on some major routes (Sheikh Zayed Rd) but plans to 
introduce more (Al-Theeb, 2008b) cameras - both mobile and stationary - 
were attributed to the police. This indicated a positive alignment of policies 
between some results of this study and actions by some stakeholders in 
Dubai. Monitoring of the incidence of speeding as a cause for serious 
crashes after the application of new cameras might validate their 
effectiveness if confounding factors were accounted for. Location of mobile 
speed cameras in Dubai was left to the discretion of the operator (Dubai 
Police, 2008b). 
Central barriers, guardrails and crash cushions were often observed at high 
speed roads and obstacles (such as lamp posts) but these were missing at 
the scene of some crashes at lower speeds where there was interaction 
between opposing traffic. In some cases impacts with fixed objects beyond 
the carriageway occurred despite the presence of a barrier; such cases were 
excluded from the count. The case for such measures may not be as 
obvious as it is in countries with twisting roads at high altitudes but the 
straight and featureless nature of many high speed roads meant that when a 
vehicle departed the road at high speed the consequences were sometimes 
severe. Also the large number of interchanges and multi-level junctions (both 
planned and in use) mean that vehicles that lose control may have severe 
impacts with these solid structures. The loss of control aspect of such 
crashes was already accounted for in the section on vehicle factors. Other 
factors (speed humps, lighting, etc) were also found but in a smaller 
percentage of serious crashes. Higher priority should be given to those 
factors that appear most frequently in crashes, then those factors that are 
less common can be tackled. 
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7.21 Vehicle class size (micro-level) 
While the full vehicle fleet data for Dubai was not obtainable some useful 
insights were gained from representative data from new vehicle sales in the 
UAE (Auto Strategies International, 2007) as the Dubai fleet makes up a 
significant percentage of the total UAE market. The full data would have 
revealed interesting information on the performance of the different vehicle 
makes and models in different crashes and on their level of occupant 
protection. The involvement of heavy vehicles (labelled as “buses” and 
“trucks” in the list of models) was difficult to match to the market data, 
though general segment size classification showed trucks were more evident 
in microanalysis than in their market share of new vehicles (figure 63, 
section 5.5). Trucks made up a large proportion (20%) of the in-depth 
sample vehicles indicating they were present in many of the serious and 
fatal crashes but their proportion of sales was not as high. This may be due 
to the fact that many trucks in service are older and imported types with a 
long service life and new trucks are very expensive and thus rare. Heavy 
trucks were also found to be involved in a large proportion of all injury 
crashes (7.1%) and fatal crashes (11.7%) for all 2006 Dubai cases from 
official statistics (RTA, 2007). 
Trucks (by virtue of their mass) were involved in more severe crashes than 
smaller and lighter vehicles (only one Heavy Goods Vehicle crash was non-
fatal). This explains their increased presence in the sample compared to 
new vehicle sales in the same year (Auto Strategies International, 2007). 
This meant that attention must be focused on this size segment of vehicles 
with all types of interventions. In the UK legislation means professional 
drivers (including heavy goods vehicles) must be monitored and limited in 
their hours of driving (Horne & Reyner, 1999) but no such legislation was 
found in the UAE. 
Division of the in-depth sample vehicles according to size revealed the high 
ranking of 4x4s in the overall population which indicated the vehicle fleet is 
closer in composition to the USA than to the UK. This was supported by new 
vehicle sales data (Auto Strategies International, 2007). New truck and bus 
sales made up a small percentage of the total for 2006 and these may be 
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mostly purchases by government departments for transport or other 
services. Further work that is possible in this area was suggested in the 
relevant chapter if more data was available. 
7.22 Estimated reductions and their derivation (micro-level) 
The level of detail in the in-depth sample allowed a more useful outcome to 
be assigned to each crash, namely a countermeasure area. This general 
area of improvement would be of limited use if not further specified. With the 
increased familiarity and knowledge of the crashes in microanalysis and the 
surrounding environment and factors it was possible to tailor interventions to 
the crashes to which they may apply with a high level of confidence as 
supported by expert validation of these factors. 
The method of calculating possible or actual reductions through relevant 
countermeasures was used in many studies and is a logical approach to 
solve such problems (Corben et al, 1996, 1997; Corben & Duarte, 2006; 
Mansfield et al, 2008; Thomas & Frampton, 2007). The limited availability 
and age of the cost data locally led to the adoption of more recent UK costs 
to calculate improvements in monetary terms in addition to reductions in 
serious and fatal crash numbers. Pedestrian-related measures had the 
largest calculated cost saving but pedestrians were also the most frequently 
hit object so the related crashes account for a majority of the total 
population. Loss of control interventions appeared high on the list too while 
the loss of control was not frequently an overall crash cause but because the 
effect of the measure is particularly significant for fatal crashes, their 
prevention is also highly rewarded. Speed cameras were already in limited 
use in some areas in Dubai and their recommendation is timely as more 
were planned for deployment in 2008 (Al-Theeb, 2008b). Other measures 
were a mix of roadside infrastructure (guardrails) and enforcement and 
legislation issues (driver punishment). The latter is more difficult to 
implement as it involves politics and rule-making while the former may be 
seen as part of road building and maintenance which is an almost 
permanent activity in Dubai. The roads and laws in the area as a whole were 
fairly young in the age of nations so revisions and improvements were 
expected and this made these suggested measures even more realistic. 
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The total number of crashes reduced through these interventions (2,412) 
were greater than the total number of injury crashes reported for that year 
(1,812). This was because the interventions were not mutually exclusive as 
many crashes had multiple contributing/causative factors. For example if one 
crash injury was due to both the loss of vehicle control and lack of a barrier 
at the roadside, either one of the interventions could improve the outcome or 
prevent the crash from happening. The sample of injury crashes was bound 
to contain crashes similar to those that took place in the overall population 
but were excluded from the in-depth sample as there were so many crashes 
in total (the total crashes reported for that year were 243,386; RTA, 2007). 
This allows for the over-estimation of improvements. For this reason the 
savings may be described as slightly optimistic because non-injury crashes 
typically cost less that injury crashes according to UK figures (DfT, 2007b). 
This does not mean all injury crashes were subject to microscopic analysis; 
on the contrary there were 87 fatal cases and 1430 non-fatal injury cases in 
2006 outside the in-depth sample. 
With little information available on the cost of these measures it was not 
possible to make accurate cost-benefit calculations but this would have been 
the next logical step after this. Though a human life should not normally be 
forsaken for anything if cost benefit calculations showed a real economic 
gain to implementing countermeasures and interventions then the case for 
such implementation cannot be argued against. 
7.23 Limitations 
7.23.1  Introduction 
Numerous limitations were encountered in collecting and analysing the 
quantitative data and these were outlined in the analysis where possible. 
The presence of “other” or “unknown” as an entry in many fields created a 
large gap in data in some cases. The time of introduction of some fields or 
the modification of others was not conclusively known though it can be 
deduced for some variables. This is often encountered in large databases 
that span many years and is expected where the data collection process 
evolves over time. 
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7.23.2 Data coverage 
The comprehensive nature of this data is assumed but it is possible that 
certain crashes have been missed and others have been miscoded so 
complete accuracy is not guaranteed. However the data is still useful in the 
current form bearing the limitations in mind. It is tempting and easy to make 
a long list of “required” data but in the real world only the bare essentials will 
be collected, even then with some reservation. Data fields that were present 
on the form but not supplied (as described in the methodology) were key to 
assessing the use and effectiveness of restraints or the effect of mechanical 
failures (like tyre blowouts).  
7.23.3 Dynamism of Dubai 
The dynamism of Dubai is a limiting factor in that the picture changes from 
one minute to the next and as large changes were seen between years (in 
causation for instance) similar variations might occur by month and day. In 
some cases the analysis was outdated as soon as it was performed as the 
data that had been used for analysis has been supplanted by newer and 
possibly different data. The advantage of this dynamism is the possibility to 
influence data collection in the future as dictated by the requirements of 
research and policy formulation. Monitoring of countermeasures in a 
dynamic country or city should also be easier as compared to a city with little 
or no growth due to the farsighted nature of those in leadership. 
7.23.4 Countermeasure assumptions 
The assumptions made to arrive at the summary table of countermeasures 
were numerous and were outlined in that section. Beginning with the 
effectiveness of countermeasures that was in itself an estimate from 
previous studies of international best-practice and ending with the biggest 
assumption that these estimates will be valid when applied to Dubai. The 
countries that supply the studies with data range from the USA to Sweden, 
Australia, Germany and the UK and none of these share all the 
characteristics of roads or road users or vehicles with Dubai (or each other). 
Similarly UK crash costings were not exactly identical to costs in Dubai nor 
are the costs of medical care, insurance or lost output. Nevertheless these 
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approximations were necessary in drawing cost figures for improvements 
until economic costings in Dubai and the UAE are established in the future. 
7.23.5 Location data 
The location data supplied with the variables is of great use if it was 
readable and combined with a digital map of Dubai (including roads). It was 
known to be of good accuracy as it was input using GIS coordinates by staff 
who are trained in that field. The analysis of the basic location data by street 
name was therefore very limited. Some of the streets can be over 100kms 
long and others were only mentioned once (in twelve years) yet they were 
bound to be close to other small streets so casualty black spots might be 
present in some areas but it was not possible to pinpoint them using existing 
methods and applications. 
7.23.6 Vehicle fleet and interventions 
Electronic stability control effectiveness was not found in any region with a 
similar climate or vehicle fleet to that found in Dubai. The results in this area 
(calculated effectiveness) may be overly optimistic as the vehicle fleet in 
Japan, the USA and Europe might have significant differences to that in the 
UAE and the vehicles surveyed or involved in crashes were also different. In 
two studies from Germany, mainly Audi, VW, Mercedes and BMW cars were 
involved. However in Japan mainly Toyota group vehicles were investigated. 
A significant minority of the vehicles in the in-depth sample were not small 
vehicles or different to the models described in other studies which raises 
some questions on the extent of similarity and effectiveness of new active 
technologies on different fleets. New vehicle sales in 2006 (Auto Strategies 
International, 2007) showed the second highest sales among all vehicle 
types to be mid-sized sport utilities. 
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Chapter 8 Conclusions from the studies 
8.1 Introduction 
The work in hand shows how the analysis of existing data is used to arrive at 
an overall picture of road safety in a particular region. The importance of 
relevant data collection and validation over time is shown through the 
limitations faced in analysing existing data. The experience of other 
countries in developing, applying and testing countermeasures and their 
level of success was utilized to suggest these measures – if they are not 
currently in extensive use – in Dubai. Safety measures that have been 
proven elsewhere vary greatly in cost and applicability depending on the 
local environment and context and this was taken into consideration in the 
work. Some measures can be carried over with good correlation of 
effectiveness seen in other countries and applications as shown by 
automatic speed enforcement reducing speeding as a crash cause in 2006 
after fixed speed camera installations increased significantly in 2005-2006. 
The savings in crash costs that were possible through these measures were 
estimated using available data. This part of the work is expected to be of 
great value as an incentive in implementing countermeasures on the 
regional or national level. This can be easily updated with more accurate 
costing information as it becomes available. Closer scrutiny of crash 
causation factors was made difficult due to the nature of the data that was 
considered base-level by European standards. This was remedied in the 
follow-up microscopic analysis of in-depth data. 
8.2 Conclusions from macroscopic analysis 
The following were in brief the main findings and results from the first study: 
♦ Some evaluation and assessment of the road safety situation in any 
region is possible if some base level of data is provided. The greater the 
level of data the clearer the picture is of the situation. 
♦ The state of road safety in Dubai as shown from the records of the 
previous 12-year period (1995-2006) provides a mixed message. 
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♦ The general fatality risk has stayed the same over the study period but it 
was significantly higher than all motorised countries found for comparison. 
♦ The almost exponential rise in population that has been witnessed and 
predicted will mean a poorer road safety situation as time progresses. 
♦ The main problems identified were as follows: 
o High proportion of fatal crashes 
o High proportion of single-vehicle and single-casualty crashes 
o Crashes peaked during afternoon and evening rush hours 
o Most crashes occurred at roads with speed limits of 60km/hr 
o Many crashes occurred in urban areas 
o Pedestrian crashes were the most common crash type 
o Inconsiderate driving was the most common crash cause listed 
o Speeding was the 2nd most common crash cause 
o Dual carriageway roads were the most frequent crash location 
o Males and younger persons made up the majority of casualties 
o Drink-driving was a problem of increasing magnitude 
♦ The treatment of road safety problems has been a field of increasing 
diversity and depth since the dawn of the motor age. 
♦ The study of road safety improvement has taken place mostly 
independently and sporadically around the world with some collaborative 
effort especially in later years. 
♦ A wealth of research material exists on the various road safety 
countermeasures in use in most countries of varying quality. Study design 
is an important factor in differentiating the confidence in and usefulness of 
the results. 
♦ The cross-application of measures across different geographic regions 
often produced the same results which encouraged the cross-use of 
safety countermeasures that have been shown to work. 
♦ The prioritisation of countermeasures can be made according to their 
measured or estimated effectiveness along with the significant presence 
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of the problem that they are designed to address in the area of their 
intended application. 
♦ Improving road safety in countries with traffic safety issues is possible 
through a logical method of problem appraisal; solution deployment and 
continuous assessment and monitoring. 
♦ Estimates of road safety improvements can be made according to a step-
by-step methodology of comparison while building upon existing data and 
economic costs. 
♦ The derivation of economic costs was an important process for 
quantifying crash savings which was particularly useful to monitor their 
impact on the economy and to provide the basis for future Cost Benefit 
Analysis. 
♦ As the amount of research work conducted on road safety measures 
increased so did the pool of available international knowledge increase in 
size and usefulness. 
♦ The process can be used to draw a prioritised plan for applying road 
safety countermeasures with reasonable predictions of improvement. 
♦ The process can be repeated for different areas and in different times to 
provide the same useful outcomes and once that is done a comparison 
can be made between estimated accuracies for different areas. 
This extensive process has not been conducted for Dubai in the past and on 
the current set of data. It has great potential for application in the future. 
However some further knowledge on crashes especially regarding causation 
to enable the assessment of possible preventative measures was curtailed 
by the data available at this level. More detailed and in-depth data is 
required to better understand crash scenarios and subsequently be able to 
suggest preventative measures with increased confidence. This was done in 
the microscopic analysis. 
8.3 Microscopic analysis conclusions 
A number of conclusions may be drawn from the results of this sizeable 
survey of 2006 and part of 2007 for serious and fatal crashes and their main 
characteristics. They were summarised as follows: 
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♦ Crash times varied significantly from month to month with the most 
crashes in December (13%) and the least in July (6%). 
♦ Peaks in crash times corresponded mostly to the rush hours (6am, 5-
8pm) while Wednesdays saw the least crashes in the week (9%). 
♦ The roads where most crashes took place were high speed roads 
(motorways): Emirates Rd (12%) and Sheikh Zayed Rd (9%). 
♦ Overspeeding was an evident problem in both the first (42%) and second 
(46%) vehicles in a crash. This is excluding incidences where the speed was 
not known. 
♦ Roads with an 80kph (50mph) speed limit accounted for most crashes 
(27%) closely followed by 120kph (70mph) speed limit roads (26%). 
♦ Impacts with movable objects were the most common crash mechanism 
(72%) either hitting a pedestrian/cyclist or other vehicles. Fixed object 
impacts (barriers, lamp posts, trees, etc) were far less common (9.6%) as a 
first crash mechanism. Multiple object impacts were evident in some cases 
(20%). 
♦ Crash causes were dominated by driving without care (42%) and 
vulnerable road users in the carriageway (22%). Speed was the third most 
cited cause (12%). 
♦ Heavy vehicles were over-represented in crashes in the in-depth sample 
by comparison with their sales (20% vs. 6%) while 4x4’s accounted for a 
large percentage of sales (21%) and had a correspondingly smaller crash 
involvement (17%). 
The main preventative measures that were chosen were grade-separated 
crossing facilities for pedestrians and ESP/stability control for vehicles. The 
estimated savings from these 2 measures - if they were applied in all the 
crashes that matched the specific measure for that year - works out at nearly 
£20 million. Many more interventions and estimates could be made with 
more data collection and more information on the crashes. 
The findings of microanalysis were different to macroanalysis in most cases 
because the sample was of a different severity level and the attendance of 
crashes (and thus selection) was determined by mostly external factors to 
the crash investigation team. Some cases of similarity were found when the 
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method and findings of microanalysis were compared to other studies. 
These included the percentage of single vehicle crashes that hit an object 
outside the carriageway (9.6% in Dubai in-depth sample vs. 9.5% in the UK) 
and the occurrence of speeding as the third most common crash cause or 
contributory factor (in-depth Dubai sample vs. On The Spot data as reported 
in Mansfield et al, 2008). 
Vehicle sales data in the UAE was put to good use for comparison with the 
observed fleet composition at the microscopic level but more detailed vehicle 
fleet data would have been useful in shedding light on the involvement of 
vehicles according to their share of registrations. Some knowledge of injuries 
could be used to estimate the effectiveness of interventions and vehicle 
technologies such as seat belts and ESC. When the cost of interventions 
was known overall cost-benefit analysis would be possible for an economic 
assessment of the suggested interventions. 
The data gathered and analysed showed what was possible with a few 
months of collection and comparison. Even more benefit could be gained if 
the data originally collected at crashes matched the intended outcome of the 
analysis. Great potential was evident from using existing data but even 
greater outcomes were expected with improved methods of collection and 
archiving of data. 
8.4 Review of research questions 
A considerable body of knowledge exists on road safety countermeasures 
and interventions to reduce crashes and injuries. Many of these have been 
successfully tested in different areas around the world. The existence of a 
road safety challenge has been established globally then locally in Dubai. 
Key indicators of road safety performance show the gap between the UK 
and Sweden (some of the best-performing countries in the field) and Dubai 
to be large and significant.  
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The research questions asked at the beginning of chapter 2 have been 
answered as follows: 
 
1. Is there a road safety problem?  
Yes. This problem is manifested in many ways, from a high fatality rate 
(deaths per motor vehicle) and risk (deaths per population size) to a high 
severity of injury crashes (over 10% are fatal) when compared to the UK. 
 
2. What is the nature of this problem?  
The problem is of multiple dimensions covering road factors, vehicle 
factors and human factors. It extends to areas such as road user 
behaviour, enforcement, legislation and data analysis. 
 
3. How can this problem be dealt with using knowledge gained from the 
experience of other nations? 
Many safety countermeasures and interventions have been proven 
successful in other countries (such as guardrails between carriageways 
and on the roadside; pedestrian crossing facilities; automatic speed 
enforcement). These can be applied in Dubai and an estimated benefit 
from these measures can be calculated from the known effectiveness 
levels found in other scientific studies. 
 
4. What are the expected benefits from the above process?  
The study has calculated that savings in financial cost from crashes and 
injuries can be made totalling between £25m and £40m annually. This is 
in addition to the effects of reduced congestion and associated societal 
costs that road casualties result in. 
 
Based on the recommendations and observations set out earlier, numerous 
changes can be made to the different factors involved in road safety. These 
range from the driver and road user, to the environment and road, to the 
vehicle, and ending with legislation and enforcement to change and improve 
the record of road safety in Dubai. Particularly at this time of growth, once 
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certain countermeasures are institutionalised it will be easier to adopt them 
on the larger scale (UAE-wide) or even at the Gulf or Mid-Eastern level. 
There is much scope for further work and for improving the collection and 
use of available crash and injury data and for the dissemination of that data 
to better effect. This shows what was possible in the capacity of this 
substantial work alone which can and should be built upon to realise the 
calculated gains. 
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Chapter 9 Future work to further develop knowledge 
and evaluate countermeasures 
9.1 Introduction 
The absence of a well-conceived and applied safety strategy became 
obvious as progress was made throughout the work. While various different 
local and federal authorities have authored and published strategy 
documents their effect was not evident. A new approach to road safety is 
needed involving all key stakeholders working together towards an 
attainable target focused on the themes outlined in the findings of this work. 
This must be led by one neutral body in Dubai with main responsibility for 
the issue of traffic safety that coordinates all the parties involved and sets 
the strategy and monitors implementation. The recommended actions 
outlined in the conclusion of the WHO world report on traffic injury 
prevention (Peden et al, 2004) form an appropriate working plan that can be 
adapted to local conditions. 
Other gaps in current knowledge and data availability were revealed in this 
work of research. These have helped direct the work in different phases. 
Expansion in other directions was possible and needed to uncover all the 
issues related to this field and to maximise the benefit to society. Some of 
the gaps provided the impetus for further work and have been translated 
below into the nucleus of future research areas and proposals. 
9.2 Consultation with stakeholders 
The attitudes, opinions and ideas of major stakeholders in the road safety 
operation in Dubai are important in gauging the level of the problem from 
both the executive and end-user perspective along with the solutions that 
might be applied in the future. These opinions and important ideas can fill in 
the gaps about the situation in the near future and plans for Dubai roads in 
the medium-term. Qualitative surveys of decision-makers, stakeholders and 
road users can help establish a foothold in this area as no recent work has 
been found in the literature. It is likely that any such work will need to be 
repeated at regular intervals as ideas can change quickly in such a dynamic 
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environment as Dubai. The suggested countermeasures, interventions and 
costs can also be reviewed with key stakeholders in Dubai (like the Traffic 
Police and Roads and Transport Authority) to determine the level of their 
acceptance and suitability. This will also serve to validate the 
countermeasures along with public policy and stakeholder views. 
9.3 Location surveys and black spot treatment 
Historically (Leeming et al, 1969) the very first safety interventions were 
carried out by blackspot treatment and this method can still reveal valuable 
information that cannot be found in crash studies and photographs except 
with great difficulty. Further work can be carried out at crash sites as the 
location (using GIS – Geographical Information Systems) was supplied for 
the majority of crashes but problems of access and manipulation prevented 
making further use of the data. Central barrier presence was not recorded in 
a majority of cases in the macroscopic analysis so further analysis using 
location data can be carried out on site to evaluate if barrier installation 
would be beneficial at these locations. Also a comparison of the 
performance of different types of barriers and central reservations would be 
possible if more detailed location data were available and accessible. 
The condition of road markings and signs was not clearly known. This type 
of information can be found if precise location information and scene 
photographs were provided in the base-level data (though without 
photographs this activity will be very time-sensitive as road signs might have 
changed). With such information it would be possible to survey crash 
locations to assess whether they contributed to crashes or were irrelevant. 
Road condition was listed very rarely as being anything other than dry but 
there might be a case for improving road surface friction to reduce stopping 
distances at certain locations with a high number of head-to-tail crashes or 
the resurfacing of old roads might improve their characteristics. In the UK 
chevrons are placed on some roads to aid drivers in keeping a safe distance 
from cars ahead. Vehicle technology developments have resulted in systems 
such as adaptive cruise control to help a driver maintain a set distance from 
vehicles ahead (Marsden et al, 2001). Such measures could be used to aid 
drivers in maintaining a safe distance to other traffic and avoiding head-to-
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tail crashes. Further information is needed especially with regards to cost-
effectiveness as road construction and repairs tend to be capital-intensive 
activities. 
9.4 Meteorological and exposure data 
It was not known if crashes peak during unconventional weather conditions 
or if drivers were more cautious during such times. Data on specific weather 
conditions, like rainfall or fog, from meteorological sources can be used to 
assess any variation in crashes during those times. If they were found to 
vary significantly against the data recorded by the police then they deserve 
more study. Exposure data was found to be lacking in a number of analyses. 
If this data was found for different nationalities it will allow the comparison of 
proportions to see if any gender or nationality has a better safety record. 
Then the reasons for that can be traced and hence applied to other “worse-
performing” nationalities. One theory found in one study (Shefer & Rietveld, 
1997) claims that safety may have improved due to more congestion and 
less opportunities for speeding. This can only be verified by surveys of 
congestion and travel time none of which have been found to date.  
9.5 Vehicle standards 
A number of standards and regulations apply to vehicles sold in the UAE 
and these were found to be largely based on American standards especially 
as related to crashworthiness. The current relevance of these standards to 
crash conditions in Dubai was neither established nor assumed. An 
appraisal of these standards and their effectiveness in the local context is 
important to ensure the most suitable standards are applied in the area and 
matched to the problems faced there.  
9.6 Hospital studies and trauma registries 
The comparison of police and hospital data for road casualties (such as in 
the UK; DfT, 2006a) facilitates a process of verification and validation and 
may highlight problems such as under-reporting of crash numbers and 
miscoding of injuries. A few studies were found from hospitals in the UAE 
but none that covered the most recent data. Correlation of these studies with 
police data or even independent assessment of trauma admissions to 
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hospitals from road crashes will improve the reliability of current data and 
might provide more detailed injury data. This in turn can be useful in a 
number of ways (correlating injury with crash or vehicle type, seated 
position, restraint use and misuse, etc). In the UK, similar efforts were made 
using data from the National Health Service – NHS (DfT, 2006a) that may be 
used for guidance. 
9.7 Improving the crash data collection form 
Crash data collection is a world-wide activity and numerous different 
methods exist for the efficient and simple collection of data from the crash 
scene. Surveying the existing state-of-the-art in this area should be 
performed to improve the crash data collection in Dubai. A pilot study using 
an improved form for Dubai crash investigations can assist in collecting 
further data that is desired but not available on the original form. For 
instance despite lighting conditions and weather being good in the majority 
of cases an additional field can be introduced on the crash form for driver’s 
quality of vision or distraction. This may be used to note down if glare from 
the sun reflecting on the road surface or another vehicle or a dirty 
windscreen or faulty wipers might have contributed to the crash. Other 
conditions of fair weather might also be worth mentioning (like the sun being 
at a low angle or excessive heat with no air-conditioning in a vehicle that 
might contribute to fatigue and loss of concentration). Contributory factors 
(such as those mentioned on the latest revision of the UK police reporting 
form, STATS19) are also a valuable addition to help understand crash 
causation and their development in the UK has been detailed already 
(Broughton et al, 1998). Performing this type of pilot study will be valuable in 
understanding the circumstances under which crash forms are normally filled 
and conducting this in the summer has the added advantage of presenting 
the most difficult situations in which to fill it for Police (extremes of 
temperature and humidity). The methodology used in more in-depth and 
longer-established crash studies in the UK (OTS, CCIS) and other countries 
(FARS, SAFETYNET) can also be incorporated as well as the latest crash 
methodology research (Lindquist et al, 2003) depending on suitability. 
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9.8 Road lengths and speed limits 
If the total length of the road network was known along with the speed limits 
for every road then the speed limits on the roads involved in the in-depth 
sample can be compared to the overall speed limit divisions to determine 
whether roads with certain speed limits posed higher risks for road users. 
This can also be compared to the incidence of overspeeding to determine 
whether some roads appear to have higher violation rates than others and to 
note if there is any relation between speeding and road length. 
9.9 Vehicle fleet analysis 
The fleet composition of MVs in Dubai is not currently known but this 
information, if made available, would be very useful in monitoring certain 
trends. For instance: to see if 4x4s were over-represented as partners in a 
crash compared to their proportion in the fleet; or to find the extent of older 
cars and compare their presence with their crash involvement; or to see if 
sports cars present a significant problem or not. One study indicates an 
increase in 4x4 vehicles in the fleet from 11.3% (1995) to 18.3% (2000) in 
Dubai only (El-Sadig, 2002). This might be linked to the high number of 
pedestrian crashes or single-vehicle crashes (loss of control etc). Heavy and 
moderately-sized passenger vehicles have decreased in proportion to 
smaller-sized cars (38% in 1985 ? 23% in 1998) (ibid.). With fleet data the 
effect of this change on the type and severity of crashes could be monitored 
as can the issue of compatibility between different crash partners. This fleet 
analysis will also permit an estimate of the percentage of the fleet with a 
certain EuroNCAP star rating based on recently-developed methodology in 
other projects (Page & Rackliff, 2006; SAFETYNET project, Work Package 
3). The benefits of improved crashworthiness can be measured by 
comparing the crash involvement and outcomes of the same models of cars 
from different generations as their EuroNCAP ratings improve. Comparisons 
between vehicles would make it possible to find the best and worst 
performing ones in terms of outcome as was done in Australia for many 
years (Newstead et al, 2008). 
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9.10  Seat belt surveys 
Seatbelt use information is scarce in the UAE in general and Dubai in 
particular with some work found at one busy site in 1999, 2002 and 2005 
(RTA, 2006c). With a time-series of this data, a lot of additional work can be 
carried out (like evaluating the effectiveness of legislation or enforcement or 
wearing rates for different vehicle types). Monitoring of seat belt use must be 
conducted at sites that are selected such that the data can be representative 
of the whole driving population to keep track of this important performance 
indicator. The protocol used can be based on an evaluation of studies in 
other countries (Broughton, 1990 & 2003; Krafft et al, 2006) and the local 
surveys previously performed. 
9.11 Pedestrian and heavy vehicle driver focus 
Pedestrians were the single largest affected group by most serious crashes. 
Some background was revealed on the reasons for their behaviour and 
involvement. To attempt to reduce this involvement further studies need to 
be conducted focusing on pedestrians and other vulnerable road users 
namely cyclists. The visibility of cyclists and pedestrians might be a factor in 
some crashes or the road conditions and driver attentiveness could be to 
blame. The reasons behind the involvement of vulnerable road users can be 
established through specific studies focusing on drivers and other road users 
involved in such crashes. Heavy vehicle drivers were less regulated (than in 
the EU) and over involved in crashes in comparison to their share of new 
vehicle sales. This needs further study to determine what factors come into 
play in these crashes (fatigue, sleepiness, exhaustion, carelessness, etc).  
9.12 Economic costs and cost benefit analysis 
If the average cost and quantity of the countermeasures needed was 
available then a cost analysis may be carried out using approximate cost 
data for crashes until UAE costs were calculated in the future. Some 
countermeasure cost data was found from other studies (Elvik & Vaa, 2004) 
but they were not deemed suitable for application in Dubai. Differences 
between the two regions include the fact that a lot of new overhead road 
crossings planned for Dubai will be airconditioned (Al-Theeb, 2007) which 
was unheard of in Scandinavian countries and adds a new element of cost 
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to such countermeasures. Relevant costs for countermeasures could be 
found from local authorities where measures have already been partially 
implemented, or from road building contractors and consultants. Further 
work on combining these sources of cost data would be very useful.  
9.13 Safety Performance Indicators (SPI) 
Other methods of measuring the level of road safety have been sought and 
recently developed, such as Safety Performance Indicators (SPI) for traffic 
safety (ETSC, 2001; Page & Rackliff, 2006; Talvitie, 1999; Vis, 2005). Such 
measures can be a standardised way to measure the safety performance of 
an area over a period of time. One example of such measures were 
developed by the World Bank from a meeting of experts in the late 1990s. At 
the time performance indicators were developed for many aspects of road 
sector administration including but not limited to accessibility and mobility; 
equity and community; environment; and traffic safety. Those performance 
indicators dealing with traffic safety include crash risk; the existence of a 
national traffic safety program; the involvement of drunk drivers in crashes; 
the time from a crash alert to treatment; and the percentage of roads not 
meeting minimum design standards (Talvitie, 1999). A later report by the 
European Traffic Safety Council (ETSC, 2001), defined SPIs as a 
“measurement that is causally related to crashes or injuries, used in addition 
to a count of crashes or injuries in order to indicate safety performance”. A 
few examples of SPIs in use in European countries were given such as the 
mean speed of traffic at selected points; speed variance between different 
vehicles; the percentage use of seat belts and the incidence of red light 
running among others. 
More recent work on SPIs related to road safety was performed within the 
European project SafetyNet (aimed at building a European Road Safety 
Observatory). The developmental work is ongoing to find a usable and 
realistic set of indicators using an iterative process of surveying the current 
factors and legislation related to road safety in EU member states then using 
that to inform the development of SPIs (Vis, 2005).  
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The SafetyNet road SPIs were divided into the following seven categories: 
1. Alcohol and drug use 
2. Speeds 
3. Protective systems 
4. Daytime running lights 
5. Vehicles 
6. Roads 
7. Trauma management 
Once the process of development is complete it was understood the 
outcome will be a full set of realistically applicable SPIs from a large 
geographic area. This in turn means that the same process can be applied in 
different areas to achieve the same or similar results (if the two areas are 
similar in nature). For areas that are significantly different in nature (ex. 
areas without a tarmac road system in place) the process is expected to be 
more complex and produce more original outcomes. 
9.14 Road safety audits 
The process of auditing roads (both existing and at the design stage) for 
evaluating safety is well-established in many areas. It is a systematic 
process for checking the safety of new and existing schemes on roads and 
is practised in many countries around the world, with the UK leading 
developments in this field in the 1980s (Proctor et al, 2001). 
9.15 Other factors 
Other interesting factors that come out of the analysis are the cultural 
differences between drivers as highlighted by work in the island-state of 
Bahrain (Al-Madani & Al-Janahi, 2002) showing that American and 
European drivers comprehend signs better than Arab and Asian drivers. 
Most traffic signs from the West have been adopted in the rest of the world. 
It might be that users from the East find difficulty in understanding some 
signs as they come from a different background. Hence some studies on the 
comprehension or development of signs more suitable for the region could 
be undertaken. Also some peaks in crashes of a certain type occur for just 
one nationality and this defies logical explanation from available data. 
Focusing on either problem could provide more information on why these 
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differences exist and show how to improve conditions for comparatively low-
performers. If the 2005 census data is provided in detail (including nationality 
breakdown) then comparisons to the overall population structure will also be 
possible.  
Nationality and cultural differences could be incorporated into a study of 
driver testing and qualification as the two research areas might be related. 
The process of driver licensing and qualification has been changing in Dubai 
but it is not clear what brought about these changes or how they will impact 
on road safety. Also drivers from different driving backgrounds might have 
different safety levels despite undergoing the same driving test in Dubai. 
9.16 Further countermeasures 
Other countermeasures not mentioned here but that may have a positive 
impact upon road safety in Dubai might have been missed due to insufficient 
data on them or the small expected improvement and due to time limitations 
that do not permit the inclusion of everything. Regular updates of the work 
can overcome such shortcomings that are found in every research project. 
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Appendix A: Abbreviations and Definitions 
4x4: Four-wheel-drive vehicle. 
AED: United Arab Emirates Dirham (local currency 1AED=3.67US$, fixed 
exchange rate as the Dirham is pegged against the Dollar) 
AIS: Abbreviated Injury Scale 
CARE: Community database on Crashes on the Roads in Europe 
CCIS: Cooperative Crash Injury Study 
DfT: Department for Transport, UK 
DHA: Dubai Health Authority 
DM: Dubai Municipality 
DMSC: Dubai Municipality Statistics Centre, later Dubai Statistics Centre 
DOHMS: Dept. of Health and Medical Services, Dubai. 
DSA: Driving Standards Agency (UK) 
DSC: Dynamic stability control 
ESC: Electronic stability control 
ESMA: Emirates Standardization and Metrology Authority 
ESP: Electronic stability program 
ETSC: European Transportation Safety Council 
EU: European Union 
EU Member Countries (2007): Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, 
Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, 
Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom. 
Euro NCAP: European New Car Assessment Program 
FARS: Fatality Analysis Reporting System 
FMVSS: Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (USA) 
GBD: Global Burden of Disease Study 
GIS: Geographical Information System 
GCC: The Cooperative Council for the Arab States of the Gulf 
GPS: Global Positioning System 
GVW: Gross Vehicle Weight 
HC: Human capital costing method 
HMC: Highly-motorised country 
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IRTAD: International Road Traffic and Crash Database 
ITS: Intelligent Transport Systems 
KSA: Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 
KSI: Killed and seriously injured casualties 
LMC: Less-motorised country 
Meta-analysis: the calculation of a weighted mean estimate of effect based 
on the estimated effectiveness of the measure from a number of studies 
(see Elvik & Vaa, 2004 pp. 22-27 for a more detailed explanation). 
MV: Motor vehicle 
NASS: National Crash Sampling System 
OECD: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
OECD Member countries - 30 (October 2006): 
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech republic, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, 
Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, 
Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, 
United States. 
PNCAP: Primary Safety New Car Assessment Program. 
RACV: Royal Automobile Club of Victoria. 
RBT: Random Breath Testing. 
RFID: Radio Frequency Identification. 
RTA: Roads and Transport Authority, Dubai. 
SAE: Society of Automotive Engineers. 
SAFETYNET: A European-funded project to build a Road Safety 
Observatory for Europe. 
SPI: Safety Performance Indicator(s) 
SUV: Sport Utility Vehicle (4x4). 
TRL: Transport Research Laboratory, UK. 
UAE: United Arab Emirates 
UNECE: United Nations Economic Commission for Europe. 
UNECE member countries - 55 (January 1995): 
Albania, Andorra, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Belgium, Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, 
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Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, 
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, 
Portugal, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, San Marino, 
Serbia and Montenegro, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, 
Tajikistan, The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkey, 
Turkmenistan, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States of America and 
Uzbekistan. 
USA: United States of America. 
VMS: Variable Message Sign. 
VSRC: Vehicle Safety Research Centre, Loughborough University, UK. 
WHO: World Health Organisation. 
WHO region abbreviations: 
 MEC = Middle Eastern Crescent 
SSA = Sub-Saharan Africa 
CHN = China 
OAI = Other Asia and Islands 
IND = India 
LAC = Latin America and the Caribbean 
FSE = Formerly Socialist Economies of Europe 
EME = Established Market Economies 
WTP: Willingness to pay (costing method)  
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Appendix B: Dubai Police Crash Data Collection 
Forms 
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Appendix C: SPSS Syntax files 
 
File 1: “Dubai 1995-2006 import.SPS” 
 
* 
* IMPORT TABLES FROM MS-ACCESS DATABASE 
* 
. 
 
GET DATA 
/TYPE=ODBC 
/CONNECT= 
 'DSN=MS Access Database;' 
 'DBQ=U:\phd\DATABASE\UAE\AccNewVersion\CrashData_Mustaf.mdb;' 
/SQL= 
 'SELECT * FROM "TbCrashGeneral Details"'. 
 
variable width 
 DATE (16) 
 DEGINJ (12) 
 LOCATION (22) 
 CAUSE  (20) 
 TYPE (16)  
 SITECOND (20) 
 SITENRTO (16) 
 CNTRESV (16) 
 LIGHT (20)  
 TCONTROL  (20) 
 WEATHER (10) 
 RDSURF (10) 
 ADATE (12) 
. 
 
variable labels 
 NUMBERVEH "No. of vehicles involved" 
 NOPERINJ "No. of people injured" 
 DEGINJ "Degree of injury" 
 LOCATION "Location" 
 CAUSE "Cause of crash" 
 TYPE "Crash type" 
 SPDLIMIT "Speed limit on road" 
 SITECOND "No. of lanes or type of junction" 
 SITENRTO "Site proximity to local feature" 
 CNTRESV "Central reservation/lane separation" 
 LIGHT "Lighting conditions" 
 TCONTROL  "Traffic markings" 
 WEATHER "Weather conditions"  
 RDSURF "Road surface condition" 
 RDTYPE "Road classification" 
. 
 
value labels DEGINJ 
'0' "No injury" 
'1' "Fatal" 
'2' "Serious" 
'3' "Medium" 
'4' "Slight" 
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. 
value labels CAUSE 
'1' "Lack of consideration to other road users" 
'2' "Lack of lane discipline" 
'3' "Entering carriageway without checking for traffic" 
'4' "Following too close to vehicle in front" 
'5' "Jumping a red light" 
'6' "Violating speed limit" 
'7' "Dangerous driving" 
'8' "Tyre blow out" 
'9' "Unknown" 
'10' "Failing to give way" 
'11' "Unroadworthy vehicle" 
'12' "Faulty road" 
'13' "Doors not securely closed" 
'14' "Entering a no-entry zone" 
'15' "Carelessness and lack of attention" 
'16' "Wrong turn" 
'17' "Going against traffic" 
'18' "Incorrect overtaking" 
'19' "Reversing without due care" 
'20' "Stopping in the road" 
'21' "Effects of natural or environment factors" 
'22' "Effects of medicines" 
'23' "Effect of taking alcohol" 
'24' "Effect of taking drugs" 
'25' "Presence of obstacles in road" 
'26' "Tiredness and sleep" 
'27' "Excess loading" 
'28' "Shedding of load" 
'29' "Trailer separation" 
'30' "Wandering animal" 
'31' "Speed humps" 
'32' "Sudden change of direction" 
'33' "No knowledge of driving and no licence" 
'34' "Other" 
'0' "Not entered or not specified" 
. 
value labels TYPE 
'1' "Stationary object impact" 
'2' "Pedestrian collision" 
'3' "Rollover" 
'4' "Impact with animal" 
'5' "Falling off moving vehicle" 
'6' "Head to side impact" 
'7' "Hit while turning" 
'8' "Side to side" 
'9' "Head to tail" 
'10' "Head on" 
'0' "undefined" 
. 
value labels SITECOND 
'1' "Dual carriageway 4 lanes each direction" 
'2' "Dual carriageway 3 lanes each direction" 
'3' "Dual carriageway 2 lanes each direction" 
'4' "Single carriageway one way" 
'5' "Wide single carriageway 2 lanes each direction" 
'6' "Single carriageway 1 lane each direction" 
'7' "Roundabout" 
'8' "Junction without traffic light control" 
'9' "Traffic light-controlled junction" 
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'10' "Other (specify)" 
. 
value labels SITENRTO 
'1' "Near to school" 
'2' "Near to mosque" 
'3' "Near to hospital" 
'4' "Near to government department" 
'5' "In residential area" 
'6' "On pedestrian (zebra) crossing" 
'7' "At U-turn" 
'8' "Near pedestrian crossing" 
'9' "Other (specify)" 
. 
value labels CNTRESV 
'1' "Steel barrier" 
'2' "Concrete barrier" 
'3' "Sand or vegetation" 
'4' "Kerb" 
'5' "No barrier or reservation" 
. 
value labels LIGHT 
'1'  "Daylight hours" 
'2' "Night time sufficient lighting" 
'3' "Night time poor lighting" 
'4' "Night time lighting not switched on" 
'5' "Night time no lighting present" 
. 
value labels TCONTROL 
'1' "Markings exist" 
'2' "No road markings or signs" 
'3' "No road markings" 
'4' "No signs" 
'9' "Unknown" 
. 
value labels WEATHER 
'1' "Fair" 
'2' "Rainy" 
'3' "Foggy" 
'4' "Sand storms" 
'5' "Other (specify)" 
. 
value labels RDSURF 
'1' "Dry" 
'2' "Wet" 
'3' "Sand-covered" 
'4' "Petrochemical substance" 
'5' "Other (specify)" 
. 
 
value labels RDTYPE 
'1' "Freeways" 
'2' "Expressways" 
'3' "Arterial" 
'4' "Arterial" 
'5' "Collector" 
'6' "Local" 
'7' "Other" 
. 
 
sort cases by CASE_ID (a). 
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*Select only fatal and injury cases as sample seems to include some non-injury cases. 
FILTER OFF. 
USE ALL. 
SELECT IF DEGINJ =1 OR DEGINJ = 2 OR DEGINJ = 3 OR DEGINJ = 4. 
EXECUTE . 
 
 
save outfile='U:\phd\DATABASE\UAE\Dubai1995-2006acc.sav' 
  /DROP=CASE_ID1 ATIME INJURY LINK NODE EAST NORTH DETAILS ADATE 
GDO_GEOMETRY /COMPRESSED 
. 
 
File 2: “naming year variable.SPS” 
 
* Date and Time Wizard: DATEYR to create a variable containing the YEAR called YEAR 
for all cases. 
COMPUTE YEAR = XDATE.YEAR(DATE). 
VARIABLE LABEL YEAR "Year". 
VARIABLE LEVEL YEAR (SCALE). 
FORMATS YEAR (F8.0). 
VARIABLE WIDTH YEAR(8). 
EXECUTE. 
 
*Try to plot injury severity by year. 
FREQUENCIES 
  VARIABLES=YEAR 
  /BARCHART 
  /ORDER=  ANALYSIS . 
 
*Select only fatal and injury cases as sample seems to include some non-injury cases. 
 
FILTER OFF. 
USE ALL. 
SELECT IF DEGINJ =1 OR DEGINJ = 2 OR DEGINJ = 3 OR DEGINJ = 4. 
EXECUTE . 
 
*Now select all 2006 cases. 
FILTER OFF. 
USE ALL. 
SELECT IF(YEAR = 2006). 
EXECUTE . 
 
 
* Date and Time Wizard: Create new variable called Month. 
COMPUTE Month = XDATE.MONTH(DATE). 
VARIABLE LABEL Month "Month". 
VARIABLE LEVEL Month (SCALE). 
FORMATS Month (F8.0). 
VARIABLE WIDTH Month(8). 
EXECUTE. 
 
*To produce the frequency of case by month of the year. 
FREQUENCIES 
  VARIABLES=Month 
  /BARCHART  PERCENT 
  /ORDER=  ANALYSIS . 
 
*Now to compare old weekend with new weekend, select cases from Jan-Aug 2006, 
keeping unselected cases. 
USE ALL. 
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COMPUTE filter_$=(Month <= 8). 
VARIABLE LABEL filter_$ 'Month <= 8 (FILTER)'. 
VALUE LABELS filter_$  0 'Not Selected' 1 'Selected'. 
FORMAT filter_$ (f1.0). 
FILTER BY filter_$. 
EXECUTE . 
 
*Alternatively, to select old weekend cases by dropping unselected cases. 
FILTER OFF. 
USE ALL. 
SELECT IF month <= 8. 
EXECUTE. 
 
*To select Sep-Dec 2006 cases. 
USE ALL. 
COMPUTE filter_$=(Month >= 9). 
VARIABLE LABEL filter_$ 'Month >= 9 (FILTER)'. 
VALUE LABELS filter_$  0 'Not Selected' 1 'Selected'. 
FORMAT filter_$ (f1.0). 
FILTER BY filter_$. 
EXECUTE . 
 
*Alternatively, to select new weekend cases by dropping unselected cases. 
FILTER OFF. 
USE ALL. 
SELECT IF month >= 9. 
EXECUTE. 
 
*Select only non-injury crash cases. 
*FILTER OFF. 
*USE ALL. 
*SELECT IF DEGINJ = 0. 
*EXECUTE. 
 
*Sort cases by date (ascending). 
SORT CASES BY 
  DATE (A) . 
 
File 3: "seatbelt law analysis.SPS" 
 
*Finding the effect, if any, of seat belt legislation in force in January 1999. 
 
* Date and Time Wizard: DATEYR to create a variable containing the YEAR called YEAR 
for all cases. 
COMPUTE YEAR = XDATE.YEAR(DATE). 
VARIABLE LABEL YEAR "Year". 
VARIABLE LEVEL YEAR (SCALE). 
FORMATS YEAR (F8.0). 
VARIABLE WIDTH YEAR(8). 
EXECUTE. 
 
*Now select all 1998 cases for comparison, then 1999. 
FILTER OFF. 
USE ALL. 
SELECT IF(YEAR = 1998). 
EXECUTE . 
 
File 4: "analysis1datetime.SPS" 
 
*RUN dubai import first. 
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*NOTE RECODE COMMAND IS CASE-sensitive. 
* Dividing the time into 24 equal intervals. 
STRING TIME1 (A8) . 
RECODE 
  TIME 
  (0000 thru 100='01')  (101 thru 200='02')  (201 thru 300='03')  (301 thru 400='04')   
(401 thru 500='05')  (501 thru 600='06')  (601 thru 700='07')  (701 thru 800='08')   
(801 thru 900='09')  (901 thru 1000='10')  (1001 thru 1100='11') (1101 thru 1200='12')  
(1201 thru 1300='13')  (1301 thru 1400='14')  (1401 thru 1500='15')   
(1501 thru 1600='16')  (1601 thru 1700='17')  (1701 thru 1800='18')   
(1801 thru 1900='19')  (1901 thru 2000='20')  (2001 thru 2100='21')   
(2101 thru 2200='22')  (2201 thru 2300='23')  (2301 thru 2359='24') INTO  TIME1 . 
VARIABLE LABELS TIME1 'TIME1'. 
EXECUTE . 
 
*line graph for time periods. 
GRAPH 
  /LINE(SIMPLE)=COUNT BY TIME1 
  /TITLE= 'Time of day, 1 hr intervals'. 
 
* Dividing time into 12 intervals. 
.  
STRING TIME2 (A8) . 
RECODE 
  TIME 
  (0000 thru 200='1-2AM')  (201 thru 400='2-4AM')  (401 thru 600='4-6AM')   
(601 thru 800='6-8AM')  (801 thru 1000='8-10AM')   
(1001 thru 1200='10-12noon')  (1201 thru 1400='12-2PM')  (1401 thru 1600='2-4PM')  
 (1601 thru 1800='4-6PM') (1801 thru 2000='6-8PM')  (2001 thru 2200='8-10PM')  
(2201 thru 2359='10-12midnight') INTO  TIME2 . 
VARIABLE LABELS TIME2 'TIME2'. 
EXECUTE . 
 
*variable width 
* TIME1 (20) 
* TIME2 (20). 
 
*table of frequencies for time periods. 
FREQUENCIES 
  VARIABLES=TIME2 
  /PIECHART  FREQ 
  /ORDER=  ANALYSIS . 
 
*pie chart for time periods. 
GRAPH 
  /PIE=COUNT BY TIME2 . 
 
*line graph for time periods. 
GRAPH 
  /LINE(SIMPLE)=COUNT BY TIME1 
  /TITLE= 'Time of day, 1 hr intervals'. 
 
GRAPH 
 /LINE(SIMPLE)=COUNT BY TIME2 
 /TITLE='Time of day, 2hr intervals'. 
 
*To produce the frequency of case by day of week. 
* Date and Time Wizard: dayofwk. 
COMPUTE dayofwk = XDATE.WKDAY(DATE). 
VARIABLE LABEL dayofwk "Day of week". 
VARIABLE LEVEL dayofwk (NOMINAL). 
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FORMATS dayofwk (WKDAY3). 
VARIABLE WIDTH dayofwk(3). 
EXECUTE. 
 
FREQUENCIES 
  VARIABLES= dayofwk 
  /BARCHART  PERCENT 
  /ORDER=  ANALYSIS . 
 
 
File 5: “analysis2locations causes.SPS” 
 
* The frequencies of different crash locations. 
 
FREQUENCIES 
  VARIABLES=LOCATION 
  /FORMAT=DFREQ 
  /BARCHART  FREQ 
  /ORDER=  ANALYSIS . 
 
* frequencies (bar charts) of the top 6 crash locations (2005 fatals). 
* FIRST select the top 6 locations. 
FILTER OFF. 
USE ALL. 
SELECT IF ANY (LOCATION, 'SHEIKH ZAYED RD', 'EMIRATES RING RD',   
'DUBAI AL-AIN RD', 'DUBAI HATTA RD', 'SHEIKH RASHID RD', 'AL-KHAIL RD'). 
EXECUTE . 
 
*Bar chart of the top 6 locations by frequency. 
 
FREQUENCIES 
  VARIABLES=LOCATION 
  /BARCHART  FREQ 
  /ORDER=  ANALYSIS . 
 
* frequencies (bar charts) of the top 6 crash locations (1995-2006 INJURIES). 
* FIRST select the top 6 locations. 
FILTER OFF. 
USE ALL. 
SELECT IF ANY (LOCATION, 'SHEIKH ZAYED RD', 'DUBAI AL-AIN RD', 'EMIRATES 
RING RD',   
'SHEIKH RASHID RD', 'BUR DUBAI AREA', 'AL-ITTIHAD RD'). 
EXECUTE . 
 
FREQUENCIES 
  VARIABLES=LOCATION 
  /BARCHART  FREQ 
  /ORDER=  ANALYSIS . 
 
*Causes analysis - ignore CAUSE2 definition hazy. 
FREQUENCIES 
  VARIABLES=CAUSE  
  /PIECHART  FREQ 
  /ORDER=  ANALYSIS . 
 
* Table of Frequencies for CAUSE. 
TABLES 
  /FORMAT BLANK MISSING('.') /TABLES 
  (LABELS)  BY 
  CAUSE 
291 
  /STATISTICS COUNT ((F5.0) 'Count' ). 
 
 
*Location frequencies. 
FREQUENCIES 
  VARIABLES=LOCATION 
  /FORMAT=DVALUE 
  /STATISTICS=MEAN MEDIAN 
  /PIECHART  FREQ 
  /ORDER=  ANALYSIS . 
 
*Analyse crashes with alcohol intoxication, first select them. 
FILTER OFF. 
USE ALL. 
SELECT IF ANY (CAUSE, 23). 
EXECUTE . 
 
FREQUENCIES 
  VARIABLES=CAUSE 
  /BARCHART  FREQ 
  /ORDER=  ANALYSIS . 
 
*Then run time analysis to see when these crashes occur. 
*NOTE RECODE COMMAND IS CASE-sensitive. 
* Dividing the time into 24 equal intervals. 
STRING TIME1 (A8) . 
RECODE 
  TIME 
  (0000 thru 100='01')  (101 thru 200='02')  (201 thru 300='03')  (301 thru 400='04')   
(401 thru 500='05')  (501 thru 600='06')  (601 thru 700='07')  (701 thru 800='08')   
(801 thru 900='09')  (901 thru 1000='10')  (1001 thru 1100='11') (1101 thru 1200='12')  
(1201 thru 1300='13')  (1301 thru 1400='14')  (1401 thru 1500='15')   
(1501 thru 1600='16')  (1601 thru 1700='17')  (1701 thru 1800='18')   
(1801 thru 1900='19')  (1901 thru 2000='20')  (2001 thru 2100='21')   
(2101 thru 2200='22')  (2201 thru 2300='23')  (2301 thru 2359='24') INTO  TIME1 . 
VARIABLE LABELS TIME1 'TIME1'. 
EXECUTE . 
 
FREQUENCIES 
  VARIABLES=TIME1 
  /BARCHART  FREQ 
  /ORDER=  ANALYSIS . 
 
 
*Further analysis of the Bur Dubai area crashes, to see if they involve pedestrians. 
FILTER OFF. 
USE ALL. 
SELECT IF ANY (LOCATION, 'BUR DUBAI AREA'). 
EXECUTE . 
 
FREQUENCIES 
  VARIABLES=LOCATION 
  /BARCHART  FREQ 
  /ORDER=  ANALYSIS . 
 
*Analyse by type of crash, to find frequency of pedestrian crashes. 
FREQUENCIES 
  VARIABLES=TYPE 
  /BARCHART  FREQ 
  /ORDER=  ANALYSIS . 
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File 6: “analysis3type and deg of injury.SPS” 
 
*frequencies of degree of injury. 
 
FREQUENCIES 
  VARIABLES=DEGINJ 
  /PIECHART  PERCENT 
  /ORDER=  ANALYSIS . 
 
 
*frequencies of type of crash. 
 
FREQUENCIES 
  VARIABLES=TYPE 
  /PIECHART  PERCENT 
  /ORDER=  ANALYSIS . 
 
File 7: “analysis4 vehic&ppl involved.SPS” 
 
*The number of vehicles involved, and the number of persons involved, is investigated here. 
FREQUENCIES 
  VARIABLES=NUMBERVEH NOPERINJ 
  /ORDER=  ANALYSIS . 
*again take to excel to produce graphs. 
 
*Select only fatal cases for further analysis, then run above again and take to Excel. 
FILTER OFF. 
USE ALL. 
SELECT IF DEGINJ = 1. 
Execute. 
 
 
File 8: “analysis5 speedlimit conditions ftrs.SPS” 
 
 
*For finding the speedlimits of roads on which crashes occur, frequencies. 
RECODE 
  SPDLIMIT  (SYSMIS=SYSMIS)  (11=SYSMIS)  (25=SYSMIS)  (0 thru 9=SYSMIS)  . 
EXECUTE . 
RECODE SPDLIMIT (sysmis=9). 
add value lab SPDLIMIT 
9 'Unknown/invalid'. 
 
*try menu-generated recoding of invalid values of speed (above). 
 
FREQUENCIES 
  VARIABLES=SPDLIMIT 
  /BARCHART  FREQ 
  /ORDER=  ANALYSIS . 
 
*Site condition, number of lanes etc. 
RECODE 
  SITECOND  (SYSMIS=SYSMIS)  (0=SYSMIS)  (10=SYSMIS). 
EXECUTE . 
RECODE SITECOND (sysmis=10). 
add value lab SITECOND 
10 'Other/missing'. 
 
FREQUENCIES 
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  VARIABLES=SITECOND 
  /BARCHART  FREQ 
  /ORDER=  ANALYSIS . 
 
*Site proximity to local feature. 
RECODE 
  SITENRTO  (SYSMIS=SYSMIS)  (0=SYSMIS)  (10=SYSMIS). 
EXECUTE . 
RECODE SITENRTO (sysmis=10). 
add value lab SITENRTO 
10 'Missing/invalid'. 
 
 
FREQUENCIES 
  VARIABLES=SITENRTO 
  /PIECHART  FREQ 
  /ORDER=  ANALYSIS . 
 
 
File 9: “anals6 rd divider lighting signs weathr surface.SPS” 
 
*frequencies of central barrier or reservation or lane divider. 
RECODE CNTRESV (sysmis=0). 
add value lab CNTRESV 
0 'Unknown'. 
 
FREQUENCIES 
  VARIABLES=CNTRESV 
  /BARCHART  FREQ 
  /ORDER=  ANALYSIS . 
 
*frequencies of light condition at crash sites. 
FREQUENCIES 
  VARIABLES=LIGHT 
  /PIECHART  FREQ 
  /ORDER=  ANALYSIS . 
 
*frequency of road markings and signs existence. 
RECODE 
  TCONTROL  (0=SYSMIS)  . 
EXECUTE . 
RECODE TCONTROL (sysmis=0). 
add value lab TCONTROL 
0 'Unknown'. 
 
 
FREQUENCIES 
  VARIABLES=TCONTROL 
  /BARCHART  FREQ 
  /ORDER=  ANALYSIS . 
 
*frequency of pre-existing weather conditions. 
RECODE 
  WEATHER  (5=SYSMIS)  . 
EXECUTE . 
RECODE WEATHER (sysmis=0). 
add value lab WEATHER 
0 'Other/unknown'. 
 
FREQUENCIES 
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  VARIABLES=WEATHER 
  /BARCHART  FREQ 
  /ORDER=  ANALYSIS . 
 
*frequency of road surface conditions. 
 
FREQUENCIES 
  VARIABLES=RDSURF 
  /BARCHART  FREQ 
  /ORDER=  ANALYSIS . 
 
File 10: "Injuries import.SPS" 
 
* 
* IMPORT TABLES FROM MS-ACCESS DATABASE 
* 
. 
 
GET DATA 
/TYPE=ODBC 
/CONNECT= 
 'DSN=MS Access Database;' 
 'DBQ=U:\phd\DATABASE\UAE\AccNewVersion\CrashData_Mustaf.mdb;' 
/SQL= 
 'SELECT * FROM "tbINJURYDetails"'. 
 
variable width 
 CASE_ID (10) 
 ASSVEHNO (10) 
 totinj (6) 
 CLASSINJ (8) 
 SEXINJ (6) 
 NATINJ (12) 
 AGEINJ (7) 
 DGINJ (6) 
 STBLTINJ (7) 
 OnBiccycle (8) 
. 
 
variable labels 
 totinj "Total no. of injured people" 
 CLASSINJ "Classification of injury" 
 SEXINJ "Gender" 
 NATINJ "Nationality" 
 AGEINJ "Age" 
 DGINJ "Degree of injury" 
 STBLTINJ "Stability of injury" 
 OnBiccycle "Cyclist" 
. 
 
value labels SEXINJ 
'1' "Male" 
'2' "Female" 
. 
 
value labels NATINJ 
'1' "UAE" 
'2' "Abu Dhabi" 
'3' "Dubai" 
'4' "Sharjah" 
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'5' "Ajman" 
'6' "Umm Al Quwain" 
'7' "Ras Al Khaimah" 
'8' "Fujairah" 
'9' "Army" 
'10' "Saudi Arabia" 
'11' "Kuwait" 
'12' "Bahrain" 
'13' "Oman" 
'14' "Qatar" 
'15' "Yemen" 
'16' "Jordan" 
'17' "Syria" 
'18' "Iraq" 
'19' "Lebanon" 
'20' "Palestine" 
'21' "Egypt" 
'22' "Sudan" 
'23' "Somalia" 
'24' "Morocco" 
'25' "Pakistan" 
'26' "India" 
'27' "Bangladesh" 
'28' "Iran" 
'29' "Japan" 
'30' "United Kingdom" 
'31' "France" 
'32' "Holland" 
'33' "Germany" 
'34' "America" 
'35' "Australia" 
'36' "Russia" 
'37' "Sri Lanka" 
'38' "Phillipines" 
'39' "No licence presented" 
'40' "Bicycle" 
'41' "Incorrect" 
'42' "No licence" 
'43' "Other countries" 
'44' "Unknown" 
. 
 
value labels DGINJ 
'0' "No injury" 
'1' "Fatal" 
'2' "Serious" 
'3' "Medium" 
'4' "Slight" 
. 
sort cases by CASE_ID (a). 
 
SAVE OUTFILE='\\ranger\users\ehma\phd\DATABASE\UAE\1995-2006casualty.sav' 
 /DROP=OnBiccycle /COMPRESSED. 
 
 
File 11: "Merging acc and injury tables.SPS" 
 
*Merging crash and injury tables for 1995-2006 Dubai cases. 
*Use MATCH command. 
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GET FILE='U:\phd\DATABASE\UAE\1995-2006casualty.sav'. 
MATCH FILES FILE=* /TABLE='\\ranger\users\ehma\phd\DATABASE\UAE\Dubai1995-
2006acc.sav' 
 /BY CASE_ID. 
sort cases by CASE_ID (A). 
SAVE OUTFILE='U:\phd\DATABASE\UAE\1995-2006mergeacc-cas.SAV' 
 /COMPRESSED. 
Execute. 
 
 
File 12: "merged acc casualty analysis.SPS" 
 
 
*Gender piechart. 
FREQUENCIES 
  VARIABLES=SEXINJ   
  /PIECHART  PERCENT 
  /ORDER=  ANALYSIS . 
 
*Nationality piechart. 
FREQUENCIES 
  VARIABLES=NATINJ   
  /PIECHART  PERCENT 
  /ORDER=  ANALYSIS . 
 
*Age ranges. 
 
STRING AGERNG (A8) . 
RECODE 
  AGEINJ 
  (0 thru 14='< 15') (15 thru 18='15-18') (19 thru 22='19-22') (23 thru 30='23-30') 
 (31 thru 40='31-40')  (41 thru 50='41-50')  (51 thru 60='51-60')   
(61 thru 100='>60')  INTO AGERNG. 
VARIABLE LABELS AGERNG 'Age range'. 
EXECUTE . 
 
FREQUENCIES 
  VARIABLES=AGERNG 
  /BARCHART  PERCENT 
  /ORDER=  ANALYSIS . 
 
*Degree of injury pie chart. 
FREQUENCIES 
  VARIABLES=DGINJ   
  /PIECHART  PERCENT 
  /ORDER=  ANALYSIS . 
 
File 12: “indepth analysis.SPS” 
*2006-7 indepth cases analysis. 
 
FREQUENCIES 
  VARIABLES=V2DIRECT 
  /FORMAT=DFREQ 
  /BARCHART  FREQ 
  /ORDER=  ANALYSIS . 
 
FREQUENCIES 
  VARIABLES=STLIGHT 
  /FORMAT=DFREQ 
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  /BARCHART  FREQ 
  /ORDER=  ANALYSIS . 
 
FREQUENCIES 
  VARIABLES=ROADTYPE 
  /FORMAT=DFREQ 
  /PIECHART  FREQ 
  /ORDER=  ANALYSIS . 
 
* Extracting hours from TIME variable. 
COMPUTE HOUR = XDATE.HOUR(TIME). 
VARIABLE LABEL HOUR "HOUR". 
VARIABLE LEVEL HOUR (SCALE). 
FORMATS HOUR (F8.0). 
VARIABLE WIDTH HOUR(8). 
EXECUTE. 
 
*line graph for hourly distribution. 
GRAPH 
  /LINE(SIMPLE)=COUNT BY HOUR 
  /TITLE= 'Crashes by hour'. 
 
*Extracting the year from date of crash. 
 
COMPUTE AYEAR = XDATE.YEAR(DATE). 
VARIABLE LABEL AYEAR "ACTUAL YEAR". 
VARIABLE LEVEL AYEAR (SCALE). 
FORMATS AYEAR (F8.0). 
VARIABLE WIDTH AYEAR(8). 
EXECUTE. 
 
*select 2006 cases only. 
SELECT IF AYEAR = 2006. 
exe. 
 
*Extracting month data from date. 
COMPUTE MONTH = XDATE.MONTH(DATE). 
VARIABLE LABEL MONTH "MONTH". 
VARIABLE LEVEL MONTH (SCALE). 
FORMATS MONTH (F8.0). 
VARIABLE WIDTH MONTH(12). 
EXECUTE. 
 
*BARCHART for MONTH. 
FREQUENCIES 
  VARIABLES=MONTH 
  /FORMAT=DFREQ 
  /BARCHART  FREQ 
  /ORDER=  ANALYSIS . 
 
*Extract day from DATE (USED TO CHECK ACCURACY OF DAY ENTRY). 
* Date and Time Wizard: DAYOFWK. 
COMPUTE DAYOFWK = XDATE.WKDAY(DATE). 
VARIABLE LABEL DAYOFWK "DAYOFWK". 
VARIABLE LEVEL DAYOFWK (NOMINAL). 
FORMATS DAYOFWK (WKDAY3). 
VARIABLE WIDTH DAYOFWK(3). 
EXECUTE. 
 
*Piechart of road conditions, to be presented in excel. 
FREQUENCIES 
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  VARIABLES=RDPAVED RDCLEAN RDDRY 
  /PIECHART  FREQ 
  /ORDER=  ANALYSIS . 
 
*Frequency table for visual conditions, to be presented in excel. 
FREQUENCIES 
  VARIABLES=CLEARVIS VISOBSTRC 
 /ORDER= ANALYSIS. 
 
*Selecting cases with adverse visual conditions. 
SELECT IF (CLEARVIS = 2) OR (VISOBSTRC = 2). 
EXE. 
 
*Frequency table for estimated speeds of vehicles. 
FREQUENCIES 
  VARIABLES= V1SPEED V2SPEED V3SPEED 
 /ORDER=ANALYSIS. 
 
*Recoding speeds into appropriate ranges. 
STRING SPEEDRG (A10) 
RECODE 
 V1SPEED 
 (1 thru 40='<40') (41 thru 80='41-80') (81 thru 120='81-120') (120 thru 140='>120') INTO 
SPEEDRG1. 
VARIABLE LABELS SPEEDRG 'V1 speed range'. 
exe.  
 
*Age ranges. 
 
STRING AGERNG (A8) . 
RECODE 
  V1DRVAGE 
  (1 thru 14='< 15') (15 thru 18='15-18') (19 thru 22='19-22') (23 thru 30='23-30') 
 (31 thru 40='31-40')  (41 thru 50='41-50')  (51 thru 60='51-60')   
(61 thru 100='>60')  INTO AGERNG. 
VARIABLE LABELS AGERNG 'V1 driver age range'. 
EXECUTE . 
 
FREQUENCIES 
  VARIABLES=AGERNG 
  /BARCHART  PERCENT 
  /ORDER=  ANALYSIS . 
 
*Selecting inexperienced drivers. 
SELECT IF (AGERNG = '19-22'). 
exe. 
 
*V2 driver age more complex, 69 cases with no age (hence no V2) must be removed before 
analysis can be carried out. 
SELECT IF V2DRVAGE >= 1. 
exe. 
 
*Selecting cases with a driver nationality entered. 
SELECT IF (VALUE (V2DRVNAT) GT 0). 
exe. 
 
*Select cases with a DRVDAT specified. 
SELECT IF (VALUE (V1DRVDAT) GT 0). 
exe. 
 
*Select cases with adverse road conditions. 
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SELECT IF (RDPAVED = 2) OR (RDCLEAN = 2) OR (RDDRY = 2). 
exe. 
 
* Date and Time Wizard: calculating DRIVER EXPERIENCE in years V1DRVEXP. 
COMPUTE V1DRVEXP = DATEDIF(DATE, V1DRVDAT, "years"). 
VARIABLE LABEL V1DRVEXP "V1 driver experience in years, since licensing". 
VARIABLE LEVEL V1DRVEXP (SCALE). 
FORMATS V1DRVEXP (F5.0). 
VARIABLE WIDTH V1DRVEXP(5). 
EXECUTE. 
 
*Frequencies of above. 
FREQ 
 VARIABLES= V1DRVEXP 
/ORDER=ANALYSIS. 
 
*Selecting drivers with less than 4 years experience. 
SELECT IF (V1DRVEXP <=4). 
exe. 
 
DO IF (V1DRVEXP >= 10) . 
RECODE 
  V1DRVEXP  (10 thru Highest=10)  . 
END IF . 
EXECUTE . 
 
*Select cases with an entry for speeding. 
SELECT IF (VALUE (V1OVERSP) GT 0). 
exe. 
 
*Piechart of speeding cases. 
FREQUENCIES 
  VARIABLES= V1OVERSP 
  /PIECHART  FREQ 
  /ORDER=  ANALYSIS . 
 
*Select cases with a road speed limit recorded. 
SELECT IF (VALUE (RDSPDLMT) GT 0). 
exe. 
 
*Frequencies of crash mechanisms. 
FREQUENCIES 
  VARIABLES= CRASHMC1 CRASHMC2 CRASHMC3 
 /ORDER=ANALYSIS. 
 
*Frequencies of crash causes. 
FREQ 
 VARIABLES= CRASHCS1 CRASHCS2 CRASHCS3 CRASHCS4 
 /ORDER=ANALYSIS. 
 
*Frequencies of objects hit. 
FREQ 
 VARIABLES= HITOBJT1 HITOBJT2 HITOBJT3 
 /PIECHART FREQ 
/ORDER=ANALYSIS. 
 
*Frequencies for seat belt use for driver and first occupant. 
FREQ 
VARIABLES= STBLTDRV STBLTOCC1 
/ORDER=ANALYSIS. 
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*Frequencies for V1axles and damage of vehicles. 
FREQ 
VARIABLES= V1AXLES 
/BARCHART FREQ 
/ORDER=ANALYSIS. 
 
 
FREQ 
 VARIABLES= V1DAMAGE V2DAMAGE V3DAMAGE V4DAMAGE 
 /PIECHART FREQ 
/ORDER=ANALYSIS. 
 
*Frequencies for V1 occupant age. 
*Age requires recoding into ranges. 
 
FREQ  
VARIABLES= V1OCC1AG V1OCC2AG V1OCC3AG V1OCC4AG V1OCC5AG V1OCC6AG 
V1OCC7AG V1OCC8AG 
 /PIECHART FREQ 
/ORDER = ANALYSIS. 
 
STRING V1OCC3RG (A8) . 
RECODE 
  V1OCC3AG  
  (1 thru 14='< 15') (15 thru 18='15-18') (19 thru 22='19-22') (23 thru 30='23-30') 
 (31 thru 40='31-40')  (41 thru 50='41-50')  (51 thru 60='51-60')   
(61 thru 100='>60')  INTO V1OCC3RG. 
VARIABLE LABELS V1OCC3RG 'V1 Occupant 3 age range'. 
EXECUTE . 
 
*Then set missing values manually, before conducting frequency count. 
 
FREQUENCIES 
  VARIABLES= V1OCC3RG 
  /BARCHART  PERCENT 
  /ORDER=  ANALYSIS . 
 
*Analysing injury levels. 
FREQ 
VARIABLES= V1DRVINJ V2DRVINJ V3DRVINJ V4DRVINJ V5DRVINJ 
/PIECHART PERCENT 
/ORDER=ANALYSIS. 
 
FREQ  
VARIABLES= V1OCC2IN V1OCC3IN V1OCC4IN V1OCC5IN V1OCC6IN V1OCC7IN 
V1OCC8IN 
 V2OCC1INJ V2OCC2IN V2OCC3IN V2OCC4IN V2OCC5IN V2OCC6IN V2OCC7IN 
V2OCC8IN V2OCC9IN 
 V3OCC1IN V3OCC2IN 
/ORDER = ANALYSIS. 
 
*Selecting all fatal cases. 
SELECT IF (V1DRVINJ = 1) | (V2DRVINJ = 1) | (V3DRVINJ = 1) | (V4DRVINJ = 1) | 
(V5DRVINJ = 1) | 
(V1OCC1INJ = 1) | (V1OCC2IN = 1) | (V1OCC3IN = 1) | (V1OCC4IN = 1) | (V1OCC5IN = 1) 
| (V1OCC6IN = 1)  
| (V1OCC7IN = 1) | (V1OCC8IN = 1) | (V2OCC1INJ = 1) | (V2OCC2IN = 1) | (V2OCC3IN = 
1) | (V2OCC4IN = 1) 
| (V2OCC5IN = 1) | (V2OCC6IN = 1) | (V2OCC7IN = 1) | (V2OCC8IN = 1) | (V2OCC9IN = 1) 
| 
(V3OCC1IN = 1) | (V3OCC2IN = 1). 
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EXE. 
 
*Piecharts of useable data. 
FREQ 
VARIABLES= V1OCC2IN V2OCC1INJ 
/PIECHART PERCENT 
/ORDER=ANALYSIS. 
 
*Analysing vehicle, human and road factors. 
FREQ 
VARIABLES= VEHFACT1 VEHFACT2 VEHFACT3 
/ORDER=ANALYSIS. 
 
FREQ 
VARIABLES= HUMFACT1 HUMFACT2 HUMFACT3 HUMFACT4 HUMFACT5 
 /ORDER=ANALYSIS. 
 
FREQ 
VARIABLES= RDFACTR1 RDFACTR2 RDFACTR3 RDFACTR4 RDFACTR5 RDFACTR6 
RDFACTR7 RDFACTR8 
 /ORDER=ANALYSIS. 
 
 
 
*Analysing make and model of vehicles, by recoding intro trimmed variables of width 8. 
missing values V1MAKE V1MODEL V2MAKE V2MODEL V3MAKE V3MODEL V4MAKE 
V4MODEL (" "). 
STRING V2MK V2MOD V3MK V3MOD V4MK V4MOD V1MK V1MOD V1TRM (A8) . 
RECODE 
  V2MAKE V2MODEL V3MAKE V3MODEL V4MAKE V4MODEL V1MAKE V1MODEL 
V1TRIM 
  (ELSE=Copy)  INTO  V2MK  V2MOD  V3MK  V3MOD  V4MK  V4MOD  V1MK  V1MOD 
  V1TRM . 
VARIABLE LABELS V2MK 'V2 make short' /V2MOD 'V2 model short' /V3MK 'V3 make'+ 
 ' short' /V3MOD 'V3 model short' /V4MK 'V4 make short' /V4MOD 'V4 model short' 
  /V1MK 'V1 make short' /V1MOD 'V1 model short' /V1TRM 'V1 trim short'. 
EXECUTE . 
 
*Manually set missing values to new variables, then run freq. 
FREQ 
 VARIABLES=V1MK V1MOD V1TRM V2MK V2MOD V3MK V3MOD V4MK V4MOD 
/ORDER=ANALYSIS. 
 
*Checking total of fatals. 
FREQ 
 VARIABLES= FATALS 
/ORDER=ANALYSIS. 
 
*Selecting cases with vehicle factor = 2. 
SELECT IF ANY(NUMBER, 1,  2, 3, 9, 10, 12, 32, 33, 51, 55, 145, 174, 179, 228, 271). 
exe. 
 
*Make and model risk profiles. 
SELECT IF V1MODEL = "Landcruiser". 
exe. 
 
FREQ 
var= crashmc1 crashmc2 crashmc3 crashcs1 crashcs2 crashcs3 crashcs4 hitobjt1 hitobjt2 
hitobjt3 
/order=analysis. 
exe. 
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*Hit object further analysis. 
SELECT IF (HITOBJT1 = 6). 
exe. 
 
*HUMFACTR further analysis. 
SELECT IF (HUMFACT1 = 5) OR (HUMFACT2 = 5) OR (HUMFACT3 = 5) OR (HUMFACT4 
= 5). 
exe. 
 
*ROADFACTOR Further analysis. 
SELECT IF (RDFACTR1 = 3) OR (RDFACTR2 = 3) OR (RDFACTR3 = 3). 
exe. 
 
File 13: “selecting indepth from base cases.SPS” 
 
*Create a new file with all the 2006 indepth case ids, and give them a flag variable with 
value 1. 
compute flag=1.  
*(then Ctrl+G to run pending transforms). 
 
*Then aggregate data with 2006 base file, inserting variables from there. Those with no flag 
can be removed. 
 
match  
 
*Selecting those cases that appear in the indepth sample, from those in the base-level data. 
*Dataset number is the donor file of data. 
 
MATCH FILES /TABLE=* 
 /FILE='DataSet1' 
 /BY CASE_ID. 
EXECUTE. 
 
 
FILTER OFF. 
USE ALL. 
SELECT IF flag=1. 
exe. 
 
*Must rename CASERTA into CASE_ID, and sort cases in ascending order of CASE_ID, for 
Merge command 
to work from Transform Menu (merge variables). 
 
File 14: “analysis 6 corrections.SPS” 
*Weekend change analysis. 
 
* Date and Time Wizard: DATEYR to create a variable containing the YEAR called YEAR 
for all cases. 
COMPUTE YEAR = XDATE.YEAR(DATE). 
VARIABLE LABEL YEAR "Year". 
VARIABLE LEVEL YEAR (SCALE). 
FORMATS YEAR (F8.0). 
VARIABLE WIDTH YEAR(8). 
EXECUTE. 
 
 
FILTER OFF. 
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USE ALL. 
SELECT IF(YEAR = 2005). 
EXECUTE . 
 
* Date and Time Wizard: Create new variable called Month. 
COMPUTE Month = XDATE.MONTH(DATE). 
VARIABLE LABEL Month "Month". 
VARIABLE LEVEL Month (SCALE). 
FORMATS Month (F8.0). 
VARIABLE WIDTH Month(8). 
EXECUTE. 
 
*Alternatively, to select new weekend cases by dropping unselected cases. 
FILTER OFF. 
USE ALL. 
SELECT IF month >= 9. 
EXECUTE. 
 
*To produce the frequency of case by day of week. 
* Date and Time Wizard: dayofwk. 
COMPUTE dayofwk = XDATE.WKDAY(DATE). 
VARIABLE LABEL dayofwk "Day of week". 
VARIABLE LEVEL dayofwk (NOMINAL). 
FORMATS dayofwk (WKDAY3). 
VARIABLE WIDTH dayofwk(3). 
EXECUTE. 
 
FREQUENCIES 
  VARIABLES= dayofwk 
  /BARCHART  PERCENT 
  /ORDER=  ANALYSIS . 
 
 
NPAR TEST 
  /CHISQUARE=dayofwk 
  /EXPECTED=EQUAL 
  /MISSING ANALYSIS. 
 
CROSSTABS 
  /TABLES=CLASSINJ  BY SEXINJ 
  /FORMAT= AVALUE TABLES 
  /CELLS= COUNT 
  /COUNT ROUND CELL . 
 
CROSSTABS 
  /TABLES=CLASSINJ  BY NATINJ 
  /FORMAT= AVALUE TABLES 
  /CELLS= COUNT 
  /COUNT ROUND CELL . 
 
*analysis on in-depth cases. 
 
CROSSTABS 
  /TABLES=HOUR  BY DAY 
  /FORMAT= AVALUE TABLES 
  /CELLS= COUNT 
  /COUNT ROUND CELL . 
 
*Vehicle (accused) type against object hit. 
CROSSTABS 
  /TABLES=V1TYPE  BY HITOBJT1 
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  /FORMAT= AVALUE TABLES 
  /CELLS= COUNT 
  /COUNT ROUND CELL . 
 
*Barchart of vehicle 1 type vs 1st object hit. 
GRAPH 
  /BAR(STACK)=COUNT BY V1TYPE BY HITOBJT1 . 
 
*Selecting all pedestrian collisions. 
SELECT IF (CRSHTYPE1 = 2) OR (CRSHTYPE2 = 2) OR (CRSHTYPE3 = 2). 
EXE. 
 
*Pie chart of pedestrian crashes by first vehicle type. 
GRAPH 
  /PIE=COUNT BY V1TYPE . 
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